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I
n the wake of the market reforms sweeping the developing world, a consensus is emerg-
ing that these reforms have been only partially successful in sub-Saharan Africa. Although
market liberalization has resulted in signiﬁcant market efﬁciency gains, reform has failed
to enhance market development in terms of increased trader investment, increased market
volume and value added, and the emergence of mechanisms to transfer producer risk.
Ethiopia, like other liberalizing countries, faces the challenge of learning how to foster mar-
ket institutions that enhance private market development.
The Ethiopian government fully liberalized the grain market in March 1990, lifting all
restrictions on private inter-regional trade ﬂows, removing ofﬁcial pricing and quotas, and
eliminating the monopoly status of the marketing board. Despite reform, only 28 percent of
total cereals production reaches the market and only 18 percent passes through the marketing
chain, suggesting considerable scope for expanding the volume of the grain market. Private
sector trade is constrained by weak public market information; the lack of a transparent sys-
tem of grades and standards for grain; the use of verbal, nonstandardized contracts; and weak
legal enforcement of contracts. In response, private traders either exchange with partners they
know well or engage brokers who act as agents on their behalf.
Using a New Institutional Economics framework, this research report addresses a funda-
mental aspect of markets: how do buyers and sellers ﬁnd each other and coordinate the trans-
fer of goods? The report quantiﬁes the transaction costs related to search faced by traders in
Ethiopia and analyzes the role of brokers in minimizing these transaction costs. The trans-
action costs of market search are signiﬁcant in the Ethiopian grain market. Estimated as the
opportunity cost of labor time spent searching for a trading partner and the opportunity cost
of holding capital ﬁxed during that search, these costs represent one-ﬁfth of all marketing
costs. This research report demonstrates that traders minimize their transaction costs of
search by using brokers, who enable them to exchange with unknown partners. The report
also shows that at the level of the grain economy as a whole, brokers signiﬁcantly increase
the total economic welfare by enabling a more efﬁcient allocation of search effort by traders.
Thus, traders with relatively higher search efﬁciency and lower search costs choose to search
on their own, while traders with lower search efﬁciency and higher search costs choose to
use a broker.
There are important policy implications:
• The high search costs facing private traders must be reduced.
• Social capital among traders must be enhanced and expanded in order to increase mar-
ket volume.• The specialized function of brokers in
the market must be promoted to capital-
ize on the welfare gains of brokerage.
The ﬁndings of this research report are ap-
plicable to many developing countries in
which high transaction costs present a seri-
ous constraint to market performance and
governments are concerned with promoting
market institutions in order to foster market
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T
he Ethiopian government liberalized the grain market in March 1990, lifting all re-
strictions on private inter-regional trade, removing official pricing and quotas, and
eliminating the monopoly status of the marketing board. While market reform has
succeeded in reducing marketing margins and improving market integration, the market re-
mains “efﬁcient but poor” in that market development is relatively limited. Reform has not
led to contractual arrangements to transfer risk, increased impersonal exchange, value added
beyond transport, and trader investment. Despite reform, only 28 percent of total cereals pro-
duction reaches the market and only 18 percent passes through the marketing chain, sug-
gesting considerable scope for expanding the grain market, in terms of volume as well as
value added. Several studies have addressed the speed and extent of price transmission in the
postreform period in Ethiopia, but the role of market institutions in supporting exchange and
the importance of transaction costs and social capital have been given relatively little at-
tention. This report examines a fundamental aspect of market behavior: how do buyers and
sellers ﬁnd each other and coordinate the transfer of goods?
To date, little quantitative analysis has been undertaken on transaction costs and institu-
tions, partly because of the difﬁculty of measuring these costs. This study redresses this gap,
using primary data collected on wholesalers and brokers in 1996. Using the New Institutional
Economics framework, this study sets forth an empirical analysis of the transaction costs re-
lated to search faced by traders in Ethiopia, traders’microeconomic behavior in the market,
and the role of brokers who act as intermediaries on behalf of traders.
The analysis of microeconomic trader behavior reveals that Ethiopian grain wholesalers
are generally small-scale, personalized enterprises. Traders’arbitrage activity is mainly lim-
ited to transport, with an average transported distance of 200 kilometers. Traders are quite
competitive in that physical marketing costs related to transport, handling, and other mar-
keting activities represent 83 percent of gross margins, and traders’net margins are less than
5 percent of the sale price.
Weak public market information, the lack of grain standardization, the oral nature of con-
tracts, and limited legal enforcement of contracts increase the risk of commitment failure. In
response, traders either choose partners they know well or engage a broker. The presence of
brokers facilitates anonymous exchange between traders. However, while 85 percent of traders
use brokers regularly, they do so for only a quarter of their total transactions and 33 to 55 per-
cent of their long-distance transactions.
A closer investigation of the norms and rules underlying relations between brokers and
traders reveals that relationships are generally long-term, exclusive, and not based on ethnicties, with only 26 percent of traders of the
same ethnicity as their brokers. Brokers and
traders avoid conﬂict through such norms as
the specialization of brokers by region and a
ﬁxed ﬂat-rate fee, and by the fact that a large
number of traders in a given market use the
services of the same broker.
Traders are constrained by the oppor-
tunity costs of search labor and of holding
capital ﬁxed during search. Trader-speciﬁc
transaction costs of search labor time and 
of holding working capital during search
are estimated as shadow costs from traders’
proﬁt functions, using instrumental variable
estimation to avoid simultaneity bias. The
transaction costs of search are signiﬁcant,
representing 19 percent of total marketing and
transaction costs, and are higher in the deﬁcit
markets, possibly because of the greater risk
of commitment failure in purchasing grain of
unknown quality.
Social capital, measured by the network
of trading contacts available to each trader,
is important in enabling traders to ﬁnd trad-
ing partners more readily. Although traders
invest in contacts in distant markets as well
as in regular local trading partners, fewer
than one-third of trading networks are based
on a common ethnic identity.
Economic analysis is used to test whether
traders are individually rational in using bro-
kers to minimize their transaction costs of
search, based on a two-tiered choice of loca-
tion of trade and use of broker. Tobit esti-
mation conﬁrms traders’ rationality in that
the use of brokers is signiﬁcantly and posi-
tively related to both types of search costs
and inversely related to their social capital.
An optimal search intensity model is con-
structed to address whether the institution of
brokers increases global efﬁciency for the
market as a whole. The presence of brokers
partly internalizes the positive spillovers of
individual search behavior through strategic
interaction between the market participants,
who base their search decisions on conjec-
tures about other traders’ decisions to use a
broker. With brokers, traders with relatively
higher search efﬁciency and lower search
costs choose to search on their own while
traders with low search efﬁciency and high
search costs use a broker. Numerical estima-
tion of this model demonstrates that the
presence of brokers increases total welfare
by 60 percent. Traders with relatively high
search efﬁciency have small welfare losses,
while relatively inefﬁcient traders have large
welfare gains from using brokers.
This study demonstrates how, in the
context of Ethiopia’s weak marketing envi-
ronment, the brokerage institution minimizes
transaction costs and facilitates exchange.
However, it also reveals that this institution
plays a limited role in that traders continue
to rely on personalized trade for a signiﬁcant
share of their transactions, even in distant
markets.
Three areas for policy intervention
emerge from the study ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is
how to address the constraints in the mar-
keting environment that lead to high search
costs. The second is how to reduce the dom-
inance of personalized exchange, which
limits the scope of the market and contrib-
utes to a reduced capacity to respond effec-
tively to market signals. The third is how to
capitalize on the welfare gains of brokerage
by increasing the share of marketed grain
handled by brokers.
This research yields insights for other
countries. First, policymakers must directly
address search as a key market issue that
fundamentally inﬂuences market dynamics.
Second, transaction costs cannot be assumed
to be uniform across market participants.
Heterogeneity in individual transaction costs
leads to different behaviors and different
types of institutions in the market.
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Introduction
In fact, the costs of transacting are the key to the performance of economies. There have
always been gains from trade . . . but so too have there been obstacles to realizing these
gains. If transport costs were the only obstacle, then we would observe through history an
inverse relationship between transport costs, on the one hand, and trade and exchange and
the well-being of societies on the other.
—Douglass North, 1989
O
ver the past two decades, recognition of the critical role of markets in economic
development has prompted sweeping market reforms across a number of developing
countries.1 The Ethiopian grain economy underwent a dramatic market reform in
March 1990, when the government lifted, overnight, all restrictions on private trade, following
a period of 15 years in which the state had exercised tight control over prices and interregional
movements of grain (Lirenso 1993). The liberalization of the Ethiopian grain market spelled
the rejection of state-controlled channels, the return of private traders dispossessed of their
trade during the socialist regime, and the restoration of age-old trading relationships and
market networks (Dadi, Negassa, and Franzel 1992; Amha 1994; Gebremeskel, Jayne, and
Shaffer 1998).
In the postreform period, recent studies have pointed to continued market segmentation,
price volatility, and the lack of trader investment in Ethiopia (Kuawab Business Consultants
1994; Dercon 1995; Negassa and Jayne 1997). In spite of the large amount of literature on mar-
ket performance following market reforms in sub-Saharan Africa, relatively little attention
has been given to the role of market institutions in supporting exchange (Barrett 1997; Bryce-
son 1993; Fafchamps 1996b; Gebremeskel, Jayne, and Shaffer 1998).2 Even less has been
given to understanding how particular institutions effectively reduce transaction costs. Yet it
is increasingly recognized that the formulation of market-enhancing policy requires a clearer
understanding of transaction costs, institutional marketing arrangements, and microeconomic
trader behavior (Palaskas and Harriss-White 1993; Dercon 1995).
1 Market reform includes, but is not limited to, policies aimed at allowing private sector participation in exchange, remov-
ing government trading monopolies, lowering or eliminating tax or licensing restrictions, and eliminating ofﬁcial price
setting.
2 See Kherallah et al. (2000) for a synthesis of ﬁndings on market reform in Sub-Saharan Africa.To date, very little quantitative analysis
has been undertaken on transaction costs
and institutions, partly due to the difﬁculty
of measuring these costs. This study aims to
redress this gap through an empirical analy-
sis of the nature and extent of the transaction
costs faced by traders in Ethiopia, traders’
social capital and microeconomic behavior
in the market, and the role of the institution
of brokers as a means of minimizing trans-
action costs. Using primary data collected
on wholesalers and brokers in 1996, the
study analyzes the microeconomic behavior
of traders in terms of their operations and
arbitrage in the market. Using the New In-
stitutional Economics framework, it under-
takes an institutional analysis of the role and
functions of brokers and the norms govern-
ing the relations between traders and brokers.
The study also estimates traders’transaction
costs related to market search and traders’
social capital, and it econometrically tests
the individual rationality of traders’choices
to use brokers as a means of minimizing their
transaction costs. Finally, the study develops
a numerical model to be used to evaluate the
equilibrium effects of the brokerage institu-
tion on traders’search behavior and the dis-
tribution of welfare gains and losses from the
presence of brokers. This report presents a
comprehensive analysis of a key market insti-
tution in Ethiopia and the role of this institu-
tion in reducing transaction costs. The results
provide important policy insights on how to
facilitate market exchange and promote mar-
ket development in the wake of liberalization.
The Institution of Brokers 
in Ethiopia
Why Brokers Exist
Ethiopian grain traders face three major
constraints that increase their transaction
costs of participating in the grain market.
First, traders do not beneﬁt from a system
of grain standardization and inspection that
would enable them to place orders with long-
distance partners for guaranteed qualities
and quantities of grain. Instead they must be
physically present at the time of transaction
in order to visually inspect the grain that is
being exchanged. Second, grain traders have
very limited recourse to legal means for en-
forcing contracts. Thus, they trade only with
partners whom they know well and trust in
order to avoid the high costs of payment
delinquency or reneging on the terms of the
contract. Third, traders do not have access to
a public market information system that en-
ables them to know prices and ﬂows in mar-
kets outside of their own. This limits traders’
ability to deliver grain to unknown markets
or to set contracts to go into effect at a future
point in time, thus limiting their scope of
spatial or temporal arbitrage.
These market constraints result in high
transaction costs for partner search, infor-
mation, and enforcement for Ethiopian grain
traders. In order to reduce these costs, traders
engage the services of grain brokers, known
as delala, who act as intermediaries on their
behalf. The majority of Ethiopia’s grain
traders, 85 percent, regularly use these inter-
mediaries to conduct their long-distance
transactions. Brokers, operating as commis-
sion agents, provide the service of matching
regional buyers and sellers, as well as han-
dling and inspecting shipments of grain and
providing market information to their clients.
Brokers have a distinct identity in the market
because they do not take market positions
themselves, but only act on behalf of traders.
There are approximately 40 established bro-
kers in the central market of Addis Ababa,
compared to a total of 2,500 wholesalers in
the country. These brokers handle roughly
16 percent of the total marketed surplus. Due
to their central position, brokers are keenly
aware of prices and ﬂows in the market, and
their presence enables the Addis Ababa mar-




In addition to the well-known function of
brokers in organized commodity exchanges
and in housing and labor markets in indus-
2 CHAPTER 1trialized countries, there is evidence of bro-
kerage in agricultural markets across Africa,
as well as in Asia and Latin America. N. W.
Thomas (1908) reports historical evidence
of brokers throughout northeast Africa and,
to a lesser extent, central and western Africa.
Historically, brokers appear to have played a
major role in the food trade of the western
Sudan and are linked to the presence of Hausa
traders (Cohen 1969; Meillassoux 1971;
Jones 1972). Gilbert (1969) ﬁnds evidence
of brokers in nearly all studied food markets
in northern Nigeria, where brokers, known
as dillali, are generally of the dominant eth-
nic group. Hill (1966) documents the activ-
ities of “landlord-brokers” in food markets
in the Kumasi market of Ghana, where their
role is similar to that of logeursin Mali (Am-
selle 1969).
Writing of Asia, Lele (1971) describes
the role in the Indian foodgrain market of
commission agents, known as adatyain Ma-
hareshtra or dalal in Hindustani, who oper-
ate in a manner closely resembling that of
Ethiopian brokers. Scott (1985) documents
the existence in the Cañete Valley of Peru of
commission agents who facilitate exchange
between potato producers in the valley and
wholesalers in Lima.
Moreover, the same word, derived from
the Arabic dalaal,is used to describe brokers
in Ethiopia (delala), India (dalal), Nigeria
(dillali), and Somalia (dilal), possibly reveal-
ing that the practice of brokerage may have
originated in Muslim commercial practices.
Pankhurst (1961) documents reports by
Marco Polo of “merchants of all nations”
trading in 12th-century Ethiopia, while
Alvarez (1881) describes the inﬂuence of
foreign traders including “Moors, from
Giada [Jeddah], Morocco, Fez, Tunis, Turks,
Greeks, Moors from India, Ormuz, and
Cairo” actively trading in Ethiopia in the
13th century.3 Jackson (1978) also notes the
existence of Muslim-dominated trade routes
traversing premodern Ethiopia. The over-
whelming evidence of brokerage in agri-
cultural markets historically and across
countries suggests that this institution has
long existed throughout the world as a viable
mechanism of promoting trade in the pres-





According to the New Institutional Econom-
ics (NIE) approach, the unit of analysis is the
transaction rather than the price. Exchange
itself is costly. Transaction costs, which are
distinct from physical marketing costs such
as those for transport and storage, arise from
the coordination of exchange among market
actors. They include the costs of obtaining
and processing market information (Hayek
1945; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Hoff and
Stiglitz 1990), negotiating contracts (Coase
1937; Williamson 1985), monitoring agents
(Bardhan 1989; Cheung 1968; Eswaran and
Kotwal 1985), and enforcing contracts (North
1989; Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990;
Greif 1993; Fafchamps 1996b).
Transaction costs are unique to each
market participant, implying that economic
actors are not interchangeable. The presence
of transaction costs, which are speciﬁc to each
market actor, implies that there is no single
effective market price at which exchange
occurs (Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). Each
agent in the market conducts transactions on
the basis of his or her speciﬁc transaction
costs. The implications of transaction costs
are that markets are thin or fail if prohibi-
tively high costs prevent exchange.
Institutions to Facilitate Exchange
Institutions are deﬁned as the “rules of the
game,” both formal rules and informal con-
straints such as norms, conventions, and
codes of conduct that provide the structure
for human interaction (North 1990). Institu-
tions emerge to minimize these transaction
INTRODUCTION 3
3 Pankhurst (1961), p. 307.costs and to facilitate market exchange. The
evolution from personalized exchange to im-
personal or anonymous exchange, supported
by legal systems that enforce contracts, is
central to the process of growth and devel-
opment (North and Thomas 1973).
However, following Polanyi (1957), it is
widely recognized that market transactions,
particularly in developing countries, are often
embedded in long-term, personalized rela-
tionships (Geertz 1968; Meillassoux 1971;
Granovetter 1985; Plattner 1989; Palaskas
and Harriss-White 1993). Personalized ex-
change emerges in response to commitment
failure, in which the risk of breach of con-
tract or opportunism is high, resulting from
the lack of market information, inadequate
regulation, and the absence of legal enforce-
ment mechanisms. Institutions build trust and
promote reputation and social capital, such
as trade associations, solidarity networks,
and groups that enhance ethnic or religious
ties, emerge to circumvent commitment fail-
ure (Greif 1993; Fafchamps 1996a; Platteau
1994a).
Historically, institutions have emerged
in various contexts to facilitate anonymous
trade. Historical institutional analysis of pre-
modern trade in medieval Europe by Mil-
grom, North, and Weingast (1990) shows
that an institution known as the Law Mer-
chant enabled impersonal exchange to occur
in 12th- and 13th-century Champagne fairs.
The Law Merchant enabled trade through a
reputation mechanism that stored informa-
tion about traders’ past behavior and sanc-
tioned violators of the commercial code.
Greif (1993) views the Maghribi traders’
coalition formed in the 11th century as a
means of overcoming the commitment prob-
lem intrinsic to long-distance trade. Clay
(1993) shows that coalitions of long-distance
traders in 19th-century Mexican California
promoted honest exchange through informa-
tion sharing and punishing of cheaters. In
contrast, Platteau (1994a, 1994b) argues that
decentralized arrangements based on repu-
tation are not sufﬁcient to ensure honest
behavior and that private and public-order
institutions are necessary to create the social
conditions necessary for markets to operate.
Fafchamps and Minten (1999) demonstrate
that the dominant contract enforcement
mechanism in liberalized grain markets in
Madagascar is trust-based relationships,
where trust is established primarily by re-
peated interaction. The incidence of theft
and breach of contract is low, and recourse
to the legal system is rare.
Social Capital
Although social scientists have long recog-
nized the role of interpersonal relationships
in human interaction (Coleman 1988; Gra-
novetter 1985), the concept of social capital
has been little used in economics (Fafchamps
and Minten 1999; Barr 1997; Narayan and
Pritchett 1996). There are two possible mean-
ings of social capital. The ﬁrst deﬁnition sees
social capital as a “stock” of trust and an
emotional attachment to a group or society
that facilitates the provision of public goods
(Fukuyama 1995; Greif 1993; Coleman 1988;
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). The
second views social capital as an individual
asset that provides private beneﬁts a single
individual or ﬁrm (Granovetter 1985; Mont-
gomery 1991; Aoki 1984).
Despite the important strides made in the
institutional literature, several gaps remain.
First, relatively little institutional research
has addressed the role of intermediaries in
facilitating exchange between anonymous
partners. Second, very little attention has
been given to a critical transaction cost, the
cost of search. That is, little institutional
analysis has been undertaken on the process
by which economic agents ﬁnd each other
in the market. Third, very few empirical
studies have attempted to measure trans-
action costs quantitatively, partly due to the
difﬁculty of obtaining data on these types of
costs. Finally, this literature generally over-
looks the implications of the existence of
institutions for behavior in equilibrium.
Most institutional analyses assume that an
institution exists because it minimizes costs,
without examining the implications of the
4 CHAPTER 1presence of the institution for the welfare of
the economy.
Study Objectives and 
Policy Relevance
This study aims to empirically analyze how
the institution of brokerage minimizes the
transaction costs of search in the Ethiopian
grain market. The analysis is based on pri-
mary data collected in 1996 in a survey of
169 traders and brokers. The sample popula-
tion represents roughly 7 percent of the total
population of traders in the country during
that period. The speciﬁc objectives of this re-
port are to address several questions in order
to inform policy aimed at facilitating market
exchange and promoting market develop-
ment. These questions are as follows:
1. What is the microeconomic behavior of
traders in the market?
2. What is the nature and extent of transac-
tion costs faced by traders?
3. How important are transaction costs rela-
tive to physical marketing costs?
4. What functions do brokers play and how
does their presence facilitate impersonal
exchange?
5. Does the brokerage institution enable
traders to reduce their transaction costs?
6. Does the presence of brokers enhance
global economic welfare?
The empirical approach taken in this study
enables policy analysts to determine how
important institutions and transaction costs
are to traders’microeconomic behavior and
to global welfare. The interaction between
market institutions and transaction costs can
be used to infer the wider impact of policy
measures to reduce these costs. This is a crit-
ical ﬁrst step in understanding how existing
market institutions can be promoted or new
institutions be designed to improve market
performance.
Structure of This Report
Chapter 2 gives a general overview of the
grain economy, including the policy envi-
ronment. The chapter reviews secondary ev-
idence on the impact of market reform on
prices, marketing margins, and integration.
In addition, it presents background informa-
tion on grain production and demand, as well
as reviewing general features of the grain
market, such as seasonality, infrastructure,
and the marketing channels. Chapter 3 pres-
ents survey data on traders in terms of their
individual characteristics and their asset base,
as well as a proﬁle of trading businesses. The
chapter also explores the spatial pattern of
grain ﬂows in the survey year and traders’
marketing costs and arbitrage behavior. The
chapter serves mainly to provide a backdrop
for analysis of the brokerage institution and
of transaction costs. Based on original data,
Chapter 4 deﬁnes the role and functions of
brokers. The chapter addresses how brokers
reduce commitment failure and promote
market exchange. Chapter 5 undertakes a
focused institutional analysis of the norms
and rules governing agency relations between
traders and brokers. Chapter 6 presents the
nature and of traders’search costs and social
capital, and instrumental variable estimation
is used to derive traders’ individual trans-
action costs of search. Chapter 7 explores
traders’ sequential choice of brokerage to
minimize their transaction costs of search
using Tobit estimation. Chapter 8 addresses
whether brokerage enhances global efﬁciency
at the level of the marketing system. An
equilibrium model is constructed in which
traders choose an optimal level of search ef-
fort to maximize their revenues as a function
of their speciﬁc transaction costs of search
and their social capital. Finally, Chapter 9
considers implications for policy and further
research.
INTRODUCTION 5CHAPTER 2
The Ethiopian Grain Economy
T
his chapter reviews secondary evidence regarding the context of grain trade in
Ethiopia. The chapter provides background information on the policy environment and
the effect of market reform on market price levels, price spreads between markets, and
market integration. It also reviews the structure and location of production, as well as of
demand, including food security considerations. It then reviews market seasonality, infra-
structure, and the structure of the market, including the distribution of traded volumes
throughout the marketing channel. Thus, the chapter provides a synthesis of recent research
ﬁndings on the situation and structure of grain markets in Ethiopia.
The Policy Environment
Between 1976 and 1990 a government-owned enterprise, the Agricultural Marketing Corpo-
ration (AMC), strictly controlled grain trade. The AMC administered a highly distorted trade
regime in which official prices were set below producer costs. Under the official pricing
system, the magnitude of producers’ losses varied from 24 percent for wheat to 52 percent
for teff (Amha 1994).4 Marketing policy in this period included the administration of a
compulsory delivery system with ﬁxed quotas for all producers. Each farmer was forced to
supply a ﬁxed quota of grain for the purpose of feeding the army and certain urban areas. In
addition, inter-regional movement of grain by the private sector was severely restricted
(Lirenso 1993). Private sector trade was banned entirely in the major grain-producing areas
of Gojjam and Arsi, while other regions required that traders supply 50 to 100 percent of their
grain turnover to the AMC at below-market prices (Dercon 1995). In urban areas the AMC
operated food ration shops for consumers, which further distorted the grain market.
In response to external pressures, a radical and abrupt market reform was enacted liter-
ally overnight in 1990, taking the government parastatal as well as private traders by surprise
(Fisseha 1994). The following excerpt from the proclamation of March 1990 reveals the
extent of the reform: “In the trade sector of the economy, private entrepreneurs will be able
to compete with state-run trade enterprises in agriculture or industrial commodities as well
as in import-export trade. In the area of trade in grain products in particular, trade exchange
4 Teff, or Eragrot teff, is a grain indigenous to Ethiopia and the primary staple used in the production of injera, a widely
consumed ﬂat bread.will henceforth be conducted on the basis of
free market pricing while the grain control
situation and the quota system will cease.
The Agricultural Marketing Corporation
(AMC) will enter the free market and oper-
ate as a state trade organization.” The reform
of 1990 resulted in the restoration of private
trade and the transformation of the para-
statal, renamed the Ethiopian Grain Trade
Enterprise, into a buffer stock scheme. The
modern warehouses built by the AMC in
the monopoly period, numbering 2,200 and
with a total storage capacity in excess of
1 million tons, were made available for rental
to private entities and relief agencies, al-
though their utilization was only 50 percent
in 1992 (Lirenso 1993).
The Impact of Market Reform
The market reform experienced in Ethiopia
in the period since 1990 is considered a
relatively consistent and internally driven
process, generally approved by the interna-
tional donor community (Jayne, Negassa, and
Myers 1998). Therefore, the Ethiopian case
presents an interesting opportunity to test
the hypothesis that market reform would
lead to reduced costs and risks of marketing
and would stimulate production. Recent
studies have evaluated the impact of reform
on the price levels and marketing spreads,




Arecent study by Jayne, Negassa, and Myers
(1998) evaluates the impact of reform on
inﬂation-adjusted grain prices and price
spreads among major markets. Using monthly
price data on eight markets over nine years
(1987 to 1996), the results reveal that aver-
age real prices of maize and teff increased
after reform for the surplus markets and de-
clined for the deﬁcit markets. Thus, prices
in the surplus areas increased in all cases by
16 percent to 46 percent, while prices in
deﬁcit areas decreased in four out of six cases
by 15 percent to 120 percent. Price variabil-
ity declined after reform, with the coefﬁcient
of variation of monthly prices declining in
8 out of 12 cases (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1 Monthly real prices before and after market reform (Eth. Birr per bag)
Before reform After reform Change
CV CV CV
Mean SD (percent) Mean SD (percent) Mean SD (percent)
Maize
Surplus market
Bako 56.81 22.78 40 82.95 31.71 38 26.14 8.93 −2
Shashamane 64.45 27.89 28 91.65 23.31 25 27.20 −3.49 −3
Jimma 76.27 34.10 45 88.68 28.99 33 12.41 −5.11 −12
Deﬁcit market
Addis Ababa 96.15 12.41 13 108.50 25.21 23 12.35 12.80 10
Dire Dawa 117.76 25.58 22 150.00 23.31 20 32.24 −2.27 −2
Mekele 196.28 54.11 28 146.72 31.71 12 −49.56 −35.94 −16
White teff
Surplus market
Bako 134.82 20.22 15 168.50 26.91 16 33.68 6.69 1
Hosaenna 149.61 20.24 14 184.27 25.47 14 34.66 5.23 0
Bahir Dar 158.65 15.56 10 199.68 29.12 15 41.03 13.56 5
Deﬁcit market
Addis Ababa 256.90 23.21 9 236.26 19.95 8 −20.64 −3.26 −1
Dire Dawa 301.41 33.26 11 285.95 23.77 8 −15.46 −9.49 −2
Mekele 389.99 48.64 12 269.95 14.49 5 −120.04 −34.15 −7
Source: Jayne, Negassa, and Myers 1998.Although favorable weather can partially
explain shifts in price levels, it cannot explain
the simultaneous increase in prices in surplus
areas and the decrease in prices in deﬁcit
areas. These suggest that market reform has
led to a reduction in price spreads (the dif-
ference in prices between surplus and deﬁcit
areas). Indeed, in 17 of 19 cases viewed by
Jayne, Negassa, and Myers, price spreads
declined after reform. The decline in spreads
was particularly large for teff, on which the
former AMC exercised the greatest restric-
tions. Reasons suggested for the decline in
marketing spreads include (1) lower trans-
action costs resulting from the elimination
of smuggling and bribery (Franzel, Colburn,
and Degu 1989); (2) the peace dividend of
the end of civil war and disrupted trade in the
northern regions (Dercon 1995); (3) beneﬁts
of not forcing traders to sell at below-market
prices, which bid down producer prices and
bid up consumer prices; and (4) less uncer-
tainty related to the commercial activities of
the former monopoly. Econometric analysis
conducted holding rainfall, seasonality, and
other exogenous factors constant reveals that
the decline in price spreads was associated
with liberalization in 16 out 19 cases and was
statistically signiﬁcant in 10 cases (Negassa
and Jayne 1997).
However, although mean price spreads
declined after reform, the coefﬁcient of vari-
ation of price spreads increased in 15 out of
19 cases, suggesting that the mean levels
declined more than the decline in the volatil-
ity of price spreads (Table 2.2).
Market Integration
The extent to which price changes in one
market are associated with price changes in
other markets is known as market integra-
tion. Using simple correlation coefﬁcients
between wholesale prices across markets,
Negassa and Jayne (1997) found that changes
in wholesale prices were transmitted more
rapidly and more fully after liberalization for
17 out of 24 market pairs observed. A fol-
low-up study of vertical integration of prices
from producer to retail levels and spatial in-
tegration across markets reveals that after
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Table 2.2 Monthly marketing spreads before and after market reform (Eth. Birr per bag)
Before reform After reform Change
Market pair Mean SD CV Mean SD CV Mean SD CV
Maize
Addis Ababa–Bako 39.34 19.79 50 25.55 15.25 60 −13.79 −4.54 10
Addis Ababa–Dire Dawa 21.61 15.97 74 41.50 21.10 51 19.89 5.13 −23
Addis Ababa–Jimma 19.87 28.64 146 19.82 14.10 71 −0.05 −14.54 −75
Addis Ababa–Mekele 98.57 51.98 53 41.67 22.69 54 −56.90 −29.29 1
Addis Ababa–Shashamene 31.69 15.71 60 16.85 11.85 70 −14.84 −3.86 20
Mekele–Bako 149.50 52.00 35 63.22 30.12 48 −86.28 −21.88 13
Mekele–Jimma 132.08 51.87 39 56.26 26.65 47 −75.82 −25.22 8
Mekele–Shashamene 130.74 46.50 36 55.42 20.20 36 −75.32 −26.30 0
White teff
Addis Ababa–Bako 122.08 29.32 24 67.76 21.36 32 −54.32 −7.96 8
Addis Ababa–Bahir Dar 98.25 21.76 22 34.64 21.54 62 −63.61 −0.22 40
Addis Ababa–Dire Dawa 44.51 22.21 50 49.69 18.12 36 5.18 −4.09 −14
Addis Ababa–Hosaenna 111.04 29.53 27 51.98 18.59 36 −59.06 −10.94 9
Addis Ababa–Mekele 115.81 45.28 39 36.49 21.22 58 −79.32 −24.06 19
Dire Dawa–Bako 142.75 32.69 23 83.61 28.15 34 −59.14 −4.54 11
Dire Dawa–Bahir Dar 157.37 35.13 22 101.67 26.39 26 −55.70 −8.74 4
Mekele–Bako 259.38 44.53 17 103.22 33.62 33 −156.16 −10.91 16
Mekele–Bahir Dar 224.23 45.29 20 66.46 31.15 47 −157.77 −14.14 27
Mekele–Hosaenna 239.00 44.04 18 86.81 28.12 32 −152.19 −15.92 14
Source: Jayne, Negassa, and Myers 1998.reform grain markets showed a high degree
of integration (Negassa 1998).
Cointegration analysis was undertaken
by Dercon (1995) using six years of deﬂated
monthly teff prices for 11 markets to test for
the effect of liberalization on short-term
and long-term integration. Using the price in
Addis Ababa as the reference price, the test
results show that an increased number of
markets became linked in the short run to
the Addis Ababa market after liberalization
(Table 2.3). The cointegrating regression
also suggested that reforms resulted in re-




Grain production in Ethiopia is almost en-
tirely based on rain-fed agriculture and is
characterized by a dominant harvest (meher)
in November and December and a secondary
harvest (belg) in April and May. Production
is carried out by small-scale farmers with lim-
ited agricultural technology and low yields
and by a small percentage of state farms.
According to the Central Statistical Au-
thority’s  meher and  belg production esti-
mates, in 1995/96, which was a relatively
good crop year, annual production of grain,
including cereals, pulses, and oilseeds, was
9.4 million tons, 98.4 percent of which was
produced by smallholders and 1.6 percent
by state farms. Of the total produced quan-
tity, the proportion of output marketed by
farmers and state farms was 27 percent and
80 percent, respectively (Gebremeskel, Jayne,
and Shaffer 1998). As shown in Table 2.4, the
proportion of total production that is mar-
keted, that is the extent the crop resembles a
“cash crop,” varies between crops. Thus, a
considerably lower proportion of total pro-
duction of cereals that is marketed (26 per-
cent), compared to pulses (37 percent) and
oilseeds (71 percent). At the same time, be-
cause cereals production is the bulk of total
grain production, the total marketed quantity
of cereals represents 81 percent of the total
marketed quantity of grains. Among the
cereals, maize has the highest share of total
marketed surplus (25 percent), followed by
teff (21 percent), and wheat (14 percent).
Surplus Production and 
Deﬁcit Areas
Both grain-surplus areas and the grain-
deﬁcit centers in Ethiopia are geographically
dispersed (Figure 2.1). The production of
teff is concentrated in Gojjam (55 percent),
Shewa (28 percent), and Wollega (4 per-
cent). Wheat is produced in Arsi (63 percent)
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Table 2.3 Short-run integration of markets after reform (f-test results)
Addis Prereform Reform Postreform
Ababa to: (7/87–2/90) (3/90–5/91) (5/91–7/93)
Wolliso 3.07* 1.04 0.34
Debre Zeit 1.84 1.61 0.90
Nazareth 1.85 1.35 3.14*
Ambo 2.76* 1.33 1.06
Dire Dawa 2.78* 0.94 2.75*
Kombolcha 2.98* 1.89– 2.22–
Hosaenna 2.72* 3.32** 1.43
Shashamene 1.64 1.21 0.41
Ziway 2.92* 1.88– 1.70
Source: Dercon 1995.
Notes: – = Short-term integration rejected at 10 percent level; * = integration rejected at 5
percent level; ** = integration rejected at 1 percent level.
Table 2.4 Production and marketable surplus of grains, 1995/96
Total
Annual marketed Percent
production Percent quantity total
Type (millions production (millions marketed
of grain of tons) marketed of tons) quantity
Cereals 8.3 26 2.16 81
Teff 1.9 24 0.45 21
Wheat 1.2 25 0.30 14
Barley 0.7 31 0.22 10
Maize 2.2 25 0.54 25
Sorghum 2.0 12 0.24 11
Pulses 0.8 37 0.31 12
Oilseeds 0.2 71 0.13 5
Other 0.1 52 0.05 2
Total 9.4 28 2.64 100
Source: Calculated from ﬁgures found in Central Statistical Authority 1995 and Gebre-
meskel, Jayne, and Shaffer 1998.and Shewa (25 percent). Maize is produced
in Shewa (45 percent), Wollega (34 percent),
and Gojjam (15 percent).5 In terms of de-
mand, Kuawab (1994) estimates that the
major deﬁcit areas are concentrated in Addis
Ababa, where demand is 32 percent of total
marketable surplus, Hararghe (18 percent),
Sidamo (7 percent), Wollo (6 percent), and
Tigray (4 percent). The dispersion of surplus
and deﬁcit areas gives rise to signiﬁcant inter-
regional ﬂows of grain, as the next chapter
explores.
Seasonality in Production 
and Marketing
There is an important seasonal pattern to
the production and marketing of cereals in
Ethiopia. Due to the rain-fed nature of agri-
culture, the grain market depends primarily
on the major harvest season, the meher,which
occurs from November through December.
In this period there is a ﬂurry of buying on
the part of traders, and prices are at their
lowest given the large supply that ﬂoods the
market as farmers seek to sell in order to meet
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Figure 2.1 Administrative regions and zones of Ethiopia
Source: United Nations Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, March 2000 (http://www.sas.epenn,edu/African_Studies/EUE/M_eue.html).
Note: All boundaries are approximate and unofﬁcial.
5 Kuawab Business Consultants (1994); Lirenso (1993). These statistics are based on 1979–1988 time series by the Cen-
tral Statistical Authority. Provincial boundaries were redrawn by the Transitional Government in 1992. Gojjam is now
separated into Eastern and Western Gojjam in Amhara region; Shewa is separated into two Northern Shewa zones (in
Oromiya and Amhara regions) as well as an Eastern and Western Shewa in Oromiya region; and Arsi zone is located in
Oromiya region. Wollo is separated into North and South Wollo zones, both in Amhara region. Hararghe is separated
into East and West Hararghe zones, both in Oromiya, while the main urban centers, Harar and Dire Dawa, are consid-
ered a separate region. Sidamo is located in Oromiya region.cash obligations related to loan and tax pay-
ments, weddings, and food purchases. Thus,
79 percent of the annual sales of farmers occur
in the period between January and March
(Gebremeskel, Jayne, and Shaffer 1998).
Analogously, the main grain-purchasing
period for traders is between January and
March, during which traders purchase 51
percent of their annual volume. The differ-
ence between volumes sold by farmers and
those purchased by traders is due to the fact
that farmers sell part of their output directly
to consumers.
Gebremeskel, Jayne, and Shaffer (1998)
report that traders do not provide advance
payment, credit, or other price incentives to
lock farmers into contracts. Thus, 97 percent
of producers indicated that they did not re-
ceive preharvest price offers, and fewer
than 5 percent of farmers received credit
from traders. These results suggest that both
forward contracts and interlinked contracts
are virtually nonexistent in Ethiopia. This
implies that farmers bear the full price risk
in marketing their output, without informal
mechanisms to lock in prices and without the
ﬁnancial means to withhold sales to mitigate
the fall in prices at harvest.
In normal production years prices exhibit
a typical seasonal pattern in which, as the new
harvest starts to come to the market, prices
decline from September, reaching a trough
in the period from January to April, when
the market is ﬂooded. Although negatively
affected by the supplies from the second har-
vest in April, prices rise in May through Au-
gust with the approach of the rainy season.
As seen in Figure 2.2, this seasonal pattern is
similar for most grains with the exception of
wheat, the price of which is inﬂuenced by
food aid deliveries at different times through-
out the year.
Grain Demand and Food Security
The most important grains in terms of con-
sumption are teff, wheat, and maize, which
together constitute roughly two-thirds of
caloric intake in Ethiopia (Lirenso 1993). In
urban areas, expenditure on grains consti-
tutes 21 percent of total expenditures (Bere-
ket, Jayne, and Tadesse 1996). Lirenso (1993)
estimates that the grain market—dependent
population, that is the population depending
on the market for all or part of its food sup-
ply, was roughly 42 percent of the total pop-
ulation, or 23 million people, in 1992. This
figure is for the urban population (15 per-
cent of the total population), the nomadic
population (12 percent), and grain-deﬁcit
farm households (14 percent).
As seen in Table 2.5, the monthly grain
requirements of major urban centers reveals
the overwhelming dominance of the Addis
Ababa central market, partly explaining why
the bulk of surplus grain from around the
country ﬂows to this market.
In food security terms, it is generally be-
lieved that Ethiopia’s total production of
grain is not adequate to meet demand, with
national production meeting only 65 percent
of per capita requirements and a grain deﬁcit
of up to 1 million tons in 1994 (Natural Re-
sources Institute 1994). Recent studies, how-
ever, indicate otherwise. Results of a major
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Figure 2.2 Seasonality in grain prices
Source: Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise 1996.
Notes: Prices given are monthly averages of three weekly observations for the dominant
varieties of each type of grain. Eth. Birr 6.35 = US$1 in 1996.household survey in 1995/96 reveal that some
5 million households, representing 57 per-
cent of total households, are food secure. The
remaining 43 percent are food deﬁcit, with a
total food gap of 1.4 million metric tons,
which is exacerbated by incorrect targeting
of food aid (Clay, Molla, and Habtewold
1998).6According to Clay, Molla, and Habte-
wold (1998), sufﬁcient food is available, be-
fore food aid imports, to meet the nutritional
needs of the entire population. The study in-
dicates that the geographical dispersion of
production and the unevenness of trade re-
sult in food-secure households’ consuming
nearly four times more food on average than
food-deﬁcit households (with a Gini ratio of
food availability of 0.44) and a large segment
of the population, the food-deﬁcit popula-
tion, lacking access to minimum levels of
nutrition. These ﬁndings emphasize the im-
portance of market distribution in the Ethio-
pian context and the critical role that markets
play in food security.
Market Infrastructure
Transport
Ethiopian transport is composed of road and
rail transport. The roads in Ethiopia are built
in a radial conﬁguration, with the capital city,
Addis Ababa, at the center. This radial struc-
ture implies that regional markets cannot
trade directly with each other without phys-
ically passing through the capital city. So the
central market of Addis Ababa has a natural
advantage as a national clearinghouse for
grain, with sellers bringing grain to the cap-
ital and buyers coming to that city to acquire
grain. The geographical advantage enjoyed
by Addis Ababa at the center of the radial
structure of roads is an important feature of
the structure of the Ethiopian market, just as,
in the United States, the location of Chicago
at the conﬂuence of the Illinois River, Lake
Michigan, and the continental railroad sys-
tem played a large part in determining its role
as the gateway between the eastern market of
New York and the grain-producing Ameri-
can Midwest in the late 19th century.7
Road transport in Ethiopia is character-
ized by high operating costs, a shortage of
total truck capacity to meet peak demand,
low capacity utilization and load factors, lack
of private sector competition, and the domi-
nance of the parastatal Ethiopian Freight
Transport Corporation, in addition to poor
roads (International Fertilizer Development
Centre 1993). Over 80 percent of the rural
population has no access to modern trans-
port, while only half of grain markets in
major production zones are served by all-
weather roads (Lirenso 1993). The majority
of traders do not own means of transport;
they rely on rented trucks, for which markets
are incomplete and linked to the transport
of manufactured goods and fertilizer, which
constitute the backhaul cargo (International
Fertilizer Development Centre 1993). Liber-
alization of the road freight sector has in-
creased private sector participation to the
extent that in 1993 private ﬂeets constituted
up to 81 percent and 38 percent of short-haul
and long-haul trucks, respectively. In the
area of rail transport, a single axis links the
neighboring port of Djibouti with Addis
Ababa. With the exception of trade into Dire
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Table 2.5 Monthly grain requirements of major urban centers, 1992
Estimated monthly requirement
Urban center Population (thousands of tons)
Addis Ababa 2,111,500 26.4






6 The food gap is deﬁned as the difference between food available and food need, which is 1,680 kilocalories per person
per day.
7 Cronon (1991) provides a fascinating account of the rise of the Chicago market in the late 19th century as a function of
Chicago’s geographic advantage, technological advantage (due to the rail and telegraph systems and grain elevators),
and institutional advantage (due to the existence of the Board of Trade and established commission merchants).Dawa, rail transport is not an important means
of moving grain in Ethiopia.
Storage
Farm-level storage is carried out by means of
primarily traditional basket granaries, while
traders generally store grain in warehouses
with an average capacity of 100 tons with
poor ventilation and dirt ﬂoors (Dadi, Ne-
gassa, and Franzel 1992). Of the total grain
production, some 72 percent is retained for
on-farm uses (Gebremeskel, Jayne, and
Shaffer 1998). However, weak storage infra-
structure leads to potentially high storage
losses, with crop vulnerability to damage
from weevils, termites, rodents, birds, and
moisture. Similarly, although storage ca-
pacity has increased since the enactment of
market reforms, roughly two-thirds of traders
indicate that their storage facilities are still
inadequate in terms of availability, capacity,
and location, with 19 percent of traders re-
porting in 1998 that they were unable to
obtain rented storage space (Gebremeskel,
Jayne, and Shaffer 1998). This inadequacy
of storage, combined with the vulnerability
of crops to damage, makes traders unwilling
to store stocks beyond the minimum turn-
over period. Modern storage facilities exist
in various parts of the country as a legacy of
the state-controlled grain-marketing system
that was in place prior to reform. There are
2,200 modern warehouses that were used dur-
ing this period to extract quotas from pro-
ducers at the ﬁxed prices. These warehouses
are located around the countryside, with a
capacity of 1 million tons. Since market re-
form, private traders have access to rented
space in these warehouses. However, in 1992
less than one-half of the total capacity was
used by private traders (Lirenso 1993).
Information
Access to market information is extremely
limited in the Ethiopian grain market. At the
producer level, farmers have very little infor-
mation on prices prevailing even in nearby
markets (Amha 1994; Dadi, Negassa, and
Franzel 1992). Farmers have indicated that
their primary source of market information
is the marketplace itself, as well as conver-
sations with neighbors and traders (Grain
Market Research Project 1996).
Similarly, grain traders rely on contact
with brokers and transporters to obtain mar-
ket information regarding prices in the Addis
Ababa market (Kuawab Business Consul-
tants 1994). Generally traders appear to have
very little or no information on imports and
food aid shipments, resulting in considerable
uncertainty in wheat and maize marketing.
Moreover, information on supply, demand,
and prices in the central market is unevenly
distributed, with only 50 percent of traders
indicating that they have access to this infor-
mation (Gebremeskel, Jayne, and Shaffer
1998). In recent years, efforts have been
made by the government to establish a mar-
ket information system.
Grades and Standards
Finally, grain grading and standardization are
limited to visual inspection, at the time of
transaction, of the color of the grain, as well
as the amount of foreign matter, pest dam-
age, and kernel breakage. Grain is classiﬁed
on the basis of this quality check and its
place of origin. Lack of grain standardization
results in prices that are difﬁcult to compare
(Dadi, Negassa, and Franzel 1992). The lack
of grades and standards is a key factors in
the market behavior of traders, subsequent
chapters show.
Market Structure
A study of several African markets after
reform notes that marketing chains remain
relatively short, which is also true of the
Ethiopian grain market (Food Studies Group
1992). This is primarily due to the low level
of commercial grain processing and the lack
of specialization of grain wholesalers, who
are often engaged in retail and other types of
trade as well. Lirenso (1993) notes that in
Ethiopia the marketing chain became more
complex after market deregulation, with the
selling outlets for farmers increasing three-
fold, to six outlets, and the supply sources for
THE ETHIOPIAN GRAIN ECONOMY 13urban consumers increasing twofold, to four
sources. The Ethiopian grain market is struc-
tured so that grain moves from producers 
to rural assemblers, then to regional whole-
salers (sellers), then on through central mar-
ket brokers to regional wholesalers (buyers),
then to retailers, and ﬁnally to consumers.
Producers
Small-scale farmers produce 95 percent of
Ethiopian grain (Kuawab Business Consul-
tants 1994). Grain reaches the market from
the farm in four principal ways: by means
of direct sales to rural and urban consumers,
direct sales to rural assemblers, direct sales
to retailers, and direct sales to either regional
wholesalers or mills (Gebremeskel, Jayne,
and Shaffer, 1998). Farmers transport grain
to the nearest regional market themselves,
either carrying sacks themselves or using
donkeys over relatively short distances of
up to 20 kilometers, and they sell directly 
to wholesalers (Lirenso 1993). Farmers also
sell small quantities of grain to rural assem-
blers known as “farmer-traders,” larger-
scale farmers who assemble grain from a
large number of farmers and transport it to
the regional market using horse-driven carts.
The role of farmer-traders is widely preva-
lent and resembles the role of village collec-
tors in peasant markets of rural Indonesia
(Hayami and Kawagoe 1993). Farmers also
sell grain directly to retailers in regional
market towns. Finally, farmers sell directly
to wholesalers in the regional market or sell
to regional traders who move from village to
village, purchasing grain until their trucks
are ﬁlled.
Rural Assemblers
Assemblers, mainly farmer-traders, buy grain
from farmers in rural markets for the purpose
of reselling it to consumers or regional
wholesalers. Although they typically operate
independently, they may also act as agents
for wholesalers on a ﬁxed-fee or commis-
sion basis (Gebremeskel, Jayne, and Shaffer,
1998).
Regional Wholesalers (Sellers)
At the level of the regional market, whole-
salers purchase grain either from farmers or
from rural assemblers. They resack the grain
and store it for up to 46 days on average.
They have four major market outlets; they
may sell it in the Addis Ababa central mar-
ket or in another terminal market through
the services of a broker, they may sell it to
nearby mills (for wheat), to retailers, or di-
rectly to local consumers and restaurants.
Central Market Brokers
Grain brokers are typically located in Addis
Ababa, although new market hubs are emerg-
ing in Nazareth. Brokers acknowledge receipt
of the grain from the regional wholesalers,
inspect its quality, determine its market-
clearing price, and proceed to sell it on be-
half of their clients. Brokers may identify as
buyers other traders, ﬂour mills, hotels or
restaurants, government agencies, or non-
governmental organizations.
Typically a grain broker representing a
seller will interact with a grain broker repre-
senting a buyer. If no buyer is found, the
grain remains on the truck for up to two days,
after which it is off-loaded into the broker’s
warehouse. The seller bears the off-loading
costs as well as additional storage costs
charged by the broker. These costs are ex-
tremely high compared to the broker’s com-
mission fee. Although the broker’s fee varies
between Eth. Birr 1.00 and Eth. Birr 1.50 per
sack, storage costs are Eth. Birr 2.00 per sack
for 1 to 30 days and Eth. Birr 2.00 per month
thereafter. Due to these high costs, it is only
rarely that a shipment is not sold from the
seller’s truck.
Regional Wholesalers (Buyers)
In deﬁcit areas regional wholesalers, through
the services of a broker, purchase grain from
regional sellers. Typically the buyer pays for
resacking the grain and loading it onto the
buyer’s truck. Once the grain arrives in the
regional wholesaler’s market, there are sev-
eral market outlets. The grain may be sold in
14 CHAPTER 2large quantities to local relief agencies, in
smaller quantities to retailers or hotels, or in
very small quantities directly to consumers.
Retailers
In the regional markets located in deﬁcit areas
or urban centers, retailers purchase grain in
semiwholesale quantities (less than 1 ton)
from the regional wholesalers. They can also
purchase directly from farmers, from mills,
or from the central market using the services
of brokers.
Consumers
As noted earlier, since reform consumers
have had a number of supply sources. They
can purchase grain directly from farmers,
from assemblers, from regional traders, from
processors (mills), or from retailers.
The Relative Importance of
Market Outlets
The marketing chain just described and the
relative importance of the different market
outlets is presented in Figure 2.3. At the
farmgate level, the volume of direct sales to
consumers is surprisingly high, 31 percent
of total sales, while sales to rural assemblers
play a minor role, comprising only 12 per-
cent of sales. The most important pattern is
seen in sales by farmers directly to regional
traders, which make up 36 percent of pro-
ducers’ sales. The bulk of sales by rural as-
semblers (76 percent) are to the regional
traders. Overall, regional traders handle 45
percent of the total domestic marketed sur-
plus, or 1.2 million tons. In turn, most of the
sales by the regional traders (nearly 70 per-
cent) are made in the terminal markets, either
through the services of brokers or directly to
regional wholesalers, constituting of roughly
800,000 tons. Either regional traders or bro-
kers in the terminal markets sell grain (mainly
wheat) to processors, their sales constituting
40 percent of the total marketed quantity of
wheat, or some 120,000 tons. Of the 54 per-
cent of the total marketable surplus that is
passed through retailers, the largest share is
procured from wholesalers (740,000 tons),
followed by that purchased directly from
farmers (520,000 tons). Finally, as expected,
consumers purchase a large share of their
total grain from retailers, 55 percent or 1.43
million tons. However, a surprisingly large
share of purchases, 31 percent, are made
directly from producers. This conﬁrms the
relatively unsophisticated nature of the mar-
ket and shows that most of the transfor-
mation of unprocessed grains is undertaken
by consumers themselves. In particular, it is
surprising that processors have not acquired
a more signiﬁcant role in the market in the
wake of market reforms. Recent studies re-
veal that one of the dramatic effects of mar-
ket reforms in eastern and southern Africa is
the emergence of small-scale maize mills that
have signiﬁcantly reduced consumer prices
(Jayne et al. 1999).
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Figure 2.3 Market structure and ﬂows, 1995/96
Source: Calculated from Gebremeskel, Jayne, and Shaffer 1998.Issues Related to the
Marketing Chain
When viewing the marketing chain from pro-
ducer to consumer, several important points
emerge. First, relatively little, if any, trans-
formation of grain takes place along the
marketing chain. With the exception of
wheat, which can be sold in the form of ﬂour,
the bulk of Ethiopian grain is sold in an un-
processed form. For this reason, consumers
may not care whether they buy grain from
producers or from retailers, and may even
prefer to buy from producers to reduce their
costs. This suggests that, beyond transport
and limited storage, relatively few market
services are provided by intermediaries, in-
dicating a relatively unsophisticated market
structure.
Second, it is common practice for the
sack in which the grain is transported to be
changed at every transfer of ownership within
the marketing chain. From the farmgate to
the consumer, there can be up to ﬁve resack-
ings. Each change of sack entails handling
and sewing costs, in addition to the cost of
the sack itself, ultimately raising total market-
ing costs and the price faced by the consu-
mer. Traders consider resacking a necessity
because it enables them to physically assess
both the weight and the quality of the grain,
as well as to ascertain the quality of the sack
(to reduce transport and storage losses).
Third, the absence of a system of grades
and standards for grain causes traders to trade
either with regular partners whom they know
well or with brokers with whom they work
exclusively. This has the result of decreasing
the size of the market and the frequency of
transactions.
Summary
The dramatic market reform implemented
by the Ethiopian government in 1990 has re-
mained fairly coherent and internally driven.
As anticipated, it had the signiﬁcant effect of
raising producer prices while reducing con-
sumer prices, thus reducing the marketing
margin between surplus and deﬁcit areas.
However, margins remain fairly high, and
their volatility has not decreased as much as
have their absolute levels. Another indica-
tion of market improvement since reform 
is the increase in short-term and long-term
market integration.
Grain production in Ethiopia is charac-
terized by the geographical dispersion of
surplus zones and deﬁcit zones, resulting in
a natural incentive to trade. Production is
highly rain-dependent and thus is marked by
a seasonal pattern of both production and
marketing in which postharvest sales occur
mainly in January through March, resulting
in depressed prices during this period. De-
spite the seasonal pattern, there is little evi-
dence of forward contracting to reduce
producer price risks.
A signiﬁcant share of the Ethiopian
population, 42 percent, is market-dependent,
and 23 million people are considered food-
deﬁcit, with a food gap of 1.4 million tons.
Like grain supply, the demand for grain is
geographically dispersed, with a high con-
centration of demand in the nation’s capital
and central market, Addis Ababa.
Market infrastructure is severely con-
strained in Ethiopia. Transport infrastructure
is limited mainly to roads, and the country
has one of the world’s lowest road densities.
Nearly half of the rural population does not
have access to all-weather roads. Although
72 percent of grain production is retained for
on-farm uses, weak storage infrastructure
results in large storage losses and vulnera-
bility of the grain to moisture and pests. Some
2,200 modern warehouses were built during
the monopoly era, with a total capacity of
1 million tons, but these facilities are largely
inaccessible to the private sector, with less
than 50 percent use.
The structure of the market has increased
in complexity since market reform was im-
plemented. However, there remains signiﬁ-
cant scope for increasing the scale and the
sophistication of the market. Of the total grain
production in 1995/96, only 28 percent or
2.6 million tons was marketed. Of the mar-
keted quantity, nearly one-third was sold by
producers directly to consumers. The remain-
16 CHAPTER 2ing 68 percent of the marketed surplus was
distributed to regional traders (36 percent),
retailers (20 percent), and assemblers (12 per-
cent). Regional traders handled 46 percent
of the total volume marketed, while brokers
in the central market handled 31 percent. An
analysis of the marketing chain suggests that
there is still signiﬁcant room for increasing
the market roles of both traders and brokers.
Also, processors play a very limited role,
indicating that very little value is added to
the marketed goods, beyond transfer across
space, throughout the marketing chain. An-
other issue is the high cost of handling the
grain due to the need for visual inspection of
both quantities and qualities, in the absence
of a system of grades and standards. The
following chapter addresses these themes
through an analysis of primary data on indi-
vidual traders’asset portfolios and arbitrage
behavior.




he data used in this study are drawn from a survey of wholesale traders in 12 markets
that was conducted in two rounds between May and December 1996. The criteria
for the selection of study regions were the representativeness of regions in terms of
type of grain, net market position (surplus versus deﬁcit), geographical distribution, and im-
portance to the national market. Surplus areas are deﬁned as areas with a signiﬁcant mar-
ketable surplus for export to other regions of the country. The survey included three surplus
areas, each representing a different traded grain: Western Wellega zone in Oromiya region,
which is a maize surplus area; Arsi zone in central Oromiya region, which is a surplus area
for wheat and barley; and Western Gojam zone in Amhara region, which is a teff surplus area.
Conversely, deﬁcit areas are deﬁned as areas that have a net grain deﬁcit and import grain
from other areas of the country. The survey included three deﬁcit areas: South Wello zone in
Amhara region, Tigray region, and the Harar/Dire Dawa region in eastern Ethiopia. It also
included Addis Ababa, representing the central market, as a seventh study region.
Markets within each region were selected on the basis of their importance as centers of
wholesale grain trade and as transit points for grain ﬂows across the country. The markets
surveyed were Nekempte and Jaji in Western Wellega, Assela and Sagure in Arsi, Bahir Dar
and Bure in Western Gojam, Dessie and Kombolcha in South Wello, and Mekele in Tigray,
as well as Dire Dawa, Harar, and Addis Ababa. The principal grains included in the study
were teff, wheat, and maize.
A sample of wholesale traders was obtained by ﬁrst undertaking a census of traders en-
gaged in wholesale activities who were present in the market on the day of the survey visit
(a market day). Sample respondents were randomly selected from the total trader population
present. Given the unavailability of a census of traders from ofﬁcial sources, this method was
considered the least biased alternative. The total sample included 152 wholesale traders rep-
resenting 6 percent of the estimated population of wholesalers in the country.
In order to obtain a panel data set, the same traders in each market were interviewed twice,
with an interval of four months. The ﬁrst round of interviews was conducted just prior to the
rainy season, in May and June, when trading slows down. In contrast, the second round of
interviews was carried out during the harvest season in October and November, when traders
are very busy buying grain from farmers. Despite the intensiﬁcation of activities in the secondround and the change of occupation of some
traders, the attrition rate of traders was rela-
tively low, with only 16 percent of the initial
sample dropping out of the second round of
interviews.
The trader survey instrument was de-
signed to obtain a complete picture of each
trader’s grain business activities: contractual
choices, agency relations with brokers, vol-
ume and direction of ﬂows, transaction
costs related to market search, physical re-
sources and assets, demographic character-
istics, working capital and access to credit,
and social capital. In the ﬁrst round of inter-
views, traders responded to questions that
caused them to recall their activities for the
past six months, from the beginning of the
harvest year in December 1995. In the sec-
ond round the traders recalled their activities
for the four months since the last interview.
The survey focused on two types of
transaction costs related to search: the costs
of search labor and the costs of holding cap-
ital ﬁxed in grain inventory during the search
process. With respect to search labor, in-
formation was collected on the number of
minutes spent daily gathering market infor-
mation, the number of traders consulted
daily, the number of person-days required
to conduct a transaction, the number of of-
fers considered prior to completing a trans-
action, and the number of employees engaged
in searches. In addition, information was
obtained on traders’ access to additional
labor, such as the number of family members
able to step in if necessary, and the traders’
other occupations.
With respect to the cost of capital, the
survey collected information on the amount
of working capital held by traders, the fre-
quency of turnover of capital, minimum
levels of working capital available during the
year, and the sources (banks, friends, family,
suppliers, savings associations) and amounts
of credit they obtained. In addition, infor-
mation was obtained on traders’access to ad-
ditional capital, such as how many creditors
they had available, whether they had parents
in the grain business, whether they owned col-
lateral assets such as a house or vehicle, and
whether they had inherited their businesses.
Data on social capital, or the extent of
traders’ “connectedness,” were obtained
through questions regarding the number of
local and distant market contacts, the num-
ber of distant markets in which traders had
contacts, the number of contacts from the
same region, the number of family members
and friends in grain trade, the number of reg-
ular partners traders had in local and distant
markets, and the number of languages traders
spoke.
Traders were asked about their use of dif-
ferent contractual arrangements in several
ways. First, traders were asked in general
terms whether they used intermediaries reg-
ularly and to state their rationale for working
with a broker, as well as detailed questions
on their agency relations. They were also
asked to recall what proportion of their total
transactions occurred in local markets and in
distant markets. They were then asked to
detail the proportion of their local and dis-
tant transactions that they conducted with
intermediaries, including both agents and
brokers. This provided detailed data, col-
lected in two rounds, on the traders’relative
use of six contractual options: local agents,
distant agents, local brokers, distant brokers,
local self-search, and distant self-search. This
information was gathered for purchases and
sales separately. Finally, traders responded
to a third set of questions related to their
contractual choices. They were asked to
describe their last transaction, speciﬁcally
whether they used a broker, how much the
commission fee was, how much time it took
the broker to search, and how transparent the
broker’s operations were.
Trader Characteristics
The survey results (Table 3.1) reveal that
traders at the wholesaler level are over-
whelmingly male; 94 percent of the sample
were male. Two-thirds of the sample were
Christian Orthodox, and nearly 70 percent
of the sample spoke the national language,
Amharic, as their mother tongue, followed
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cent), and Gurage (5 percent). Traders ap-
pear to carry on the trading activities of their
fathers; nearly half of traders indicated that
their fathers were occupied in grain trade.
This ﬁnding implies that a signiﬁcant amount
of social capital may be derived from carry-
ing on the family grain trade business.
Mothers’ occupation in grain trade did not
appear to be signiﬁcant.
Generally, traders did not appear to switch
businesses very often; the total number of
years the traders surveyed had worked in
grain trading was only slightly higher than
the number of years they had been in their
current businesses, 10 and 8 years, respec-
tively (Table 3.2). At the time of the survey
in 1996, traders indicated that they had
worked in their current businesses since be-
fore the reform in 1990. This suggests that
trading businesses had operated from within
the parallel economy even prior to reform.
Finally, there appears to have been rela-
tively little variation within the sample in
terms of years of schooling or age; traders
had received 10 years of schooling on aver-
age, and the average age of those in the
sample was 33.
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Table 3.1 Demographic characteristics of traders, 1996
Father’s Mother’s
Gender Religion Mother tongue occupation occupation
Grain Grain House-
Type of market Male Female Muslim Orthodox Amharic Oromigna trade Farmer trade wife
Surplus
Nekempte N 8 1 6 2 2 7 42 06
Percent 89 11 67 22 22 78 57 29 0 86
Jaji N 31 4 0 2 2 1 313 0
Percent 75 25 100 0 50 50 25 75 25 75
Assela N 7 0 3 4 1 6 34 07
Percent 100 0 43 57 14 86 43 57 0 100
Sagure N 5 0 1 4 1 4 04 04
Percent 100 0 20 80 20 80 0 100 0 100
Bahir Dar N 29 1 3 27 29 1 11 6 0 18
Percent 97 3 10 90 97 3 50 27 0 82
Bure N 90 1 8 9 0 3 406 0
Percent 100 0 11 89 100 0 38 50 0 75
Subtotal N 61 3 18 45 44 20 22 23 1 44
Percent 95 5 28 70 69 31 42 44 2 85
Deﬁcit
Dessie N 14 0 13 1 14 0 6 2 0 11
Percent 100 0 93 7 100 0 50 17 0 92
Kombolcha N 5 0 3 2 5 0 23 03
Percent 100 0 60 40 100 0 40 60 0 60
Mekele N 14 0 2 12 1 0 2 7 1 8
Percent 100 0 14 86 7 0 17 58 8 67
Dire Dawa N 7 2 0 9 9 0 42 14
Percent 78 22 0 100 100 0 50 25 13 50
Harar N 6 3 0 9 8 1 63 26
Percent 67 33 0 100 89 11 67 33 22 67
Subtotal N 46 5 18 33 37 1 20 17 4 32
Percent 90 10 35 65 73 2 43 37 9 70
Central
Addis Ababa N 36 1 13 23 24 6 20 10 2 26
Percent 97 3 35 62 65 16 67 33 7 87
Total Percent 94 6 32 66 69 18 48 39 5 80
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.Firms and Their Resources
Status and Ownership of Firms
As elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, grain
businesses in Ethiopia are small operations,
started and managed by their owners and
operating with relatively few ﬁxed invest-
ments. Although the trading businesses
sampled were identiﬁed as wholesale ﬁrms,
25 percent of the sample identiﬁed them-
selves as mainly retailers with some whole-
sale activity, while 3 percent of the sample
identiﬁed themselves as assemblers, suggest-
ing a lack of specialization (Table 3.3). Eighty
percent of current owners had started up their
trading businesses rather than inheriting or
buying them. This suggests that a trading
ﬁrm does not acquire a business identity or
reputation outside of the identity of the
owner, implying that grain-trading busi-
nesses are likely to be small and personal-
ized. The close identiﬁcation of a business
with the current owner was further conﬁrmed
in that, for the majority of businesses, the
owner was also the manager of the day-to-
day operations. Thus, in both surplus and
deﬁcit regions roughly three-quarters of
ﬁrms had owners who also managed them.
In the central market the proportion is lower;
54 percent of ﬁrms have owner-managers.
Finally, the extent of specialization of
grain-trading businesses varies considerably
TRADERS’ MARKET BEHAVIOR 21
Table 3.2 Human capital of traders, 1996
Type of market Years in Years operating Years of
(N) trade this business education Age
Surplus
Nekempte Mean (SD) 5 (6) 3 (2) 11 (2) 24 (4)
(N) 99 9 9
Jaji Mean (SD) 17 (7) 15 (9) 10 (2) 20 (1)
(N) 44 4 4
Assela Mean (SD) 17 (12) 11 (7) 9 (3) 44 (8)
(N) 77 7 7
Sagure Mean (SD) 20 (15) 6 (4) 5 (2) 54 (12)
(N) 55 5 5
Bahir Dar Mean (SD) 8 (7) 5 (4) 11 (3) 30 (12)
(N) 30 30 30 30
Bure Mean (SD) 8 (6) 5 (4) 8 (3) 32 (10)
(N) 99 9 9
Subtotal Mean (SD) 10 (9) 6 (5) 10 (3) 32 (13)
(N) 64 64 64 64
Deﬁcit
Dessie Mean (SD) 17 (12) 13 (12) 8 (5) 41 (18)
(N) 14 14 14 14
Kombolcha Mean (SD) 6 (3) 5 (3) 10 (4) 28 (5)
(N) 55 5 5
Mekele Mean (SD) 10 (9) 7 (7) 7 (3) 36 (9)
(N) 14 14 13 14
Dire Dawa Mean (SD) 11 (9) 11 (9) 11 (3) 30 (7)
(N) 99 9 9
Harar Mean (SD) 9 (4) 8 (4) 9 (5) 31 (15)
(N) 99 9 9
Subtotal Mean (SD) 11 (9) 9 (9) 9 (4) 34 (13)
(N) 51 51 50 51
Central
Addis Ababa Mean (SD) 10 (7) 9 (7) 11 (3) 32 (10)
(N) 37 37 37 37
Total Mean (SD) 10 (9) 8 (7) 10 (4) 33 (12)
(N) 152 152 151 152
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.between markets. Overall, only one-third of
ﬁrms are engaged in other business activities
outside of grain trade. However, the range
for different markets varies from 14 percent
to 78 percent of ﬁrms.
Firm Assets
Few trading ﬁrms invest in transport vehicles;
only 6 percent of the traders sampled owned
vehicles. In contrast, traders in small mar-
kets such as Jaji and Sagure own their ware-
houses, compared to the majority of traders
(70 percent), who rent storage space, often
from the government (Table 3.4). A rela-
tively high proportion of traders (39 percent)
own telephones, and generally all traders
appear to have access to telephones. At the
same time, traders place relatively few tele-
phone orders for their businesses. This is an
important ﬁnding, suggesting that the lack
of use of telecommunications in grain trad-
ing is not due to infrastructural constraints
as much as to other factors. Finally, a sig-
nificant share of traders, roughly half, has
electricity. Surprisingly, traders outside of
the central market have much better access
to electricity than do those in Addis Ababa.
The average storage capacity of traders
within markets varies considerably, indicat-
ing the different storage behavior in the dif-
ferent markets (Table 3.5). Thus, traders in
the Wellega zone had relatively little storage
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Table 3.3 Business characteristics of traders, 1996
Percent
Percent Percent Percent owner
Type of
Business classiﬁcation
owner sole owner- with other
market Assembly Wholesale Retail start-up owner manager business
Surplus
Nekempte N 0 6 3994 3
Percent 0 67 33 100 100 44 33
Jaji N 0 3 1440 3
Percent 0 75 25 100 100 0 75
Assela N 0 7 0677 1
Percent 0 100 0 86 100 100 14
Sagure N 1 4 0544 2
Percent 20 80 0 100 80 80 40
Bahir Dar N 1 23 6 23 28 24 16
Percent 3 77 20 77 93 80 53
Bure N 0 7 2598 7
Percent 0 78 22 56 100 89 78
Subtotal N 2 5 0 1 25 26 14 7 3 2
Percent 3 78 19 81 95 73 50
Deﬁcit
Dessie N 1 7 61 41 41 0 3
Percent 7 50 43 100 100 71 21
Kombolcha N 0 3 2455 1
Percent 0 60 40 80 100 100 20
Mekele N 0 11 3 13 12 14 5
Percent 0 79 21 93 86 100 36
Dire Dawa N 0 3 6792 2
Percent 0 33 67 78 100 22 22
Harar N 0 6 3998 4
Percent 0 67 33 100 100 89 44
Subtotal N 1 3 0 2 04 74 93 9 1 5
Percent 2 59 39 92 96 76 29
Central
Addis Ababa N 2 29 6 23 32 20 4
Percent 5 78 16 86 54 11
Total Percent 3 72 25 80 93 70 34
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.capacity (383 to 519 quintals) compared to
the average of 1,156 quintals for the sample
(1 quintal is equivalent to 100 kilograms).
The average number of days grain was stored
during the marketing year, 16 to 21 days, was
also lower for this area compared to more
than twice that for the sample. This might be
explained by the fact that maize is more
subject to storage losses due to its greater
moisture content. In contrast, traders in the
Arsi zone, who trade mainly barley and
wheat, had the greatest storage capacity and
the largest number of storage days. Strik-
ingly, traders in Assela stored grain for 92
days, roughly twice the sample average, over
the year. According to ﬁeld interviews, this
was not a usual practice, but rather a re-
sponse to falling wheat prices due to the un-
favorable timing of food aid shipments of
wheat. Overall, neither the storage capacity
nor the days stored on average varied signif-
icantly by type of market, with traders in
surplus, deﬁcit, and central markets storing
grain for about 50 days on average over the
year.
Although only one-third of the traders
sampled received formal bank loans, all re-
ceived credit over the marketing year. The
survey reveals that traders have access to
substantial levels of credit; those sampled
received on average Eth. Birr 89,000 over
the year, which corresponds to US$14,000
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Table 3.4 Business assets of traders, 1996
Percent
Percent Percent Percent Percent have Percent
Type of own own rent own access to have
market vehicle warehouse storage telephone telephone electricity
Surplus
Nekempte N 019 3 69
Percent 0 11 100 33 100 100
Jaji N 240 3 14
Percent 50 100 0 75 100 100
Assela N 026 2 55
Percent 0 29 86 29 100 71
Sagure N 250 2 33
Percent 40 100 0 40 100 60
Bahir Dar N 11 1 2 16 2 3 8
Percent 3 38 81 20 100 27
Bure N 074 1 87
Percent 0 78 50 11 100 78
Subtotal N 53 04 0 1 7 4 63 6
Percent 8 48 70 27 100 56
Deﬁcit
Dessie N 158 9 4 1 3
Percent 7 36 62 64 100 93
Kombolcha N
Percent 60 40 100 100
Mekele N 177 6 56
Percent 7 50 50 43 83 43
Dire Dawa N 64 6 3 5
Percent 67 44 67 100 56
Harar N 62 6 3 8
Percent 67 22 67 100 89
Subtotal N 22 72 3 2 7 2 03 7
Percent 4 53 46 53 95 73
Central
Addis Ababa N 2 4 36 15 22 5
Percent 5 11 97 41 100 14
Total Percent 6 40 69 39 99 51
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.(Table 3.5). This is a signiﬁcantly greater
amount than the average per capita income
(US$110) for the country. Similarly, the
traders sampled had fairly large amounts 
of working capital (Table 3.5), ranging from
US$7,700 to US$10,000, which is a signiﬁ-
cantly larger amount than recent survey re-
sults (Gabre-Madhin et al. 2001) indicate for
Benin (US$1,470) and Malawi (US$560).
In all markets, traders have greater amounts
of total credit than working capital. Working
capital is deﬁned as the amount of money
that traders regularly have at their disposal
for the purposes of buying and selling grain,
while total credit refers to the sum of all the
loans they receive over the course of a year
for their trading business. These are different
in that credit is cumulative and can be used
for purposes other than buying and selling
grain; for instance, it can be applied to the
ﬁxed costs of the business.
Traders in the central market of Addis
Ababa appear to have signiﬁcantly more
access to credit than do those in other mar-
kets. It remains somewhat of a puzzle why,
although the average amount of credit for
Addis Ababa traders is one and a half times
greater than the sample average, the amount
of working capital of traders in Addis Ababa
falls below the sample average. There appears
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Table 3.5 Firm resources: Physical, human, and ﬁnancial, 1996
Total storage
Type of capacity Days Total Total credit Working capital
market (100-kg bags) storage employees (Eth. Birr)a (Eth. Birr)
Surplus
Nekempte Mean (SD) 383 (177) 16 (9) 7 (1) 23,778 (35,138) 27,500 (31,168)
(N) 99 9 9 8
Jaji Mean (SD) 519 (344) 21 (13) 11 (6) 100,750 (97,233) 53,333 (41,633))
(N) 44 4 4 3
Assela Mean (SD) 2,486 (1,633) 92 (72) 8 (2) 75,786 (55,963) 45,000 (34,278)
(N) 77 7 7 7
Sagure Mean (SD) 3,875 (4,131) 43 (38) 8 (7) 23,0400 (19,2683) 37,750 (44,724)
(N) 45 4 5 4
Bahir Dar Mean (SD) 653 (491) 49 (32) 8 (4) 78,807 (116,065) 62,367 (53,811)
(N) 30 30 30 30 30
Bure Mean (SD) 1,083 (1,440) 50 (24) 9 (8) 79,444 (102,372) 30,375 (25,054)
(N) 99 9 9 8
Subtotal Mean (SD) 1,076 (1,543) 47 (39) 8 (4) 84,043 (114,257) 49,333 (45,878)
(N) 63 64 63 64 60
Deﬁcit
Dessie Mean (SD) 1,773 (2,588) 28 (19) 7 (4) 29,564 (48,531) 104,375 (122,982)
(N) 14 14 14 14 8
Kombolcha Mean (SD) 1,810 (3,186) 43 (40) 6 (1) 42,700 (46,424) 29,000 (19,494)
(N) 55 5 5 5
Mekele Mean (SD) 750 (971) 63 (45) 6 (4) 99,000 (220,831) 56,000 (56,804)
(N) 14 14 14 14 10
Dire Dawa Mean (SD) 506 (339) 47 (32) 4 (3) 27,784 (22,384) 30,000 (14,577)
(N) 89 9 9 9
Harar Mean (SD) 1,767 (1,818) 37 (36) 5 (3) 91,111 (115,941) 102,222 (92,976)
(N) 99 9 9 9
Subtotal Mean (SD) 1,287 (1,932) 44 (36) 6 (3) 60,460 (129,503) 66,585 (79,116)
(N) 50 51 51 51 41
Central
Addis Ababa Mean (SD) 1,114 (1,703) 47 (49) 8 (6) 136,573 (388,609) 51,172 (66,512)
(N) 37 37 36 37 29
Total Mean (SD) 1,156 (1,711) 46 (41) 7 (5) 88,917 (218,733) 55,185 (62,647)
(N) 150 152 150 152 130
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
a Eth. Birr 6.35 = US$1 in 1995/96.to be little variation in markets in terms of
human resources. Generally, trading ﬁrms
are small enterprises composed of seven to
eight employees, including the owner.
The Spatial Pattern of
Grain Flows
Survey evidence for the study markets con-
ﬁrms the radial conﬁguration of grain ﬂows,
with the Addis Ababa market operating as a
national hub for grain ﬂows. Market ﬂows
cover considerable distances, ranging from
200 to 1,200 kilometers. As shown in Fig-
ure 3.1, although ﬂows in and out of Addis
Ababa dominate the pattern of ﬂows, new
market channels are emerging because of
new roads that link rural areas. Thus, there
is also evidence of ﬂows directly from pro-
ducer regions in Wellega and Gojam zones
to deﬁcit areas of Tigray and Wello.
In the major maize-producing zones of
western Oromiya, the main supply areas for
the Nekempte and Jaji markets are nearby
producer markets as well as the markets
themselves, where traders buy directly from
producers. The main destination for grain
purchased in these markets is Addis Ababa,
located at a distance of 330 kilometers from
Nekempte and 215 kilometers from Jaji. In
addition to this main channel, some respon-
dents reported that there are secondary ﬂows
to Bure in the Gojam zone of Amhara region,
located 270 kilometers away. One respon-
dent also indicated that he had made one
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Figure 3.1 Grain ﬂows and distances between study markets, 1995/96
Source: United Nations Development Program 1998 (http://www.undp.org).
Note: Distances in kilometers. All borders are approximate and unofﬁcial.direct sale in Mekele in Tigray region, at a
distance of 1,300 kilometers. However, the
respondent noted that this sale was too dif-
ﬁcult and costly to repeat.
In the wheat- and barley-producing zones
of Arsi, the Assela and Sagure markets are
supplied by surrounding producer markets
and their own markets. The principal desti-
nation of grain from these markets is Addis
Ababa, located 175 and 200 kilometers
away, respectively. Other destinations include
Nazareth and Debre Zeit, located 75 and 125
kilometers away, respectively, on the Addis
Ababa route. Nazareth appears to function
as a secondary hub through which grain
from Arsi and other nearby areas ﬂows to the
terminal markets of Harar and Dire Dawa
(425 kilometers away). In addition to trading
directly in the Addis Ababa market, traders
also reported that they delivered wheat di-
rectly to wheat mills in Akaki, on the outskirts
of Addis Ababa, and barley to the brewery in
Assela.
In the major teff-producing zone of West-
ern Gojam, the survey revealed a dynamic
transformation of marketing channels in the
Bure and Bahir Dar markets, with multiple-
destination markets and an evolution away
from the traditional dominance of the Addis
Ababa market axis. As in the other surplus
regions, these markets were supplied mainly
by nearby markets and by producers in the
markets themselves. In contrast to the other
surplus markets, however, the survey re-
vealed numerous-destination markets. Thus,
ﬂows from Bahir Dar to Addis Ababa were
surpassed by ﬂows directly to Mekele (744
kilometers), Adigrat, and other markets in
Tigray; to Dessie (470 kilometers) and Kom-
bolcha in Wello zone; and to Gonder in
Amhara region, in addition to Asmara, the
capital city of neighboring Eritrea (1,000 kilo-
meters distant). Similarly, important channels
have emerged from Bure to Mekele (600 kilo-
meters) and Asmara, Eritrea (1,200 kilome-
ters), although the channel to Addis Ababa
(410 kilometers) remains primary.
Thus, among the study markets, grain
flows into Addis Ababa were observed from
Nekempte, Jaji, Assela, Sagure, Bure, and
Bahir Dar. Grain ﬂows out of Addis Ababa
were observed to Harar and Dire Dawa, in
the eastern part of the country, located 525
kilometers away and served by rail transport
in the case of Dire Dawa. A second major
destination of grain ﬂowing out of Addis
Ababa was the Wello zone of Amhara re-
gion, speciﬁcally Dessie and Kombolcha, at
a distance of 400 kilometers. Grain ﬂows
were also observed from Addis Ababa to the
Mekele market, located 780 kilometers away,
as well as to Asmara in neighboring Eritrea.
In addition to receiving ﬂows from Bure,
Bahir Dar, and Addis Ababa, the Mekele
market was supplied from Dessie, as well as
nearby producer markets. Although Mekele
can be considered a terminal market in that
the majority of grain is supplied to the local
population, there were also ﬂows outward
from Mekele, to Adigrat in Tigray region as
well as to Asmara in Eritrea. In contrast to
Dessie, which relied heavily on supplies from
distant markets such as Addis Ababa, Bure,
and Bahir Dara, the Kombolcha market was
supplied by nearby producer markets in ad-
dition to these distant markets. In addition to
receiving ﬂows from Addis Ababa, the Harar
and Dire Dawa markets were supplied by
Debre Zeit and Nazareth, also on the railway
line. Harar was supplied by nearby producer
markets. Both Harar and Dire Dawa func-
tioned as terminal markets, with little out-
ward ﬂow.
Marketing Margins and Proﬁts
Traders surveyed provided detailed evidence
regarding their most recently completed
wholesale transaction, deﬁned as a trans-
action in which a given quantity of grain was
purchased and sold. Information was also
collected on the various attributes of this
transaction: the total kilometric distance in-
volved from purchase to sale, the number of
suppliers from whom they purchased grain
and the number of clients to whom they sold
it, and the quantity transacted. In addition,
detailed information was obtained on all the
marketing costs incurred from purchase to
26 CHAPTER 3sale as well as the purchase and sale prices.
These data enabled the calculation of the
gross marketing margin (deﬁned as the dif-
ference between purchase and sale price), the
total marketing costs, and the net margin or
proﬁt (deﬁned as the residual after market-
ing costs are deducted from the gross mar-
gin). Clearly the net margin includes returns
that may be attributed factors of marketing
whose costs are not explicitly included in
the set of marketing costs, such as managerial
inputs, as well as partner search, enforcement,
and information gathering.
As shown in Table 3.6, traders in both
surplus and deﬁcit markets appear to trade
grain over similar distances (223 to 260 kilo-
meters on average), while traders in the
central market have much smaller distances
(34 on average) to travel, as expected. The
number of suppliers and clients involved in
a transaction provides an indication of the
structure of the marketing chain. Thus, in
rural markets in surplus areas, traders tend
to buy from a large number of suppliers,
such as farmers as well as collection agents.
As markets get larger, traders buy in larger
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Table 3.6 Attributes of last transaction by type of market, 1996
Total Number Number Ratio Quantity
Type of distance of of supplier/ purchased
market traded (km) suppliers clients client (quintals)a
Surplus
Nekempte Mean (SD) 331 (0) 5 (7) 1 (0) 5 (7) 222 (258)
N 37 7 7 1 6
Jaji Mean (SD) 215 (0) 73 (57) 1 (0) 73 (57) 68 (30)
N 44 4 4 8
Assela Mean (SD) 202 (31) 16 (18) 1 (1) 16 (7) 83 (73)
N 77 7 7 1 4
Sagure Mean (SD) 203 (7) 93 (78) 26 (50) 68 (90) 110 (110)
N 44 4 4 9
Bahir Dar Mean (SD) 177 (206) 4 (10) 8 (21) 3 (11) 147 (180)
N 20 22 22 22 52
Bure Mean (SD) 331 (358) 52 (51) 1 (0) 52 (51) 116 (50)
N 87 8 7 1 7
Subtotal Mean (SD) 223 (205) 25 (43) 6 (19) 22 (42) 137 (164)
N 46 51 52 51 116
Deﬁcit
Dessie Mean (SD) 369 (103) 2 (2) 74 (32) 0 (0) 171 (134)
N 11 10 10 9 26
Kombolcha Mean (SD) 243 (180) 1 (1) 28 (19) 0 (0) 90 (112)
N 55 3 3 1 0
Mekele Mean (SD) 181 (290) 1 (1) 29 (31) 1 (1) 91 (54)
N 12 12 12 12 26
Dire Dawa Mean (SD) 139 (215) 1 (1) 108 (115) 0 (0) 97 (105)
N 66 6 6 1 5
Harar Mean (SD) 323 (226) 2 (1) 110 (101) 0 (0) 213 (309)
N 99 9 9 1 8
Subtotal Mean (SD) 260 (225) 2 (1) 70 (75) 0 (1) 137 (168)
N 43 42 40 39 95
Central
Addis Ababa Mean (SD) 34 (107) 2 (2) 3 (5) 2 (2) 472 (2,223)
N 30 30 30 30 67
Total Mean (SD) 189 (213) 11 (30) 26 (54) 10 (29) 218 (1,104)
N 119 123 122 120 278
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
aAquintal is equivalent to 100 kilograms.quantities from a small number of suppliers,
and these are more likely to be other traders
rather than farmers. In deﬁcit areas the con-
verse is true, in that traders are likely to buy
grain in large quantities from wholesalers in
distant markets and to sell the grain in small
quantities to retailers as well as directly to
consumers. The survey results reveal that
traders in smaller rural markets in surplus
zones, such as Jaji, Sagure, and Bure purchase
from a large number of suppliers (farmers),
while traders in larger wholesale markets in
the surplus zones purchase from a relatively
small number of suppliers, mostly collec-
tion agents. In general, the number of clients
is considerably smaller than the number of
suppliers for traders in the surplus zones, in-
dicating that traders buy in numerous small
transactions and bulk up for sale to a single
wholesaler in their destination market. Thus,
the ratio of suppliers to clients for the surplus
zones is 22 on average.
As expected, the evidence suggests that
in the deﬁcit markets traders purchase large
quantities from a small number of agents
(Table 3.6), typically wholesalers located in
the central market. They then sell the grain
purchased to many clients, suggesting that
they both sell to retailers and sell in retail
quantities themselves. Thus, the ratio of sup-
pliers to clients is very low, between 0 and 1.
Finally, traders in the central market appear
to be engaged mainly in wholesale trade for
both purchase and sale, with relatively few
suppliers and relatively few clients. Thus, the
ratio of suppliers to clients for the Addis
Ababa market is 2. These results suggest that
traders in the regional markets are not spe-
cialized in wholesale activities, but rather
are engaged in assembly and bulking-up ac-
tivities in the surplus areas and in retail dis-
tribution in the deﬁcit areas.
In terms of the quantities transacted,
traders in surplus and deﬁcit areas have sur-
prisingly similar capacities, with 137 quintals
(1.4 tons) exchanged per transaction, varying
from 68 to 222 quintals (Table 3.6). Traders
in Addis Ababa, however, engage in trans-
actions involving signiﬁcantly larger, highly
variable quantities, on average 472 quintals.
These results suggest that there is a loca-
tional advantage to trade in the central mar-
ket, with traders tending to have better access
to credit and to be more specialized in whole-
sale activities.
Absolute Margins and Costs
In absolute terms, gross marketing margins
appear to be 2 and 3 times higher in the
regional markets than in the central market
(Table 3.7). This is because traders in the
Addis Ababa market both buy and sell locally,
as noted earlier. On average, marketing mar-
gins in surplus and deﬁcit areas are Eth. Birr
28 and 21 per quintal. However, there is a
surprising amount of variation between mar-
kets in the surplus areas. In particular, Bure,
which is located in the Gojam zone, has an
especially high average marketing margin
of Eth. Birr 51 per quintal.
Absolute marketing costs appear to fol-
low a pattern similar to that of margins, with
costs roughly similar in the surplus and deﬁcit
zones, in contrast to markedly lower costs
in the Addis Ababa market (Table 3.7). Bure
again shows an exceptional pattern, with sig-
niﬁcantly higher costs than elsewhere. In the
deﬁcit markets, traders in Harar and Dire
Dawa appear to incur relatively low costs,
which is puzzling given that distances of
trade are not particularly small. Viewed as a
percentage of the gross margin, relative costs
vary from as low as 35 percent and 38 per-
cent in Dire Dawa and Harar to 134 percent
in Dessie and 124 percent in Jaji and Sagure,
where traders appear to be trading at a loss.
On average, marketing costs represent 83 per-
cent of the gross margin.
Finally, traders’proﬁts, calculated as the
residual after deducting marketing costs from
the gross margin, are roughly similar in ab-
solute terms between surplus and deﬁcit
markets, Eth. Birr 5 and 4 per quintal, re-
spectively (Table 3.7). At the same time,
absolute proﬁts vary considerably between
markets. Thus, in surplus markets proﬁts are
relatively large in Bahir Dar and Bure, located
in Gojam zone, compared to the very small
28 CHAPTER 3or negative proﬁts in the small rural markets
of Jaji and Sagure. An explanation of the
larger proﬁts in Gojam is that traders are
exploring new marketing channels, thus by-
passing the Addis Ababa route in favor of
direct trade routes to Mekele, Dessie, and
Asmara.
In the case of the deﬁcit markets there is
a similarly wide range, with negative proﬁts
in Dessie and relatively high proﬁts in Dire
Dawa and Harar (Table 3.7). It is puzzling
why proﬁts in Dessie are negative while
proﬁts in nearby Kombolcha are positive.
Traders’ proﬁts in the central market (Eth.
Birr 1 per quintal) are signiﬁcantly below the
sample average of Eth. Birr 5, suggesting
that traders in the central market are more
specialized, operate on a larger scale, and
are more competitive.
Costs and Proﬁts Relative to 
Sales Revenue
So that the reader can compare the proﬁt-
ability of trading enterprises across the sam-
ple, Table 3.8 shows a breakdown of trade
revenue for grain (equal to sale price) into
the costs of acquiring the grain (purchase
price), the costs of marketing the grain
(marketing costs), and the remaining proﬁt.
Viewing these three elements relative to the
sale price, one can see that, for the sample
as a whole, the purchase price represents 
82 percent of the sale price, marketing costs
represent 16 percent of the sale price, and
proﬁts represent 2 percent of the sale price.
Notwithstanding the considerable variation
between markets, the high proportion of the
sale price that is attributed to the purchase
costs indicates that traders add relatively lit-
tle value, in terms of transport, storage, or
transformation of the grains in question. That
is, the traders surveyed essentially undertake
only spatial arbitrage in the case of the re-
gional markets, and they are not engaged in
either temporal arbitrage or arbitrage over
form. In the case of surplus markets, where
the bulk of locally produced grain is sold to
distant markets, transport costs play a more
important role, so the share of the sales rev-
enue that is attributed to purchase price is
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Table 3.7 Absolute marketing margins and costs by type of market, 1996
Gross margin Marketing costs Proﬁt Costs as a percentage
(Eth. Birr/quintal)a (Eth. Birr/quintal) (Eth. Birr/quintal) of gross margin
Type of market Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
Surplus
Nekempte 29 9 14 27 7 15 2 8 14 97 26 14
Jaji 17 6 8 20 6 8 −3 5 8 124 46 8
Assela 23 5 13 18 2 12 4 4 11 86 21 11
Sagure 15 3 8 17 4 6 −3 4 6 124 32 6
Bahir Dar 27 23 49 24 21 36 8 11 36 72 41 36
Bure 51 26 15 43 24 11 12 18 11 82 27 11
Subtotal 28 21 107 25 18 86 5 11 86 87 39 86
Deﬁcit
Dessie 18 6 25 26 26 15 −6 26 15 134 129 15
Kombolcha 17 4 10 12 7 5 6 5 5 64 30 5
Mekele 30 22 23 31 25 18 6 10 17 70 32 17
Dire Dawa 17 9 15 6 9 9 12 9 9 35 25 9
Harar 21 16 18 14 18 9 11 8 9 38 31 9
Subtotal 21 15 91 22 23 56 4 17 55 76 80 55
Central
Addis Ababa 9 7 65 7 11 39 1 10 37 83 85 38
Total 22 21 264 21 20 187 5 15 179 83 65 180
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
aAquintal is equivalent to 100 kilograms. Eth. Birr 6.35 = US$1 in 1996.consequently less, as small as 63 percent and
65 percent, respectively, of the sale price in
Nekempte and Bure. In terminal markets the
results suggest that local procurement is
important and that transport costs are signif-
icantly lower. Consequently, the share of the
sale price attributed to purchase price is as
high as 94 percent and 92 percent, respec-
tively, in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.
Markets for relatively undifferentiated
goods, such as agricultural commodities, are
expected to be less risky, with greater com-
petition and low proﬁt margins. The very
low actual proﬁt rates of 2 percent for the
sample as a whole conﬁrm that this may in-
deed be the case in the Ethiopian grain mar-
ket (Table 3.8). At the same time, proﬁt rates
vary considerably between and within mar-
kets, with very high coefﬁcients of variations
for both the market averages and the averages
by type of market. In the surplus areas, prof-
its appear to be very low, and even negative
in the case of markets in western Wellega
and Arsi, while they are relatively high in
the Gojam area. Proﬁt rates vary less among
traders and among markets in the deﬁcit mar-
kets with the exception of Dessie, where
average proﬁt rates are negative and highly
variable. Finally, in Addis Ababa proﬁt rates
are very low, which is to be expected in that
traders typically buy and sell in the same
market and marketed volumes are generally
much larger than in other markets.
Annual Sales and Gross Proﬁts
Annual sales revenue is calculated using data
collected on annual quantities purchased
and sold as well as price data. As shown in
Table 3.9, traders in Assela and Addis Ababa
have the highest average annual sales in
tons, with roughly 1,100 tons sold per trader.
Taking into account the number of traders
per market, Bahir Dar has the second high-
est volume of trade in the sample, following
Addis Ababa.
Applying the average proﬁt rate for the
sample of 2 percent to calculate gross annual
proﬁts for all markets corrects for the poten-
tial bias that arises from using the proﬁt rate
obtained for the most recent transaction. Fol-
lowing the pattern of annual sales, gross an-
nual proﬁts per trading ﬁrm were highest in
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Table 3.8 Marketing costs and net proﬁts relative to sale price by market, 1996
Purchase price Marketing costs Net proﬁt
as a percentage as a percentage as a percentage
of sale price of sale price of sale price
Type of market Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD N
Surplus
Nekempte 63 8 36 13 1 10 14
Jaji 75 7 28 4 −48 8
Assela 83 3 14 3 3 3 11
Sagure 89 3 14 4 −23 6
Bahir Dar 75 16 19 15 6 9 36
Bure 65 18 24 11 7 10 11
Subtotal 74 15 22 14 3 12 86
Deﬁcit
Dessie 83 5 20 14 −31 5 1 5
Kombolcha 88 5 9 6 3 2 5
Mekele 82 11 14 12 3 4 17
Dire Dawa 92 5 2 3 5 4 9
Harar 87 12 7 10 5 4 9
Subtotal 85 9 12 12 2 9 55
Central
Addis Ababa 94 5 5 9 1 7 37
Total 82 14 15 14 2 9 178
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.Assela and Addis Ababa, US$5,000 and
US$5,400, respectively (Table 3.9). For the
sample as a whole, the average annual ﬁrm
proﬁt was US$2,300. It is important to note
that this ﬁgure represents gross proﬁts in
that it does not account for the ﬁxed costs of
warehouse rental, employee salaries, interest
costs, taxes, or other ﬁxed costs. The residual
proﬁts after deduction of these costs would
represent the returns relative to managerial
inputs.
With the exception of Assela and Addis
Ababa, gross annual proﬁts varied between
US$500 in Dire Dawa and US$1,575 in Harar
(Table 3.9). Moreover, high coefﬁcients of
variation for the market averages suggest
that gross proﬁts varied between traders and
were linked to the size of the ﬁrm, the size
of the ﬁrm’s working capital, and the extent of
the ﬁrm’s specialization in grain trade.
Breakdown of Marketing Costs
The traders surveyed were asked to identify
for their most recent completed wholesale
transaction all the costs incurred between the
purchase and the sale of the grain, including
up to 20 types of physical marketing costs.
These marketing costs were variable in that
they were speciﬁc to the transaction rather
than ﬁxed costs for things such as warehouse
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Table 3.9 Annual sales and gross proﬁts by type of market, 1996
Annual gross Annual gross Annual
Type of  Annual sales sales revenue sales revenue gross proﬁt
market (tons) (Eth. Birr)a (US$) (US$)
Surplus
Nekempte Mean 237 302,063 47,569 951
(N = 9) SD 237 329,769 51,932 1,039
Jaji Mean 218 307,159 48,371 967
(N = 4) SD 241 386,706 60,899 1,218
Assela Mean 1,111 1,595,209 251,214 5,024
(N = 7) SD 1,742 2,472,088 389,305 7,786
Sagure Mean 286 394,026 62,051 1,241
(N = 5) SD 237 339,874 53,523 1,070
Bahir Dar Mean 352 468,789 73,825 1,476
(N = 30) SD 455 642,650 101,205 2,024
Bure Mean 330 428,167 67,428 1,349
(N = 9) SD 400 599,122 94,350 1,887
Subtotal Mean 404 546,890 86,124 1,722
(N = 64) SD 702 993,514 156,459 3,129
Deﬁcit
Dessie Mean 163 164,680 25,934 519
(N = 14) SD 170 153,312 24,144 483
Kombolcha Mean 348 499,826 78,713 1,574
(N = 5) SD 564 790,905 124,552 2,491
Mekele Mean 106 179,515 28,270 565
(N = 13) SD 50 85,524 13,468 269
Dire Dawa Mean 108 158,850 25,016 500
(N = 9) SD 60 109,345 17,220 344
Harar Mean 375 500,053 78,748 1,575
(N = 9) SD 384 581,006 91,497 1,830
Subtotal Mean 193 261,369 41,160 823
(N = 48) SD 265 372,560 58,671 1,173
Central
Addis Ababa Mean 1,112 1,703,018 268,192 5,364
(N = 37) SD 1,797 3,070,966 483,617 9,672
Total Mean 509 735,636 115,848 2,317
(N = 151) SD 1,067 1,744,799 274,772 5,495
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
a Eth. Birr 6.35 = US$1 in 1995/96.rental, employee wages, and so on. For the
purposes of analysis, the costs were reclas-
siﬁed into eight categories (Table 3.10).
Handling costs comprise the costs of loading
the grain at the time of purchase, off-loading
it at the trader’s warehouse, loading it to a
transport vehicle for sale, and off-loading it
at the site of sale. Sacking costs include the
costs of empty sacks (taking into account
the multiple uses of the same sacks) and the
cost of sewing the tops of the sacks. Trans-
port costs include the costs of transporting
the grain from the place of purchase to the
trader’s warehouse and transporting it from
the trader’s warehouse to the place of sale.
Storage costs refer to the variable costs per
sack of temporarily storing the grain either in
a private warehouse or in the broker’s ware-
house between purchase and sale. Kella costs
are composed of payments at road stops dur-
ing the course of transport from the place of
purchase to the trader’s warehouse and from
the trader’s warehouse to the place of sale.
Broker costs include the commissions paid
to agents or brokers for either the purchase
or the sale of goods, as well as the commis-
sions paid to transport brokers for ﬁnding
transport services. Travel costs refer to the
costs incurred by the trader in accompanying
a shipment, including the costs of personal
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Table 3.10 Breakdown of marketing costs by type of market, 1996
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
Type of for for for for for for for for Total
market handling sacking transport storage road stops brokers travel tips/other percent
Surplus
Nekempte Mean (SD) 8 (6) 3 (3) 52 (25) 0 (1) 8 (6) 7 (3) 2 (3) 2 (4) 100
N 18 18 18 18 18 15 18 18 15
Jaji Mean (SD) 8 (3) 6 (2) 53 (11) 0 (0) 18 (4) 6 (3) 1 (3) 7 (13) 100
N 88888888 8
Assela Mean (SD) 7 (3) 4 (4) 55 (5) 0 (1) 27 (4) 5 (3) 2 (2) 1 (1) 100
N 12 12 12 14 12 12 14 13 12
Sagure Mean (SD) 6 (3) 4 (4) 49 (21) 0 (1) 17 (14) 6 (4) 1 (3) 1 (2) 100
N 888 1 09799 7
Bahir Dar Mean (SD) 9 (15) 3 (7) 45 (35) 0 (1) 4 (12) 7 (18) 1 (3) 5 (13) 100
N 49 54 49 58 49 36 52 55 36
Bure Mean (SD) 7 (7) 9 (12) 45 (29) 0 (0) 6 (6) 2 (2) 1 (3) 4 (8) 100
N 15 15 16 18 16 12 18 16 12
Subtotal Mean (SD) 8 (11) 4 (7) 48 (28) 0 (1) 10 (12) 6 (11) 1 (3) 4 (10) 100
N 110 115 111 126 112 90 119 124 90
Deﬁcit
Dessie Mean (SD) 12 (20) 6 (7) 52 (26) 0 (2) 2 (2) 8 (4) 0 (0) 4 (12) 100
N 17 17 17 27 21 15 25 25 15
Kombolcha Mean (SD) 19 (16) 2 (4) 62 (7) 0 (0) 1 (2) 7 (6) 0 (0) 4 (8) 100
N 56587597 5
Mekele Mean (SD) 8 (11) 8 (21) 32 (35) 0 (0) 5 (8) 15 (29) 2 (4) 3 (10) 100
N 23 27 27 26 28 18 28 27 18
Dire Dawa Mean (SD) 40 (39) 20 (26) 4 (16) 0 (0) 1 (4) 2 (7) 0 (0) 4 (17) 100
N 12 12 18 18 18 9 18 18 9
Harar Mean (SD) 50 (39) 13 (15) 18 (31) 0 (1) 3 (8) 10 (13) 0 (1) 0 (2) 100
N 9 9 11 18 11 9 18 18 9
Subtotal Mean (SD) 22 (29) 10 (18) 30 (33) 0 (1) 3 (6) 10 (18) 1 (2) 3 (11) 100
N 66 71 78 97 85 56 98 95 56
Central
Addis Ababa Mean (SD) 34 (36) 15 (23) 5 (17) 0 (2) 1 (5) 9 (25) 0 (0) 11 (25) 100
N 46 45 67 69 72 38 72 71 38
Total Mean (SD) 18 (26) 8 (16) 31 (33) 0 (1) 5 (9) 8 (17) 1 (2) 5 (16) 100
N 222 231 256 292 269 184 289 294 184
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.travel as well as accommodation at the dis-
tant market town. Finally, the category of
costs called “Tips and other” includes tips
paid during the purchase and sale, as well as
other costs related to storage or transport
losses, phytosanitary measures, and others.
Notable omissions from these costs are those
imposed by taxes and other regulations. This
omission was made because, unlike taxes in
other countries, Ethiopian taxes were not vari-
able fees incurred during the course of the
market day, but rather were paid annually.
Among the various costs, transport costs
appear to be the most important; for the
surveyed transactions they ranged between
45 percent and 62 percent of total marketing
costs for most of the regional markets with
the exception of Dire Dawa and Harar
(Table 3.10). Because of the relative lack of
transport activities by traders in the central
market as well as in these two markets, the
sample average was 31 percent. As noted
earlier, the main value added in the Ethi-
opian grain marketing chain is that added in
the spatial transfer of goods. Thus, it is to be
expected that transport costs represent the
bulk of marketing costs. However, adding the
costs of road stops to the transport costs in-
creased the percentage of transport-related
costs for traders in the regional markets to
as high as 82 percent in Assela, 71 percent in
Jaji, and 58 percent for the surplus markets
as a whole. Kella costs, which can act as a
disincentive for trade, appear to have been
considerably higher in Wellega (8 to 18 per-
cent) and Arsi (17 to 27 percent) compared
to the other zones. The higher kella costs ex-
plain the negative proﬁts or very low proﬁts
noted for the markets in these areas.
The second most important costs are
those of handling, which ranged from 8 per-
cent to 19 percent in the markets in which
signiﬁcant transport activities occurred and
considerably more in markets in which trans-
port was limited (Table 3.10), such as Addis
Ababa (34 percent), Dire Dawa (40 percent),
and Harar (50 percent). Overall, handling
costs for the sample represented 18 percent
of the total marketing costs. Adding sacking
costs to the costs of handling results in a
combined share of handling-related costs 
of 26 percent for the sample. This is a very
signiﬁcant ﬁnding in that these costs are
directly linked to the inefﬁciency built into
trading practices. First, loading and off-
loading are labor-intensive, sack-speciﬁc
activities, the costs of which would be sig-
niﬁcantly reduced by making bulk shipments
rather than selling grain by the sack. Second,
the lack of a system for grading and stan-
dardizing grain requires the visual inspection
of the grain, sack by sack, resulting in the
need to resack every sack of grain at the time
of sale. Thus, for every transaction a new
sack must be purchased, handling costs must
be incurred in off-loading and transferring
the grain to new sacks, and the sacks must be
sewn. This involves not only labor costs but
also time costs, resulting in the slowing of
transactions.
The third most important cost category
is that of commissions paid for brokerage
services. These costs, which represent the
costs of market coordination, ranged from
6 to 10 percent of the total marketing costs
for the three types of markets in the sample,
8 percent overall (Table 3.10). This is an in-
teresting ﬁnding, because market coordina-
tion services appear to be equally important
even where trade does not occur across long
distances, such as in the central market, where
broker fees represent 9 percent of costs. The
following chapter explores the range of serv-
ices provided by a broker in exchange for
this fee and the nature of the brokerage in-
stitution in greater detail in the following
chapter. However, the importance of this
institution is conﬁrmed by its relatively high
share of the marketing costs and by its per-
vasive use in all the markets studied.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the share of
costs related to personal travel by traders ac-
companying shipments was rather small, only
1 percent of total costs (Table 3.10). This is in
stark contrast to recent ﬁndings in Malawi and
Benin, where personal travel accounted for
23 and 11 percent of costs, respectively. Given
that brokers play a much less signiﬁcant role
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opia, this ﬁnding can be interpreted as an
indication that the presence of brokers in the
Ethiopian context reduces the search costs
that would be incurred by traders who would
need to personally accompany their ship-
ments. Subsequent chapters rigorously test
this interpretation.
Summary
Analysis of traders’ operations and their
arbitrage behavior reveals that Ethiopian
grain wholesaler trading ﬁrms are generally
small-scale, personalized enterprises in which
the owner is the sole owner and dominant
player in the business. In 70 percent of cases,
owners are also managers. Manager-owners
appear to be well educated relative to the
general population, with 10 years of school-
ing, and are predominantly male. On aver-
age, traders have had 10 years of business
experience, often starting out in businesses
other than those they currently operate. Firms
are not bought or sold, but are typically
started up by their current owners, indicating
that a ﬁrm’s reputation is not separate from
its owner’s. Social capital plays an important
part in trade in that at least half of the traders
interviewed are children of current or past
traders, generally their fathers.
Further, with the exception of Addis
Ababa, the grain trade operations sampled
do not appear to be highly specialized in
wholesale activity, despite their identiﬁca-
tion as wholesalers. Thus, in surplus areas
wholesalers are also engaged in assembling
grain by purchasing it directly from farmers.
In deﬁcit areas the converse is true, with
wholesalers engaged in selling grain in
smaller quantities to retailers and directly 
to consumers. In addition, businesses do not
appear to be fully specialized in grain trad-
ing, with 34 percent indicating that they are
engaged in other types of trade or income-
earning activities.
Trade enterprises are characterized by a
very low asset base. Only 6 percent of the
sample own transport vehicles, and more than
70 percent rent storage space. Traders invest
relatively little in business assets outside of
scales. Surprisingly, a relatively high pro-
portion of traders own telephones and have
electricity. In terms of ﬁnancial assets, only
one-third of the sample obtained formal bank
loans during the survey year, although all
traders indicated that they had access to other
sources of credit, at less favorable terms.
Despite the lack of access to formal credit,
traders appear to be well endowed in terms
of total loan amounts (US$14,000 per year on
average) and working capital levels (roughly
US$9,000).
Due to the regional disparities in market-
able surplus of speciﬁc grains, grain trade in
Ethiopia is characterized by long-distance
wholesale shipments, ranging from 200 to
1,200 kilometers. Spatial ﬂows of grain
conform to a radial conﬁguration in which
grain is shipped from western, northern, and
southern surplus-producing areas to the
central market of Addis Ababa. From Addis
Ababa grain ﬂows outward to the deﬁcit
areas in the northern parts of the country, as
well as to eastern and southeastern markets.
Although Addis Ababa is the main hub of
the spatial conﬁguration of markets, smaller
hubs are emerging, such as Nazareth. Dire
Dawa and Harar appear to function as termi-
nal markets, with little transport activity by
local traders. Bahir Dar in the Gojam area
appears to be another emerging market hub.
In this area new marketing channels are
evolving, with traders bypassing the Addis
Ababa market and shipping grain directly
along new or revitalized roads to Wello,
Tigray, and neighboring Eritrea.
Traders’arbitrage behavior is mainly lim-
ited to transport, or transformation over space,
with the exception of the terminal markets
of Addis Ababa as well as Dire Dawa and
Harar. In these terminal markets arbitrage
activity is very restricted: traders buy grain
from regional sellers, then turn around and
sell it to urban buyers. The average distance
traveled by the traders surveyed for trans-
actions was 200 kilometers. Overall, their
marketing costs represented 83 percent of
their gross margins, indicating that traders
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proportion of marketing costs represented
by marketing margins is quite variable, how-
ever, with very high marketing costs in the
regional markets compared to the terminal
markets.
There is also a high degree of variability
in the level of absolute proﬁts among the
various markets. Thus, proﬁts appear to be
signiﬁcantly higher in the Gojam markets of
Bahir Dar and Bure, possibly due to new
and potentially riskier market channels. As
expected, the large number of traders and
the limited services provided lead to very low
proﬁts in the Addis Ababa market, where
traders appear to beneﬁt mainly from a high
volume of operations rather than from large
proﬁt margins. In relative terms, the costs of
purchasing grain represents 82 percent of its
sale price, while marketing costs and proﬁts
represent 16 percent and 2 percent, respec-
tively. The very low share of proﬁts, indica-
tive of low returns to trade, suggests that trade
is quite competitive in general, although this
rate varies considerably between markets and
between traders. This ﬁnding seems incon-
sistent with hypotheses that grain trade is a
highly risky activity, due in part to the high
differentiation of individual types of grains.
This may be because of the presence of bro-
kers, who play a critical role in reducing the
risk of contract failure and in inspecting and
certifying the various qualities of grains in
the market, as subsequent chapters explore.
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The Middlemen of the Middlemen:
The Institution of Brokers
T
he geographic dispersion of trade, the absence of grades and standards, the lack of
market information, and limited legal enforcement are factors that contribute to an in-
creased risk of commitment failure, which is the failure to complete a transaction. In
the absence of formal means to mitigate the risk of commitment failure, how do Ethiopian
grain traders carry out long-distance transactions? One option employed by traders is per-
sonalized exchange, whereby they trade grain only with partners whom they know and trust,
who may be associated to them by kinship, religion, or ethnicity. Alternatively, survey evi-
dence reveals that traders use the services of brokers to conduct long-distance trade with
anonymous partners.
This chapter closely examines the institution of brokerage in the Ethiopian grain market.
It explores the sources of commitment failure in the Ethiopian market, then engages in an em-
pirical examination of the structure of the brokerage institution. The chapter then addresses
how brokers enable traders to reduce commitment failure.
The analysis of brokerage in this chapter relies on primary data collected in 1996 in a for-
mal survey of central market brokers located in Addis Ababa. The sample included 17 brokers
randomly selected from a total population of 40 established brokers in the central market. The
main purpose of the survey was to obtain a fuller understanding of how brokers operate as
well as to corroborate the information provided in the trader survey, described in the previous
chapter. The broker survey covered the function and operations of brokers, as well as their
assets, resources, transaction costs, and social capital.
Sources of Commitment Failure in the Ethiopian Market
As in many other developing economies in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, traders in the
liberalized Ethiopian grain market operate in a context in which grain prices are not publicly
announced, grain is highly differentiated because there is no formal standardization and clas-
siﬁcation system, contracts are oral and nonstandardized, grain shipments are not inspected
or certiﬁed ofﬁcially, and there are very limited means of legally enforcing contracts (Dadi,
Negassa, and Franzel 1992; Kuawab Business Consultants 1994). These constraints cause
grain traders to be highly vulnerable to being cheated with respect to market prices, quality and quantity of the delivered grain, and other
contractual terms such as the timing of de-
livery and grain spoilage or loss during
transport, inter alia. The traders interviewed
reported that partners can, and do, cheat
by delivering lower-quality grain than was
discussed at the time of sale. Since there
are no ofﬁcial inspections of grain, a trader
who contacts a partner by telephone is forced
to take the partner’s word at face value.
Furthermore, grain quality can deteriorate
in the course of storage or transport to
the buyer. The relevant parameters of qual-
ity for Ethiopian grain are qualitative and
open to considerably different interpreta-
tions. Traders can deceive partners by mis-
quoting or omitting information on any of
these parameters at the time of the oral
agreement regarding the grain price.
Other opportunities for fraud are pre-
sented by the lack of standardized sacks.
Traders indicate that sacks, which are reused
numerous times, vary dramatically in terms
of the quantity of grain they will hold and
their quality. Sellers can cheat by using
sacks that hold less than the 100 kilograms
that they are presumed to hold. In small rural
markets where there are no scales, buyers
are reported to cheat farmers routinely by
putting grain in sacks that hold considerably
more than 100 kilograms. Moreover, the
practice of reusing sacks creates room for
opportunistic behavior. Traders report that
buying a load of grain in the sacks of a sell-
ing merchant is undesirable, because the
seller is likely to provide the oldest possible
sacks, which are likely to tear and cause
grain loss or damage over the course of
transport.
The commitment problem is also a func-
tion of the point at which ownership of grain
is transferred between partners. When a
seller retains ownership of, and concomitant
risk for, a shipment of grain until it reaches
its ﬁnal destination, the trader is highly vul-
nerable to the buyer’s reneging on his agree-
ment to buy. Similarly, if the buyer takes
ownership of a load of grain at the seller’s
venue, the buyer is highly vulnerable to fraud-
ulent representation of the grain or damage
during transport.
In the event that cheating occurs, re-
course to a legal third party is very limited in
Ethiopia. In part, the lack of legal recourse
is due to the time-consuming nature and in-
accessibility of formal courts. Moreover, as
elsewhere in Africa, it is not customary for
business partners to engage in legal suits
(Berry 1993). Platteau (1994b) argues that
markets depend on generalized social norms
rather than continuous legal sanctions. Ac-
cording to the traders interviewed, a trader
who has been deceived by a partner must re-
turn to the market in order to seek out the
wrongdoer and engage in a public confronta-
tion. When the partner is not found or a
settlement cannot be reached, the trader
bears the loss. This commitment problem se-
verely inhibits traders from placing orders
with other traders in distant markets or, in
general, from trading with unknown mer-
chants, even if they meet face to face.
The Structure of
Grain Brokerage
Brokers generally do not trade on their own
account, with less than 10 percent of trans-
actions made for themselves. However, al-
though they do not bear market price risk,
they are held accountable in the event of a
breach of contract. Brokers are permanently
located in the central market and thus are
easily identiﬁable to all traders who come
in and out of the market. Their permanent
presence in the central market is a mecha-
nism that ensures the transmission of infor-
mation on traders’ reputations. In addition,
their continuous presence implies that in the
event that a falling-out between partners en-
gaged in long-distance trade, a broker can be
contacted to mediate and resolve the dispute.
Characteristics of Brokers
The 1996 survey revealed that brokers are
similar to the larger group of traders in terms
of age, educational level, religion, and gen-
der (Table 4.1). However, brokers appear to
be considerably better endowed than traders
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Thus, they have 44 percent more working
capital than traders and 29 percent of brokers
own vehicles in contrast to only 6 percent of
traders. Similarly, 71 percent of brokers have
telephones compared to 39 percent of traders
(Table 3.7). This comparison suggests that
established brokers are relatively well off,
with greater access to ﬁnancial resources. It
also suggests that brokers may be involved
in a number of activities outside of direct bro-
kerage, such as providing transport services,
extending loans to clients, and engaging in
grain trading on their own account. Brokers
are highly heterogeneous with respect to
working capital, implying that brokers may
perform different market roles, according to
their capacities.
Brokers are also better endowed with
social capital than are traders. It is interest-
ing to note that while brokers and traders
have similar endowments of “in-born” social
capital, such as family and friends in grain
trade,9 brokers have considerably more “ac-
quired” social capital, with three times more
local contacts and nearly ﬁve times more
distant trading contacts (Table 4.1).
In terms of their search capacity, brokers
are clearly more search-efﬁcient than traders
in that although they spend roughly the same
amount of time in information gathering as
traders, they consult with nearly twice as
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Table 4.1 Comparison of brokers and traders, 1996
Brokers Traders
(N = 17) (N = 152)
Mean SD Mean SD
Demographic measure
Age (years) 36.21 11.49 32.83 12.32
Education (years) 8.29 4.41 9.61 3.64
Religion: Orthodox Christian (percent)a 78.6 . . . 66.4 . . .
Gender: Male (percent) 100.0 . . . 94.1 . . .
Years in grain trade 8.77 7.63 10.41 8.76
Assets
Working capital (Ethiopian birr)b 79,750 100,805 55,184 62,647
Warehouse capacity (tons)c 92.89 75.80 115.55 171.08
Vehicle (percent) 28.6 . . . 5.9 . . .
Telephone service (percent)c 71.4 . . . 38.8 . . .
Social capital
Number of friends in traded 4.60 5.89 6.17 8.74
Number of family members in trade 1.20 1.69 0.83 1.38
Number of local contacts 15.50 13.46 4.59 4.32
Number of distant contacts 38.50 19.50 7.89 7.46
Number of markets in which operate 5.80 2.70 3.46 2.86
Father in grain trade (percent) 60.0 . . . 48.4 . . .
Search behavior
Minutes spent daily in information gathering 37.80 41.93 39.06 39.79
Number of people consulted daily 7.80 8.43 4.24 3.28
Number of employees engaged in searching 5.00 3.89 1.74 1.29
Number of weekly transactions 20.00 17.04 1.56 0.74
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
Note: No standard deviation is reported for percentages.
a If not Orthodox, religion is generally Muslim.
b Eth. Birr 6.35 = US$1 in 1996.
c The sum of rented and owned storage capacity.
d Friends are deﬁned as personal contacts who are not merely acquaintances.
9 Two types of social capital can be distinguished: “in-born” social capital that is obtained by an individual involuntarily,
such as family connections, ethnic or religion-based networks, and “acquired” social capital that is based on the indi-
vidual’s choice to join an association, invest in contacts, and so on (Fafchamps and Minten 1999).many people, have three times more employ-
ees engaged in search activities, and conduct
more than 10 times as many transactions as
do traders (Table 4.1).
Brokers’ Operations
Grain brokers operate from permanent mar-
ket stalls in the central grain market, known
as the Ehil Berenda, in Addis Ababa. Each
broker handles transactions for clients in
nearly six markets, on average, with a total of
60 clients (Table 4.2). Of these clients, most
are distant sellers; on average a broker may
have 38 such clients. There is relatively little
variation among brokers in terms of the total
number of clients and the number of clients in
distant markets. However, there is more vari-
ation in the number of local clients, indicating
that some brokers may be more specialized
than others in handling distant orders.
Brokers who work with clients outside of
the central market may handle orders exclu-
sively by telephone, indicating the sophisti-
cation of the brokerage service as well as the
degree of trust between brokers and traders.
The data reveal that brokers work solely by
telephone with more seller clients, 77 percent,
than with buyer clients, 20 percent (Table
4.2). Underlying reasons for this difference
in behavior may be the greater risks involved
for buyers, who are more likely to be cheated
on the quality or price of the grain that they
order.
Over the six-month period from January
through June 1996, the average amount of
grain handled weekly by each broker ranged
from 141 tons to 279 tons. Extrapolating these
figures for the estimated 40 established bro-
kers operating in the market allows one to
assume that approximately 423,000 tons of
grain were handled by the established Addis
Ababa brokers in the 1995–96 marketing
year.10 In relative terms, this amounts to
only 16 percent of the total marketable sur-
plus of grain in 1995/96, estimated at 2.6
million tons. However, considering that only
1.2 million tons were marketed through as-
semblers and wholesalers, the share handled
by brokers was actually 52 percent of the
grain marketed through traders.
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Table 4.2 Brokers’ operations, 1996
Coefﬁcient
Mean variation
Total number of clients 60.50 0.53
Number of local buyer clients 11.20 1.41
Number of distant buyer clients 7.44 0.96
Number of local seller clients 2.10 2.56
Number of distant seller clients 38.44 0.45
Share of distant buyer clients with whom broker can work solely by telephone 19.63 1.89
Share of distant seller clients with whom broker can work solely by telephone 76.77 0.47
Share of buyer clients to whom broker would offer buyer credit 32.22 1.07
Share of seller clients to whom broker would offer sales advance 41.15 1.06
Weekly transactions (100-kg bags)
January 1996 2,777.27 0.76
February 1996 2,788.64 0.82
March 1996 2,543.18 0.82
April 1996 1,411.36 0.98
May 1996 1,752.27 1.06
June 1996 1,956.82 0.85
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
Note: N = 17.
10 Lirenso (1993) estimates that in 1992 some 342 regional wholesalers from 64 market towns shipped 1,354 tons weekly
to 50 brokers.Functions of Brokers
Due to the constraints noted earlier, the Ethi-
opian grain market is primarily, if not en-
tirely, a physical cash market. Thus, not only
are there no forward transactions, but all
transactions involve visually inspecting and
entire shipment of grain rather than a sample.
In this context, brokers’ functions involve
ﬁve distinct activities, some of which could
otherwise be considered “public goods”: pro-
viding market information to clients, ar-
ranging the handling and logistics of grain
delivery, grading and classifying grain, de-
termining its market price, and matching
buyers and sellers. Of these, the latter two
functions are typically the ones most closely
associated with brokers in most world mar-
kets, where the function of brokers is gen-
erally considerably narrower than that of
Ethiopian brokers.
Ethiopian grain brokers also consider
their role as “witnesses” of transactions the
most important service they provide. That is,
in facilitating transactions between buyers
and sellers, brokers, by their presence and
the weight of their reputation, sanction the
legitimacy of their clients. In the event of a
dispute, a broker can be called upon to en-
force the contract or mediate a negotiated
settlement.
Brokers provide market information and
business advice to clients on a continuous
basis. After consulting with a broker about
prevailing market conditions and prices, a
seller in a distant market will send a ship-
ment of grain directly to the broker, in effect
placing a sale order, or a buyer will place a
purchase order, which involves sending funds
to the broker. In each case, the buyer or seller
assumes the total burden of price risk in the
transaction and faces the transaction costs of
holding either grain inventory or physical
cash ﬁxed during the search period.
In the case of a sale order, the broker
physically receives the shipment of grain on
his premises. Generally the grain is not off-
loaded from the transport vehicle, which re-
mains parked in front of the broker’s stall
where it is visible to incoming buyers. After
receiving a grain shipment, the broker in-
spects and grades the incoming grain. In order
to ascertain the quality of the grain, the
broker uses a pointed tubular device, known
as a memermeria, to take samples randomly
from different sacks of the shipment. On the
basis of this type of inspection of the grain,
brokers set the market price for each of the
types of grain they receive. Each broker sets
an average of seven different prices daily.
The time required for brokers to set prices
ranges between 15 and 30 minutes, or about
6 minutes per commodity (Table 4.2).
The search for buyers or sellers involves
discussing the state of the market with other
brokers, touring the marketplace by foot talk-
ing to traders, placing phone calls to interested
parties, and instructing assistants to stand on
top of trucks shouting out the available types
and qualities of grain. At the point of sale or
purchase, the broker arranges the handling
of the grain and the transport logistics.
When a sale is completed on behalf of a
client, a broker deducts the commission and
remits the funds to the regional seller. If the
grain has not been sold and the seller is short
of funds, the broker may extend a sales ad-
vance to a valued client. Brokers indicated
that they provide this service to roughly 40
percent of their clientele (Table 4.2). Unsold
grain is off-loaded to the broker’s warehouse,
where it is stored for a monthly rental fee.
Depending on the relationship with a client,
the broker may also provide buyer credit for
up to 30 days. Brokers offer this service to
approximately one-third of all their clients
(Table 4.2).
Price Discovery by Brokers
Price discovery generally refers to the pro-
cess by which a market-clearing price is ob-
tained in a centralized market.11 In Ethiopia,
grain brokers carry out an implicit bidding
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11 See Chicago Board of Trade (1989).process that results in a single daily Addis
Ababa spot price for each type and origin of
grain prevailing in the Addis Ababa market.
Before the start of the market day at 6 A.M.,
brokers individually evaluate the supply and
demand conditions in the market. Using the
previous day’s closing price as a starting
basis, brokers individually “ﬁx” a market
price for each type and quality of grain they
have received from regional clients. They
then adjust this price according to what other
brokers may have ﬁxed in nearby stalls. It
takes some 18 minutes, on average, for this
tâtonnementprocess to result in a single daily
spot price for each grain, by type, region of
origin, and quality.
For this reason, contrary to what is seen
in many agricultural markets throughout
Africa, a single cash price prevails in the
Addis Ababa market for a given quality and
origin of a particular grain. This spot price
generally holds for the entire trading period
(between 6 and 9 A.M.) or changes one or
two times as the closing of the market ap-
proaches at 9 A.M.12 On a given day, brokers
determine up to 40 such spot prices for the
five principal grains traded on the Addis
Ababa market: teff, wheat, maize, barley,
and sorghum (Table 4.3).
This price discovery process has signiﬁ-
cant implications for the national grain econ-
omy in that studies of market integration
have shown that prices in major regional
deﬁcit and surplus markets are closely linked
to the Addis Ababa price (Negassa 1998;
Dercon 1995). The price discovery role
played by brokers represents a highly spe-
cialized market function, resulting in ﬁnite
variations in prices according to very pre-
cisely deﬁned qualities of grain. The relevant
parameters of quality used by brokers are
color, taste, appearance, moisture content,
impurity, breakage of kernels, and baking
qualities.13 Thus, on a given market day 11
different prices of wheat, varying from Eth.
Birr 105 to 175 per bag, were noted in the
Addis Ababa market, each of which was pre-
cisely identiﬁed according to its region of
origin, variety, and grade (Table 4.4). Simi-
larly, teff prices ranged from Eth. Birr 130
to 245, and barley prices from Eth. Birr 105 to
300 per bag.
Surprisingly, ofﬁcial trading agencies
do not recognize the price discovery func-
tion of brokers, and trade licensing and reg-
ulatory bodies neither distinguish brokers
from wholesale traders nor acknowledge their
price discovery role. Moreover, this function
is equally hidden from other market partici-
pants, such as consumers and farmers, be-
cause the various grades of grain determined
by brokers are not openly labeled or known.
Due to this lack of transparency, a recent at-
tempt to establish a public market informa-
tion system, set up to report a single price for
each of the ﬁve grains, failed to distinguish
the origins and qualities of grains, as is done
by brokers (Grain Market Research Project
1996).14 This failure was due to the lack of
awareness of this relatively sophisticated
market function of brokers.
In essence, the Ethiopian price discovery
process most closely resembles what is known
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Table 4.3 Price discovery by brokers, 1996
Percentage of brokers
Existence of single daily market price 78.6
Frequency of price changes
Daily 21.4
2–3 times per day 64.3
Mean (SD)
Time required to set market prices (minutes) 18.77 (11.25)
Number of prices set daily 7.30 (3.47)
Time required to set each price 6.20 (4.80)
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
Note: N = 17.
12 The Addis Ababa grain-trading association established that trading would be done only between 6 and 9 A.M. Monday
through Saturday. Other rules set by the association concern the logistics of delivery trucks and market taxes for infra-
structural improvement.
13 Brokers revealed in interviews that they use these parameters to determine appropriate prices.
14 The grain prices reported were for mixed teff, white barley, white wheat, white sorghum, and maize.as ring trading in the London metals market,
in which metals brokers determine the daily
price of each metal within a preset time
frame through bidding on the price (Gibson-
Jarvie 1983). Other examples are found in
the London bullion market, which informally
determines the London Gold Fix, a daily
gold price.15
Entry into Brokerage
There do not appear to be signiﬁcant formal
barriers to becoming a broker. Indeed, as
noted earlier, there are no ofﬁcial require-
ments for or restrictions on becoming a bro-
ker that are distinct from those one needs 
to obtain a trading license. Yet the number
of brokers is relatively small in the Addis
Ababa market. Given the relatively lucrative
opportunities and the lower risk involved in
brokerage compared to wholesale trade, what,
if any, are the informal barriers to entry?
Brokers themselves perceive the trust
(imnet) they acquire from their network of
traders as a critical asset in their business,
and lack of such trust as the principal barrier
to entry into brokerage. How do brokers ac-
quire trust? One means is through inherited
social capital. Thus, 60 percent of the bro-
kers surveyed had a parent in grain trade, and
40 percent had a parent in grain brokerage.
Grain brokerage businesses pass from gen-
eration to generation, gradually transferring
trust from father to son, who acquires the fa-
ther’s clients. The high value placed on an
Ethiopian broker’s work is similar to the
importance, in traditional Chinese trading
practices in southeast Asia, of xinyong, or
trust, which is also transferred across gener-
ations (Menkoff 1994).16
Another means by which brokers secure
the loyalty of their clients is through extend-
ing sales advances and buyer credits, which
potentially requires that brokers dispose of a
certain amount of working capital for these
purposes and also that brokers be willing to
be exposed to some risk. Traders are exposed
to price risk when they send grain shipments
to their brokers without locking in a price,
but brokers must be willing to assume the
counterparty risk associated with lending
funds to their clients. As noted earlier, brokers
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Table 4.4 Wholesale grain prices in the Addis Ababa market, 
December 1996
Quality Price
Grain Origin Variety (grade) (Eth. Birra/100 kg bagb)
Teff Ada Magna 1st 245
Ada Red 1st 165
Butajira White 1st 215
Welenkomi Mixed 1st 180
Gojjam Mixed 1st 155
Gojjam Abolsey 3rd 140
Gojjam Red 1st 130
Wheat Ada Israel 1st 175
Ada Israel 2nd 150
Ada White 1st n.a.c
Ada White 2nd 160
Ada Aybo 1st 175
Ada Abesha 1st 175
Ada Abesha 2nd 170
Arsi Favel 1st 145
Arsi Favel 2nd 135
Arsi Favel 3rd 105
Arsi Dashin 2nd 135
Bale Favel 1st 140
Maize Bale Red 1st 87
Gojjam White 1st 85
Gojjam Red 2nd 70
Illubabor White 2nd 65
Sorghum Wellega White 1st 140
Jirru White 1st 140
Jirru Yellow 1st 130
Arsi Red 1st 110
Barley Sodo Senef 1st 300
Sodo Senef 2nd 260
Sodo Wegertena 1st 225
Arsi Birra 2nd 160
Arsi Black 2nd 130
Arsi Asharo 2nd 105
Guder Black 2nd 135
Guder Asharro 1st 125
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
a Eth. Birr 6.35 = US$1 in 1996.
b Bags are unstandardized and vary in capacity between 90 and 120 kg.
c Price undetermined during survey.
15 These insights were provided by Jeffrey Williams.
16 The existence of trust is most frequently cited by Chinese traders to explain their success in business. The need 
“to trust trust” is among the safeguards against the possible breach of business commitments (see Menkoff 1994;
Fukuyama 1995).are signiﬁcantly better endowed with work-
ing capital than are traders, indicating that
inadequate liquidity may represent a critical
barrier to entry into brokerage.
Poor location also plays a role in limiting
entry into brokerage. That is, an important
aspect of brokerage is being physically
present in the market, with a ﬁxed place of
business and storage facilities. The number
of stalls in the Addis Ababa grain market is
limited. This may restrict the number of bro-
kers who can operate in this market. This is
analogous to the ﬁxed number of brokers’
seats in formal exchanges, resulting in a sec-
ondary market for the seats themselves.
The Role of Brokers 
in Reducing 
Commitment Failure
The likelihood of commitment failure causes
traders to be extremely reluctant to trade with
partners they don’t know. It could be ex-
pected that exchange between unknown long-
distance partners would occur rarely because
traders would anticipate cheating by their
partners. Yet there is ample evidence that
grain is traded over considerable distances
around Ethiopia and that cheating is the ex-
ception rather than the rule. The reason is
because there are brokers to limit the risks of
commitment failure.
How do brokers resolve the commitment
problem? First, as neutral intermediaries, bro-
kers are uniquely able to gather information
from a large number of traders. The traders
surveyed asserted that their primary reasons
for using brokers were the brokers’access to
traders and their superior market information
(Table 4.5). Close to 40 percent of traders
cited brokers’access to more contacts as the
most important reason for their choice, while
25 percent listed the brokers’access to infor-
mation as most important. Conversely, when
traders feel they know the market or have
sufﬁciently trustworthy partners, they don’t
use brokers. More than half of the traders in-
terviewed (53 percent) noted that if they had
felt they knew the market well enough, they
would not have used brokers, while 26 per-
cent indicated that brokers were unnecessary
when they had well-known trading partners.
Second, brokers are perceived as the
guarantors or underwriters of given trans-
actions. Brokers indicate that they see their
role as guarantors or witnesses as their most
important function in the market. Through
their mediation they ensure that imnet is
present in long-distance transactions.
Third, because brokers are permanently
located in the central market they are easily
identiﬁable by all traders who come in and
out of the market. Thus, they are natural
repositories of information regarding market
ﬂows, the behavior of market participants,
and the outcomes of past transactions. Their
permanent presence in the central market
provides a mechanism for the transmission
of information on traders’reputations. In ad-
dition, their continuous presence implies that
in the event of a falling-out between partners
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Table 4.5 Traders’ rationale for choice of brokers’ services, 1996
Reasons to work with brokera Percent traders Reasons not to work with brokerb Percent traders
Broker has better access to market information 24.8 I trade with partners whom I know well 25.9
Broker acts as guarantor 9.7 I know the market well enough 52.8
Broker has more contacts 38.9 Brokers cheat on prices 6.5
Broker identiﬁes good quality 8.0 I want to save commission fees 9.3
I have no choice 10.6 I don’t need a quick transaction 4.6
Broker gives business advice 1.8 Disagreement with broker 0.9
Less costly to work with broker 6.2
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
a N = 113.
b N = 108.in long-distance trade, the broker can be con-
tacted to mediate and resolve the dispute.
Summary
The effective expansion of the grain market
depends in part on the ability of traders to
exchange grain anonymously with buyers
and sellers in distant markets without risk of
commitment failure. Weak public market in-
formation, the lack of grain standardiza-
tion, the oral nature of contracts, and limited
legal enforcement of contracts are all factors
that contribute to the difﬁculty that traders
encounter in attempting to trade directly
with unknown partners. Using primary data,
this chapter demonstrates that brokers en-
able traders to circumvent commitment fail-
ure and facilitate anonymous trade. Analysis
reveals that brokers perform multiple func-
tions in the grain market, among which are
acting as inspectors and witnesses to each
transaction and guaranteeing that contracts
will be enforced, supporting impersonalized
exchange in the Ethiopian grain market. In
addition, brokers deliver “public goods,” such
as market information and product classiﬁ-
cation, as well as playing a key role in price
discovery. Brokers thus determine market-
clearing prices of a large number of grains
according to very speciﬁc attributes of type
and quality, enabling highly differentiated
products to be traded in a systematic fashion.
In terms of market volume, brokers handle
roughly half of transactions by wholesalers
and 16 percent of the total marketed surplus
of grain.
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Rules and Norms Underlying 
Relations between Traders 
and Brokers
W
ith brokers acting on behalf of traders, the relationship between them is essentially
that of principal and agent. Like most principal-agent relationships, the trader-
broker relationship is characterized by information asymmetry, because traders
have relatively less information on market prices and equally little information on the actual
behavior of their brokers. This information asymmetry, exacerbated by the physical distance
separating regional wholesalers and brokers, gives rise to moral hazard and opportunism on
the part of brokers. In order for the institution of brokerage to be sustained and to be more
efﬁcient than the alternatives, there must be norms to provide incentives for brokers not to
cheat their clients, the traders. Norms can be viewed as voluntary conventions that facilitate
contract enforcement (Aoki 1998).
This chapter, using primary data from trader and broker surveys, closely examines sev-
eral aspects of the principal-agent relationship between traders and brokers, deﬁned as their
agency relations. Elements of trader-broker agency relations include the basis of the relation-
ship, the extent of traders’dependence on brokers, the transparency of brokers’operations
to traders, and the extent to which conﬂict is manifest in the relations. The chapter begins by
systematically analyzing the norms embedded in the brokerage institution that limit moral
hazard and sustain the function of brokers.
The Basis of Agency Relations
Relations between traders and brokers appear to be based on repeated interaction and exclu-
sive relations. Thus, 87 percent of brokers’transactions are with long-term clients (Table 5.1).
On average, traders have worked with the same brokers for six years (Table 5.2).17 More-
over, 59 percent of traders appear to work exclusively with a single broker. There is signiﬁ-
cant variation in the exclusivity of traders’relations with brokers, with 74 percent to 100 percent
of traders in surplus regions engaged in exclusive relations compared with 22 percent of
traders in the central market.
17 Similarly, Fafchamps (1996b) ﬁnds an average of 4.1 years of business relations among ﬁrms in Ghana.Aparticular feature of trader-broker rela-
tions is that not only do traders work exclu-
sively with a broker, but traders in a given
location all tend to work with the same bro-
ker.18Thus, brokers obtain 50 percent of their
clients through traders’referrals and 43 per-
cent from having other clients in the same
region (Table 5.1).
It is generally uncommon for a broker to
represent both a buyer and a seller in a given
transaction, with only 7 percent of brokers’
transactions falling into this category. Simi-
larly, it is relatively rare for brokers to trade
on their own account with their own clients.
That is, if the brokers surveyed did not ﬁnd
a partner for a client, only 7 percent engaged
in transactions that involved directly buy-
ing grain from or selling grain to the client
(Table 5.1).
Due to the sensitivity of respondents to
ethnicity-oriented questions, the issue of
ethnic origin was addressed by asking about
the region of origin, or birthplace, which is
culturally interpreted as one’s ethnic roots.
However, responses can be biased in that
several ethnic groups may coexist in certain
regions, though not all. The results suggest
that ethnicity does not appear to be a signif-
icant basis for agency relations in that, while
the proportion of traders with the same ethnic
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Table 5.1 Brokers’ relations with trader clients, 1996
Percentage of brokers N
Basis of broker-trader relations
Referral 50.0 17
Common region 42.9 17
Anonymous meeting 7.1 17
Flat fee payment 92.9 17
When no partner is found for client
Broker charges client for storage 71.4 17
Broker rents outside space for client 7.1 17
Broker buys/sells grain at market price 7.1 17
Broker stores grain without charge 14.3 17
If partners meet, future direct exchange is likely 21.4 17
Coefﬁcient
Mean of variation N
Percentage of transactions with long-term clients 87.43 0.16 17
Percent transactions with distant buyer clients from same region 16.00 2.19 17
Percent transactions with distant seller clients from same region 17.89 1.95 17
Percent transactions where broker
Represents both buyer and seller 7.36 3.62 17
Represents buyer only 16.21 0.57 17
Represents seller only 76.43 2.11 17
Percent transactions with
Immediate matching of partners 77.53 0.14 17
No match—rent storage to client 17.00 0.63 17
No match—buy or sell on own account 6.68 1.65 17
Percent transactions with
Only buyer present 37.36 0.63 17
Only seller present 3.73 3.63 17
Both buyer and seller present 53.68 0.49 17
Neither buyer nor seller present 0.77 2.44 17
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
18 Thus, each broker in Addis Ababa is specialized in handling transactions from a particular set of markets in a region.
Brokers who handle grain from the same area have their stalls adjacent to each other, enabling the rapid transmission
of price and market information.origin as their brokers ranged from 8 percent
to 54 percent between regions, only 26 per-
cent of all traders were from the same regions
as their brokers. As further conﬁrmation, only
4 percent of traders revealed that they had
“kinship” ties with their brokers (Table 5.2).
Similarly, brokers reported that, on aver-
age, only 16 percent of distant buyer clients
and 18 percent of distant seller clients were
from the same region. The relative weakness
of ethnicity as a basis of agency relations is a
striking departure from other studies of trust-
based trading networks, in which ethnicity
plays a major role (Fafchamps 1992a, 1996b;
Greif 1993; Evers and Schrader 1994).
Traders’ Dependence 
on Brokers
The majority of Ethiopian grain traders (as
reﬂected by 85 percent of the survey sample)
use brokers regularly. The level of their
dependence on brokerage, as measured by
whether the traders perceived it was possible
to carry out long-distance trade without
brokers, varied across regions. On average,
34 percent of the sample perceived that they
could not operate in the grain market with-
out brokers (Table 5.2). A greater share of
traders in surplus markets, ranging from
26 percent to 70 percent, felt they could not
operate in distant markets without a broker,
while all traders in the deﬁcit regions (with
the exception of Dessie and Kombolcha
markets) and the central market considered
it possible to trade without brokers. In gen-
eral, regional buyers are more likely to travel
the distance to the central market and pur-
chase the grain themselves, while regional
sellers are more likely to work closely with
brokers by means of telephone transactions.
This ﬁnding may have to do with the oppor-
tunity cost of time faced by regional sellers
of grain, who are busy purchasing grain from
smaller rural markets and whose business
would suffer if they were obliged to travel
to the central market for each long-distance
sale.
Another signiﬁcant feature of the trader-
broker relationship is that traders receive
some form of ﬁnancial credit from their
brokers. The traders surveyed received either
a sales advance or a buyer credit for 68 per-
cent of their transactions, suggesting that
brokers play a more important role than search
and enforcement (Table 5.2).
Openness of
Trader-Broker Relations
The absence of a public market information
system and the physical distance between
regional traders and central market brokers
in Ethiopia result in high monitoring costs for
traders to monitor brokers’ actions. Traders
suspect that brokers occasionally “skim”
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Table 5.2 Traders’ relations with brokers, 1996
Percentage of traders N
Percent traders using brokers regularly 85.5 152
Percent traders not able to operate without broker 33.8 152
Percent traders working exclusively with a single broker 59.2 152
Percent traders with kinship ties with broker 3.9 152
Percent traders from same region as broker 26.5 152
Coefﬁcient
Mean of variation N
Years of exclusive relations with broker 5.6 1.17 152
Percent transactions where broker gives sales advance or buyer credit 68.21 0.55 152
Percent local transactions where trader is present with broker 82.42 0.42 152
Percent distant transactions where trader is present with broker 43.88 0.95 152
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.additional proﬁts off the actual prices they
obtain in the market as opposed to the prices
that they convey to the traders, a practice re-
ferred to as ferque. Thus, 79 percent of all
traders generally attempt to cross-check infor-
mation provided by their brokers (Table 5.3).
The extent to which brokers inform their
clients about the identities of buyers or sell-
ers whom they have discovered is a potential
indicator of the openness of agency relations.
Overall, 64 percent of traders are informed
of their trading partners’identities, although
there is very wide variation between regions
(Table 5.3). With the exception of traders in
the Dessie and Kombolcha markets, more
traders in deﬁcit regions were provided with
this information. This is due to the consid-
erably higher frequency of transactions at
which buyers are physically present in the
central market, 92 percent of brokers’trans-
actions, compared to 58 percent for sellers.
A possible result of providing partner
information to clients is that with this in-
formation traders would attempt to bypass
their brokers and trade directly among
themselves. Overall, 76 percent of traders
indicated that they would consider direct
exchange without their brokers. However,
39 percent of traders felt that the implication
would be to enter into conﬂict with their
broker, if they were to do so (Table 5.3). In
contrast, relatively few brokers (21 percent)
felt that direct exchange was likely to occur
without their involvement as witnesses and
facilitators of transactions (Table 5.1).
Conﬂict between Traders 
and Brokers
Conﬂict between traders and brokers may
arise when traders suspect price misinforma-
tion by brokers or when traders attempt to
bypass their brokers and exchange directly
with partners whom their brokers found in
previous transactions. Yet relatively few
traders surveyed (34 percent) had ever expe-
rienced conﬂict with their brokers during
the entire period of their working relations,
and the average number of conﬂicts for a
year (1.5) had a very high coefﬁcient of vari-
ation (Table 5.3).
The majority of traders (65 percent of
the sample) used informal mediation as a
means of resolving conﬂicts, with the share
of traders using this option ranging from 40
percent to 100 percent (Table 5.3). In sum,
relations between traders and brokers appear
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Table 5.3 Openness and conﬂict between brokers and traders, 1996
Surplus Deﬁcit Central Total
(N = 64) (N = 51) (N = 37) (N = 152)
Percentage of traders who cross-check 
information from broker 80.6 80.9 64.7 78.6
Percentage of traders to whom broker 
reveals identity of trading partner 53.5 74.4 66.7 63.7
Percentage of transactions in which traders  64.71 75.70 58.21 68.21
know their trading partners (38.01) (38.78) (30.10) (37.65)
Percentage of traders who consider trading 
directly without broker 82.7 72.1 66.7 76.4
Percentage of traders who feel direct trading 
would cause conﬂict with broker 27.9 51.6 50.0 39.3
Percentage of traders who have experienced 
conﬂict with broker 33.9 31.1 42.1 34.1
Number of conﬂicts in past year with broker 1.78 0.88 2.07 1.47
(3.38) (1.31) (2.99) (2.73)
Percentage of traders for whom conﬂict was 
resolved through legal recourse 0.0 12.5 0.0 4.3
Percentage of traders for whom conﬂict was 
resolved through mediation 63.6 50.0 100.0 65.2
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.to be characterized by relatively little con-
ﬂict and the absence of legal recourse. 
The widespread use of informal mediation
rather than legal recourse is consistent with
the existence of generalized social norms




The sustainability of the brokerage institu-
tion over time depends on the extent to
which brokers are prevented from abusing
the trust of their clients. Without institutional
constraints limiting the possibility of oppor-
tunistic behavior by brokers, trader-broker
relations would be characterized by a higher
incidence of conﬂict and would not be self-
enforcing. In the absence of any market reg-
ulation of their function and given the high
costs of monitoring the activities of brokers,
what norms prevail to limit cheating by
brokers and maintain long-term agency rela-
tions between brokers and traders?
Effective Transmission 
of Information on 
Brokers’ Reputations
Agency relations are structured in a manner
that provides a means for sanctioning bro-
kers’ actions. Thus, the practice of many
traders in the same market working exclu-
sively with the same broker would appear
to give brokers signiﬁcant market power vis-
à-vis the individual traders in a market. How-
ever, this practice actually offers a safety net
for individual traders in that information
provided by the brokers ﬂows freely among
all traders in a given market. This enables
traders to monitor the reputations of brokers,
because if a broker cheats one client, other
traders are likely to ﬁnd out about it and
spread the news, compromising the cheating
broker’s relations with all clients in that mar-
ket and in nearby markets of the region. Ev-
idence suggests that traders actually do carry
out sanctions and effectively boycott brokers.
For example, over the course of the survey
visits, traders in the Nekempte market col-
lectively boycotted their broker and together
switched to a new broker.
The Absence of “Market Making”
A second means of limiting opportunistic
behavior by brokers lies in the incentive com-
patibility of brokers relative to their clients.
Apotential source of conﬂict in agency rela-
tions would exist if brokers, trading on their
own account, bought and sold grain from
their own clients.19As noted earlier, it is not
common practice for grain brokers to buy
or sell clients’ grain on their own account,
at least overtly, in the interests of maintain-
ing neutrality vis-à-vis their client traders.20
Thus, the grain market structure does not
have a role for “market makers” who openly
purchase unmatched orders at a discount
(the bid price) and sell unmatched orders at
a premium (the asking price) in order to cre-
ate a market for those willing to pay the price
of immediacy (Demsetz 1968).
The brokers surveyed reiterated that trad-
ing on their own account is considered a se-
rious breach of the implicit rules governing
agency relations. Because information on
purchase and sale orders is incomplete at any
given point in time, traders cannot conﬁrm
a broker’s information that a partner is un-
available. Brokers would be willing to trans-
act at rates more favorable than the market,
thus causing strains in their relations with
clients.21
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19 A number of commodity exchanges, such as the Chicago Board of Trade, prohibit house trading by brokers in order
to limit “frontrunning,” whereby brokers trade on their own account before placing clients’orders, of which they know
in advance.
20 Although brokers stated that they do not trade directly with their own clients, many are engaged in grain trade. Thus,
brokers may conduct undetected “frontrunning,” in which case they would be reluctant to reveal the identity of their
partners.
21 Matching remaining orders at the market price would not be economically rational behavior for a broker, who would
incur market risk in the process.Flat Commission Rates
Third, Ethiopian grain brokers are compen-
sated for their services by means of a ﬁxed
commission that is a ﬂat rate per quantity
transacted rather than a percentage of the
ﬁnal transaction price. This practice is com-
mon to all regions of Ethiopia studied and
was conﬁrmed by 93 percent of the brokers
surveyed (Table 5.1). Lirenso (1993) also
noted this payment system in the Ethiopian
grain market in 1992. The ﬂat fee is ﬁxed
across brokers and across time, but varies
according to region.22
The practice of charging ﬁxed brokerage
fees has also been noted in other studies, in
rural Indian foodgrain markets by Lele (1971)
and in northern Nigerian grain markets by
Gilbert (1969). Historical records from the
late 19th century indicate that brokerage fees
for grain traded on the Chicago Board of
Trade were ﬂat fees per quantity and were
ﬁxed across time.23 Flat fees are also found
in other international commodity markets,
such as those for coffee and cocoa. In these
markets both sellers and buyers pay com-
mission fees, as is the case in the Ethiopian
grain market.
In the Ethiopian grain market, a ﬂat bro-
kerage fee is compatible with broker incen-
tives for several reasons. First, brokers do
not usually act as dual agents; they represent
only one of the trading partners. Thus, they
receive a commission from only one party
in the transaction. In a given transaction,
both the seller’s agent and the buyer’s agent
receive commissions from their clients. Sec-
ond, the service for which brokers are com-
pensated is not price search, given that there
is a spot price that prevails in the market, but
rather the search for buyers or sellers. For
this reason, brokers maximize proﬁt across a
large volume of transactions in a short period
of time, charging a small transaction fee.
Third, and most important in the Ethiopian
market, a ﬂat commission limits cheating by
brokers. Since brokers themselves determine
the market price in the price discovery role
described earlier, a percentage fee would
bias the price discovery process and provide
brokers with incentives to ﬁx the prices to
their advantage.
Summary
Aclose investigation of the agency relations
between traders and brokers highlighted the
importance of long-term, reputation-based
relations in a structure in which many traders
in a given market work with the same bro-
kers. Ethnicity does not seem to be an im-
portant factor in these relations. The analysis
revealed that, although traders attempt to
monitor their brokers’activities, relatively lit-
tle conﬂict occurs. Conﬂict is avoided through
established norms that limit brokers’oppor-
tunistic behavior and that are incentive-
compatible for brokers. These norms include
the joint client system that enables traders
to share information regarding their common
broker, the absence of market-making by bro-
kers, and the ﬂat fee system.
The implications of these ﬁndings for
policy are that strengthening the role of bro-
kers further promotes anonymous exchange.
At present, although a large proportion of
traders use brokers regularly, fewer than half
of traders’ total transactions are conducted
using brokers. Despite the higher search ca-
pacity of brokers, less than 20 percent of the
total annual marketable surplus is exchanged
through brokers (Gebremeskel, Jayne, and
Shaffer 1998). This implies that formalizing
the brokerage function could have signiﬁ-
cant positive consequences for the Ethiopian
grain economy.
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22 Brokers charge different fees for grain coming from different regions. The fee is the same for all brokers handling grain
from the same region, and changes in the fee are jointly determined by the brokers.
23 See Chicago Board of Trade (1888).CHAPTER 6
Transaction Costs and Social Capital
M
arket search is costly, both in terms of labor costs for search activities and in terms
of the time cost of holding inventory during the search. For every transaction,
each trader incurs the cost of labor time invested in search. This cost is represented
by the opportunity cost of the labor employed in search, which depends on the trader’s abil-
ity to hire additional labor or to engage the help of family members in the search effort.
Second, each trader ties up his or her working capital in the form of grain for the time re-
quired to search. This cost is represented by the opportunity cost of the working capital dur-
ing search, which depends on the trader’s access to formal and informal sources of capital.
Finally, each trader’s search effort is inﬂuenced by the number of trusted contacts that he or
she has, that is, the trader’s social capital.
Search Time
Market search includes both the search for market information and the search for a trading
partner. Market search costs are a function of the opportunity cost of a trader’s time, the time
spent searching, and the amount of search labor.
Table 6.1 compares traders’own search time, in terms of number of days spent identify-
ing partners, with brokers’search time. These data were obtained by asking traders to recall
for their last transaction how much time it took either them or a broker to ﬁnd a partner.
Traders who did not use a broker searched for 1.5 days, which was less than the broker’s
search time of 2.7 days. Comparing the number of price offers obtained, traders who did not
use a broker had an average of 2.3 price offers per transaction, which was roughly equal to the
number of offers obtained by brokers (on behalf of traders), who had an average of 2.5 price
offers. These results indicate that traders do not use brokers when their search costs, indi-
cated by the number of price offers they can obtain in a given amount of time, are lower than
or equal to a broker’s costs.
The traders interviewed estimated their own direct costs of search (including the costs of
travel and telecommunications) per quantity transacted and compared these costs to the
brokerage fee. As expected, traders who used the services of a broker calculated that their
own search costs would be nearly double the brokerage fee, with an average ratio of 1.7. Fur-
ther, 60 percent of traders who used brokers indicated that their search time would be greater
without a broker, while 48 percent of traders who did not use a broker estimated that the searchtime with a broker would be at least equal to
the time they spent themselves, conﬁrming
that traders’choice of brokerage is based on
their own search costs.
Search Labor
Several alternative measures of search labor
were gathered in the survey. Search labor 
is measured by the number of persons em-
ployed by the trader to help in searching for
buyers and sellers and the number of persons
responsible for purchasing and selling activ-
ities. Table 6.2 reveals that many traders do
not have other staff to conduct partner search
and to handle transactions, implying that the
opportunity cost of their labor time is very
high. The sample average for the number of
employees conducting partner searches, in-
cluding the trader interviewed, was 1.7, and
the sample average for the number of per-
sons responsible for sales and purchases, in-
cluding the trader, was 2.1.
Alternatively, traders’ search labor is
measured by the amount of time spent daily
consulting with other traders to obtain mar-
ket information, identifying and negotiating
with potential partners, and carrying out
transactions. Traders spent an average of 39
minutes daily in market information searches
and consulted with 5.2 persons (Table 6.2).
The traders indicated that they conducted 1.6
transactions weekly on average. As a measure
of their time constraint, the traders inter-
viewed identiﬁed the incremental transac-
tionsthat would be possible with the addition
of another responsible helper who could act
on their behalf. The traders estimated that
the incremental transactions resulting from
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Table 6.1 Search time and search costs per transaction, 1996
Search time Number of Self-search cost/
(days) price offers broker fee
Using broker Mean 2.7 2.5 1.7
SD (3.4) (1.7) (1.8)
With trader self-search Mean 1.5 2.3
SD (9.2) (1.8)
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
Table 6.2 Search labor by region, 1996
Number of Minutes Number of Number of Incremental
traders spent daily in employees employees Number of sales with
consulted information engaged engaged weekly additional
daily gathering in search in sales transactions employee
Region Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Surplus
Wollega 3.36 1.29 42.73 31.73 2.73 1.79 3.09 1.70 1.43 0.91 0.27 0.65
Arsi 4.54 3.04 44.50 32.01 1.73 1.01 2.09 0.94 1.86 1.61 0.45 0.82
Gojjam 4.83 2.78 49.33 49.74 1.67 0.80 2.13 0.73 1.17 1.25 0.36 0.88
Deﬁcit
Wollo 4.23 4.41 25.18 40.64 1.24 0.75 2.06 0.83 0.66 0.46 0.11 0.29
Tigray 3.25 2.56 39.54 30.93 1.33 0.78 1.67 0.65 0.60 0.36 0.00 0.19
Hararghe 3.12 3.71 18.00 9.02 2.06 0.90 1.71 0.47 0.41 0.25 0.00 0.00
Central
Addis Ababa 4.90 3.54 43.41 42.82 1.73 1.89 2.10 0.88 3.41 4.63 2.35 9.05
Total 4.24 3.28 39.06 39.79 1.74 1.29 2.09 0.93 1.56 2.62 0.74 4.52
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.adding a helper would be 0.7 transactions,
which would add 47 percent to current oper-
ations (Table 6.2).
Working Capital
The opportunity cost of capital is a measure
of how costly it is for a trader to tie up work-
ing capital in grain stocks for the period of
time required for a transaction to be com-
pleted. Traders’liquidity preferences depend
on how difﬁcult it is to obtain additional
sources of working capital, that is, their ac-
cess to credit.
Table 6.3 reveals that the use of credit
was prevalent among the traders sampled;
90 percent of them used some type of credit
in their operations. However, far fewer had
access to formal credit; only 31 percent had
used bank loans. Informal credit extended
by friends and family was considerably
more important; 74 percent of the traders
had used this type of loan. Supplier credit,
which involves reimbursement of suppliers
after a lag of one or two weeks, was used 
by 67 percent of traders. Traders received,
on average, total credit of Eth. Birr 88,917
(US$14,000) for the marketing year, while
their average working capital was Eth. Birr
55,000 (US$8,500), indicating either that part
of the credit was used toward ﬁxed costs of
grain trading or that the traders occasionally
supplemented their average levels of work-
ing capital with credit from family, friends,
and suppliers. Although traders’ actual use
of credit allows a comparison of the impor-
tance of capital across traders, it does not
provide a measure of traders’liquidity prefer-
ences, in that the use of credit is endogenous
to their trading activities. Alternatively,
traders’ potential access, rather than actual
use, indicates how liquidity-constrained they
may be.
Traders are constrained from receiving
bank credit primarily by their lack of collat-
eral assets (Table 6.4). This is conﬁrmed by
the low proportion of the traders surveyed
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Source of loan who received loans Mean SD
Bank 30.8 26,723 64,657
Savings association 37.5 2,595 12,163
Friends 73.8 21,778 66,377
Family 31.9 5,537 16,046
Suppliers 67.1 32,114 169,723
Total credit received 90.1 88,917 218,733
Available working capital 55,184 62,647
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
a Eth. Birr 6.35 = US$1 in 1996.
Table 6.4 Access to formal credit by region, 1996
Percentage of
Percentage requested loan
of traders received Percentage Percentage
who have applied of traders of traders
Region for bank loan Mean SD who own car who own home
Surplus
Wollega 27.3 56.96 38.01 0 63.6
Arsi 72.7 63.86 17.36 18.2 81.8
Gojjam 56.7 61.25 21.56 0 55.2
Deﬁcit
Wollo 29.4 78.89 22.86 17.6 88.2
Tigray 33.3 39.49 10.04 0 75
Hararghe 23.5 100.0 0.00 5.9 58.8
Central
Addis Ababa 6.7 52.5 31.81 13.3 23.3
Total 33.6 65.25 24.64 7.9 57.5
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.who owned a personal vehicle (8 percent) or
a home (57 percent).
Traders have a pool of friends and family
as well as suppliers whom they can draw on
for short-term credit (Table 6.5). However, the
traders surveyed indicated that they had re-
ceived loans from only between one-half and
two-thirds of their potential creditors in the
past year. This is partly due to liquidity con-
straints faced by these creditors themselves.
Social Capital
Factors that enhance a trader’s social capital
are whether his or her parents were in the
grain business in the past, whether family
members are currently in the grain business,
how many languages the trader speaks, how
many regular partners the trader has, and
how many people the trader consults regu-
larly (Table 6.6). Traders have more distant
market contacts that they consult regarding
market trends than they have contacts in
their local market. On average, the traders
surveyed had contacts in 3.5 distant markets
and regularly consulted with 8 traders in
distant markets and with 5 traders locally.
Ethnicity and kinship are not important deter-
minants of social capital; the traders surveyed
indicated that, on average, only 1.5 of their
market contacts were from the same region
compared to their total number of contacts,
13 persons. Similarly, the number of contacts
who were also family members was, on av-
erage, 1, while the number of “friends” in
grain trade was much higher, with an aver-
age of 6 contacts.
The number of “regular” clients that a
trader has is an alternate measure of social
capital (Table 6.6). Again, traders have more
regular partners in distant markets than lo-
cally, which is explained by noting that local
transactions are smaller than distant ones and
involve retail quantities bought directly from
farmers or sold directly to consumers. Traders’
social capital can also be characterized by the
types of relationships, or the amount of trust,
that traders enjoy with their regular partners.
That is, social capital is enhanced if a trader
can sell or purchase solely on the basis of a
telephone conversation and if he or she re-
ceives or provides supplier credit to partners.
Traders have an average of 4 partners with
whom they transact only by means of tele-
phone orders, representing one-third of the
mean number of distant partners. The number
of partners with whom they have credit rela-
tions is signiﬁcantly higher, with an average
of 13 persons.
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Table 6.5 Traders’ access to informal and supplier credit by region, 1996
Friends or Friends or Friends or Suppliers Buyers
family family that family to Suppliers who gave to whom
willing to gave credit whom trader willing to credit trader
give credit last year gave credit give credit last year gave credit
Region Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Surplus
Wollega 3.45 1.97 3.09 2.30 3.18 2.71 4.00 0.82 3.00 0.82 3.91 5.66
Arsi 5.36 3.83 3.18 1.89 6.36 4.37 31.00 32.00 14.53 16.37 5.10 2.47
Gojjam 4.45 2.78 2.38 1.52 2.83 2.24 5.30 5.33 4.38 5.16 5.87 5.32
Deﬁcit
Wollo 3.06 2.16 1.47 1.70 2.59 1.58 2.21 2.61 1.79 1.58 13.75 17.67
Tigray 5.00 3.77 4.75 3.60 3.92 3.80 4.00 3.32 3.86 3.58 3.60 4.06
Hararghe 3.53 4.50 0.35 0.86 0.71 1.69 5.13 4.08 4.13 4.46 6.94 6.23
Central
Addis Ababa 4.10 3.09 1.77 1.72 2.13 2.37 8.36 6.94 3.82 5.36 7.60 6.53
Total 4.10 3.20 2.20 2.20 2.79 2.91 7.06 10.73 4.54 6.77 7.03 8.53
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.Estimation of the Transaction
Costs of Market Search
Each trader faces a unique set of transaction
costs related to his or her costs of ﬁnding a
buyer or seller with whom to exchange. The
trader invests labor time in the search pro-
cess and, because search is time-consuming,
bears the opportunity cost of the labor time
spent in search. Second, the trader bears the
opportunity cost of tying up his or her work-
ing capital in the form of grain stocks while
the search is under way.
Using directly observed search labor and
working capital to explain traders’ use of
brokerage would result in endogeneity bias
since the actual levels of search labor and
working capital chosen by traders are not in-
dependent of their choice of brokerage. In
order to avoid this bias, the opportunity costs
of the traders’search time and working cap-
ital are derived as shadow costs from each
trader’s proﬁt function. After controlling for
physical marketing costs, such as transport,
handling, and storage, each trader maximizes
revenue subject to his or her costs of the
labor time invested in search and the oppor-
tunity cost of holding grain inventory during
the search period. Each trader is endowed
with a unique distribution of trading contacts
that directly inﬂuences his or her ability to
find a trading partner. This distribution, or net-
work, is considered a parameter of the trader’s
social capital and acts as a positive shifter in
the trader’s revenue function. The trader’s
revenue maximization is expressed by
=γ δLαKβeε −ω L −ν K, (1)
where
Ris net revenue (revenue minus physical
marketing costs),
γ is social capital,
ω is the opportunity cost of search labor
(L),
and ν is the opportunity cost of working
capital (K).
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Table 6.6 Social capital of traders, 1996
Surplus Deﬁcit Central
Regions Wollega Arsi Gojjam Wollo Tigray Hararghe Addis Ababa Total
Local trade contacts Mean 3.91 7.27 6.13 3.29 3.92 2.53 4.50 4.59
SD 5.63 8.70 3.71 2.28 2.35 3.14 3.41 4.32
Distant trade contacts Mean 5.82 7.55 11.28 4.65 5.36 6.76 8.93 7.89
SD 5.49 5.41 7.67 7.15 3.78 5.24 9.60 7.46
Distant markets with contacts Mean 3.82 4.45 5.60 2.12 4.50 2.47 1.73  3.46
SD 3.57 1.51 3.06 1.83 3.78 1.55 1.51 2.86
Contacts from same region Mean 0.82 1.64 2.57 1.82 0.42 0.71 1.43 1.52
SD 1.08 3.64 5.86 2.88 1.16 2.02 3.67 3.77
Family in grain trade Mean 0.73 1.18 0.77 0.47 1.25 0.41 1.07 0.83
SD 1.01 1.40 1.68 0.87 1.66 0.80 1.51 1.38
Friends in grain trade Mean 8.00 8.73 11.97 4.00 4.50 0.40 3.93 6.17
SD 7.21 14.28 12.11 4.11 4.06 1.06 4.02 8.74
Regular local partners Mean 1.00 5.64 7.93 3.76 2.75 5.18 15.57 7.49
SD 1.84 5.29 5.11 5.12 3.57 6.08 8.78 7.70
Regular distant partners Mean 15.70 24.89 13.93 16.06 14.00 8.65 8.3 13.07
SD 11.04 29.32 7.80 33.17 7.73 3.20 10.26 16.59
Partners with telephone orders only Mean 2.33 3.00 3.68 13.30 2.40 0.0 3.92 4.34
SD 1.87 3.26 6.59 30.68 1.89 0.0 4.31 11.51
Partners with supplier credit Mean 5.78 22.09 8.93 16.73 4.52 15.21 12.57
SD 6.85 26.85 6.99 22.21 3.16 11.45 14.60
Number of distant markets in which have contacts (SD) 3.46 (2.86)
Number of contacts from same region (SD) 1.52 (3.77)
Number of family members in grain trade (SD) 0.83 (1.38)
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.From the ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt max-
imization, the shadow opportunity costs of
search labor, ω*, and of working capital, ν*,
are derived as
αR ω* = —— (2)
L
βR ν* = —— . (3)
K
Ordinary least-squares estimation of the
traders’ revenue function would result in
asymptotically biased estimators because of
the simultaneity bias that exists because both
search labor and working capital depend on
revenue and thus will not be independent of
the model’s error term.24 To overcome this
bias, two-stage least-squares estimation is
used to obtain the coefﬁcients necessary for
deriving ω* and ν*. Arich set of instruments
for search labor and working capital are
obtained from the data, chosen on the basis
of their impact on search labor and working
capital without directly inﬂuencing revenue.
The instruments used for search labor are
access to additional persons to help with
search, the number of languages spoken by
the trader, the trader’s age, and whether the
trader has another business. The instruments
for working capital are access to a bank loan,
access to credit from friends and family, and
collateral assets such as a home. The criteria
for the choice of instruments are that they
should be correlated with the variables that
are being instrumented and uncorrelated with
the dependent variable.
As shown in Table 6.7, these conditions
hold. The estimation uses two alternative
speciﬁcations of trader revenue. Net revenue,
the net margin (after accounting for physical
marketing costs) multiplied by the quantity
of sales, is used in the ﬁrst estimation. The
gross value of sales is used in the second es-
timation. Search labor is measured by the
number of persons in the trading ﬁrm who
are engaged in searching for buyers and
sellers. Working capital is measured by the
average amount of funds that the trader has
at his or her disposal for the purpose of buy-
ing and marketing grain. Social capital is a
measure of the trading network that is avail-
able to the trader and is measured by the
number of persons in grain trade whom the
trader knows personally. This deﬁnition in-
cludes both a quality element, that is, the type
of relationship that the trader has with other
traders, and a quantity element.
Table 6.8 presents descriptive statistics
on the dependent and independent variables
used in the instrumental variable estimation
of trader revenue, which is used to derive the
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Table 6.7 Correlation coefﬁcients for instruments for search labor and working capital
Dependent variables Instrumented variables
Instruments Net revenue Value of sales Search labor Working capital
Number of languages spoken −0.0029 0.0844 0.0969* 0.1129
Engaged in other business 0.0006 −0.0035 0.1294* 0.0416
Have others to manage business 0.0496 0.0951 0.6213* 0.0550
Age −0.0828 −0.0592 −0.0897* 0.0445
Own home −0.0915 −0.0691 0.0971 0.0428*
Have access to informal credit 0.0945 0.0753 0.1525* 0.2870*
Able to obtain bank loan 0.0709 0.0161 0.1334* 0.1940*
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
* = Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
24 This issue generally plagues the estimation of production functions. A solution is to apply duality theory, but this so-
lution fails to use all available information and is statistically inefﬁcient (Mundlak 1996). In this case, the existence of
a rich set of instruments provides a more convincing instrumental variables estimator.opportunity costs of labor and capital for
individual traders. As shown in Table 6.9,
search labor, working capital, and social cap-
ital have positive coefﬁcients, as expected,
and are signiﬁcant in both model estimations.
The Wald test of the assumption of homo-
geneity reveals that the null hypothesis that
revenue is homogeneous of degree 1 in search
labor and working capital holds at the 13 per-
cent conﬁdence level.25 The α and β coefﬁ-
cients generated from the two-stage least-
squares estimation are used to derive the
shadow opportunity cost of labor (ω*) and
the shadow opportunity cost of capital (ν*)
for each individual trader.
An important issue is whether the instru-
mental variable estimation is undertaken at
the expense of a signiﬁcant efﬁciency loss
in estimation. The adjusted R2 of the ordi-
nary least-squares regression of search labor,
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Table 6.8 Variables used in estimation of transaction revenue
Variable Description of variable Mean SD
Dependent
(ln) REV Net trading revenue (Eth. Birr/season) 8.96 1.51
(ln) VSALES Gross value of sales (Eth. Birr/season) 7.16 1.29
Search labor
(ln) SLABOR Number of employees engaged in search 0.72 0.36
Instruments
OTHRESP = 1 if trader has access to additional search 0.71 0.45
NLANG Number of languages spoken by trader 1.89 0.80
OTHBUS = 1 if trader has another business 0.22 0.41
AGE Age of trader 32.83 12.30
Working capital
(ln) WORKAP Average working capital (Eth. Birr) 10.41 1.08
Instruments
POSSBANK = 1 if trader can access a bank loan 0.77 0.44
ACCESS Number of persons trader could ask for loan 4.10 3.20
HOME = 1 if trader owns residence 0.57 0.49
Social capital
(ln) SOCKAP Number of trading contacts 2.26 0.83
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
ln = Natural logarithm.
25 Tests for functional form speciﬁcation were carried out with alternative speciﬁcations, such as translog and CES.
Table 6.9 Results of instrumental variables estimation of transaction revenue
(1) (2)
Net trading revenue Gross value of sales
Variable Variable name Coefﬁcient Standard error Coefﬁcient Standard error
Intercept ln CONS 1.87 3.82 1.99 3.38
Search labor ln SLABOR 0.75 0.40** 0.64 0.36*
Working capital ln WORKAP 0.56 0.39* 0.88 0.34***
Social capital ln SOCKAPzz 0.34 0.13*** 0.23 0.11**
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.22
N 174 178
Wald test of homogeneity 0.13 0.18
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
* = Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level; ** = signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level; *** = signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level; ln = natural logarithm.working capital, and social capital is 0.34
and 0.27 for the net revenue and value of sales
model speciﬁcations, respectively. Thus, the
instrumental variable estimation only slightly
raises the root mean squared error from 1.22
with ordinary least squares to 1.26 in the rev-
enue model and from 1.12 to 1.18 in the sales
model.
The distributions of the estimated oppor-
tunity costs of search labor (ω*) and of work-
ing capital (ν*) across traders are shown in
Figures 6.1 and 6.2. More than 80 percent of
the traders surveyed had shadow daily wage
rates of Eth. Birr 20 daily (equivalent to
US$6.00 in 1996) and greater (Figure 6.1).
The shadow wage of Eth. Birr 20 was seven
times the national income per capita per
day.26 And the mean daily shadow wage of
Eth. Birr 44 for the traders interviewed was
ﬁfteen times the national average. This sug-
gests that traders are time constrained. More-
over, there are limited opportunities for the
majority of traders to increase their revenue
through alternative uses of their labor time.
As shown in Figure 6.2, the opportunity cost
of capital is normally distributed across the
sample population, with an average annual
interest rate of 15 percent, which is signiﬁ-
cantly higher than the ofﬁcial bank interest
rate of 10 percent in 1996. The higher vari-
ability of shadow costs of capital suggests
that capital constraints may be more binding
in terms of traders’ market behavior, with a
greater number of traders likely to opt for op-
portunities to reduce these costs. In sum, the
distribution of both types of transaction costs
across traders demonstrates the heterogene-
ity of individual market actors and allows for
test the impact of these costs on the use of the
brokerage institution in the Ethiopian grain
market, which is addressed later.
Transaction Costs versus
Physical Marketing Costs
How important are these transaction costs
of search relative to the physical marketing
costs incurred by traders? There is an inher-
ent difﬁculty in comparing these costs, be-
cause physical marketing costs are incurred
relative to individual transactions, while 
the shadow search labor wage rates and the
shadow interest rates for working capital are
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Figure 6.2 Opportunity costs of working capital across trader
sample, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
Notes: Figure shows shadow annual interest (annualized interest rate over the study
period). SD = .05; mean = .151; N = 101.00.
26 The average annual per capita income in Ethiopia was US$110.00, or Eth. Birr 700.00, in 1996.
Figure 6.1 Opportunity costs of search labor across trader
sample, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
Notes: Figure shows shadow daily wage (daily wage of incremental search labor). Eth.
Birr 6.35 = US$1 in 1996. SD = 59.31; mean = 43.9; N = 101.00.estimated as either daily or annual rates. In
order to compare transaction costs and mar-
keting costs during the study year, both the
estimated transaction costs and the per-
transaction marketing costs were annualized.
For search labor costs, the daily shadow rate
was multiplied by the total number of search
days per year, computed from survey data.
Capital holding costs were annualized by
adjusting the annual shadow interest rate for
the number of days spent searching and mul-
tiplying by the working capital of each trad-
ing ﬁrm. Marketing costs were annualized
by adjusting the annual sales revenue by the
proportion of marketing costs. Although these
calculations resulted in rough approximations
and are subject to measurement error, they
provide an idea of the magnitudes of differ-
ent types of costs and point to interesting
differences between types of traders.
As seen in Table 6.10, transaction costs
of search represent an important share of the
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Table 6.10 Annualized transaction costs and physical transfer costs, 1996 (Eth. Birr)a
Search Percentage Capital Percentage Percentage
labor search holding capital Marketing marketing
Markets cost costb cost cost cost cost
Surplus
Nekempte Mean 7,803 7 4,925 5 102,128 89
SD 12,807 5 7,402 3 103,310 8
Jaji Mean 2,354 2 2,268 2 125,592 96
SD 2,823 0 2,374 1 158,477 1
Assela Mean 5,277 4 3,818 2 219,609 94
SD 6,238 4 5,673 3 280,164 7
Sagure Mean 863 2 543 1 34,190 96
SD 1,197 3 684 2 13,595 5
Bahir Dar Mean 5,727 12 4,834 7 72,414 81
SD 9,884 19 10,460 11 112,788 30
Bure Mean 3,691 10 2,149 8 77,475 81
SD 5,202 19 3,086 17 74,228 36
Subtotal Mean 5,078 9 3,836 6 97,786 86
SD 8,521 15 7,790 10 142,267 25
N 45 45 45 45 45 45
Deﬁcit
Dessie Mean 1,447 5 979 4 41,453 91
SD 748 3 641 3 35,301 6
Kombolcha Mean 1,160 12 736 7 61,036 81
SD 1,346 12 789 7 116,622 19
Mekele Mean 1,842 6 1,052 4 38,358 90
SD 2,857 8 1,701 5 21,983 12
Dire Dawa Mean 705 17 369 8 7,819 75
SD 475 11 313 6 11,629 17
Harar Mean 3,282 24 1,530 11 30,457 65
SD 3,233 26 1,299 11 62,888 36
Subtotal Mean 1,866 14 996 7 34,310 79
SD 2,342 17 1,124 8 58,420 24
N 31 31 31 31 31 31
Central
Addis Ababa Mean 9230 17 5,730 11 262,269 72
SD 14242 17 8,391 11 514,264 28
N 19 19 19 19 19 19
Total Mean 4860 12 3,288 7 109,970 81
SD 9023 16 6,736 10 260,486 26
N 95 95 95 95 95 95
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
a Eth. Birr 6.35 = US$1 in 1996.
b Share of sum of search labor, capital holding, and marketing costs.overall set of costs, representing 19 percent
for the sample as a whole. The relative im-
portance of transaction costs varies between
types of markets. Transaction costs in the
surplus markets represent 15 percent of total
costs, compared to 21 percent and 28 percent
in the deﬁcit and central markets. This is
partly due to higher overall marketing costs
in the surplus markets. This ﬁnding suggests
that traders in the deﬁcit markets, who are en-
gaged in long-distance purchases, face higher
transaction costs than do traders in the other
markets. Transaction costs appear higher for
markets located in the Gojam zone and in
Dire Dawa and Harar. Comparing labor and
capital holding costs, transaction costs related
to search labor costs appear higher for all
markets. The next chapter explores the links
between these transaction costs and traders’
use of brokerage.
Summary
Transaction costs matter. The results of the
survey of traders’ search time and access to
working capital indicate that traders are con-
strained in terms of both search labor and
capital. Traders spend between one and three
days searching for potential buyers or sellers
with whom to complete transactions. Many
traders do not have other staff to conduct
searches on their behalf, suggesting that the
opportunity cost of their labor time is very
high. Further indication of this is that traders
estimate that, at the margin, an additional
staff member would increase their operations
by 47 percent. In terms of access to capital,
few of the traders surveyed received formal
bank loans, mainly due to the lack of collat-
eral. Traders that did apply for credit re-
ceived, on average, 65 percent of the amounts
for which they had applied. In general, 90
percent of the traders received some form of
credit, whether from friends and family or
other traders or in the form of supplier credit.
The survey also highlighted the impor-
tance of social capital in enabling traders to
ﬁnd trading partners more readily. The re-
sults suggest that, although traders invest in
contacts in distant markets as well as in reg-
ular trading partners, ethnicity and kinship
are not obvious contributors to social capital;
fewer than one-third of trading networks are
based on traders’ common ethnic identity.
This ﬁnding raises the possibility that some
factor other than ethnicity may be a stronger
determinant of traders’social capital.
In order to avoid endogeneity bias, the
trader-speciﬁc transaction costs of search
labor time and of holding working capital
during search were estimated as shadow
costs from the traders’ proﬁt functions. In-
strumental variable estimation is used to
avoid simultaneity bias, relying on instru-
ments for labor and capital, such as languages
spoken, other business, collateral, and access
to credit. The results of this estimation of
transaction costs reveal considerable hetero-
geneity among traders. They also suggest
that traders may be more capital constrained
than time constrained.
Comparing the annualized transaction
costs of search with the physical marketing
costs reveals that transaction costs are a
signiﬁcant share of the total costs. For the
sample as a whole, transaction costs repre-
sented 19 percent of total costs. However,
considerable divergence can be seen between
surplus and deﬁcit markets, with transaction
costs playing a larger role in the deﬁcit mar-
kets. This ﬁnding suggests that transaction
costs might play a more signiﬁcant role in
traders’ decision to use brokers for distant
purchases. The following chapter examines
this topic rigorously.
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Traders’ Use of Brokers to Reduce
Transaction Costs
I
ndividual efforts to minimize transaction costs lead to the emergence of alternative insti-
tutional arrangements. The link between transaction costs and the emergence of insti-
tutions has long been recognized in institutional economics theory (Alchian and Demsetz
1972; Coase 1937; Hoff and Stiglitz 1990; North 1990; Williamson 1985). However, the in-
herent difﬁculty of measuring transaction costs at the level of market agents has limited em-
pirical studies of whether particular institutions indeed effectively minimize transaction
costs. Yet empirical analysis is particularly warranted in contexts in which agents operate in
a weak market environment and transaction costs related to market coordination are very
high, such as in the recently liberalized agricultural markets of sub-Saharan Africa and other
economies in transition.
This chapter empirically tests the hypothesis that market agents are individually rational
in using the services of brokers to minimize the transaction costs of search. The study of the
brokerage institution in Ethiopia is particularly interesting because grain wholesalers are not
obligated to use brokers for any or all of their transactions, enabling an empirical test of the
determinants of their choice to use brokers. Thus, although 85 percent of the traders sampled
in Ethiopia indicated that they used brokers regularly, they used brokers for only 30 percent
of their total transactions, on average, suggesting that they chose whether to use brokers on
a transaction-by-transaction basis. Despite the importance of brokerage in the Ethiopian grain
market, a relatively large share of trade occurs in personalized direct exchange among traders
who know each other well.
Traders’ Use of Brokers
The choice of whether to use brokerage depends on the type of transaction, sale versus
purchase, and the location of the trader, whether in a surplus or a deﬁcit region. The traders
interviewed in the 1996 survey who were located in surplus regions used brokers for 23 per-
cent of all purchase transactions (Figure 7.1). In contrast, they used brokers for 49 percent of
all sales transactions and for 66 percent of all distant sales transactions. The low incidence
of brokerage use for purchases is due to the traders’ practice of purchasing directly from
farmers, while the higher share of brokerage use for distant sales is due to their practice ofselling grain in the central market of Addis
Ababa.27
Traders located in deﬁcit zones used
brokers for 48 percent of all purchases (Fig-
ure 7.1). The use of brokerage for sales by
traders in deﬁcit markets was signiﬁcantly
lower at 13 percent. This pattern reﬂects
traders’ practice of selling grain directly to
local retailers as well as consumers. Due 
to their location, central market traders use
brokerage only for local transactions, with
use if brokerage for both sales and pur-
chases of 4 percent, because central market
traders tend to engage in transactions only
locally. Wholesalers in the central market
can buy directly from regional sellers who
bring grain to the central market and can sell
directly to local retailers, consumers, and
millers.
For the sample of traders as a whole,
without distinguishing by type of transac-
tion, brokerage is used in roughly one-fourth
of all transactions. Traders search on their
own, either locally or in distant markets, in
72 percent of transactions. Thus, although
the majority of traders (85 percent) use bro-
kers regularly in their transactions, the pro-
portion of brokered transactions among total
transactions is relatively low compared to
those accomplished by direct exchange. The
coexistence of direct exchange and broker-
age appears to be linked to the use of brokers
for transactions in distant markets, sales for
surplus market sellers and purchases for def-
icit market buyers.
The use of brokerage also varies across
regions within a type of market and across
traders within each of the regions. For pur-
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Figure 7.1 Brokerage use by type of market and type of transaction, 1996
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
27 The data used are self-reported ﬁgures provided by traders recalling transactions over six months. Given the low fre-
quency of transactions, the recall period does not greatly increase error. Contractual choice data were gathered during
two survey rounds. The results of the two rounds have been pooled, which provides a better estimation of the true values.
Correlations between rounds are signiﬁcant for data on the use of brokers and of self-search.chases, there is a dramatic variation in the
use of both local and distant brokers between
regions within a type of market (Figure 7.2).
Overall, the traders surveyed in the surplus
regions, Wollega, Arsi, and Gojjam, used
brokerage for a smaller percentage of trans-
actions than did traders in the deﬁcit regions
of Wollo, Tigray, and Harar. However,
within the deﬁcit regions traders in Wollo
and Tigray exhibited signiﬁcantly higher use
of distant brokerage than those in Harar,
while the use of local brokerage is highly
variable across regions in each type of mar-
ket. In the case of sales, differences between
regions within a type of market are less pro-
nounced, with traders in surplus regions
exhibiting high usage of distant brokerage
compared to traders in deﬁcit regions (Fig-
ure 7.3).
Heterogeneity among traders within each
region is indicated by the coefﬁcients of vari-
ation for the average percentages of trans-
actions in which traders use brokerage for
each region, as reported in Figures 7.2 and
7.3. The traders appear to have displayed
signiﬁcant variation in their use of brokerage
for both purchases and sales, with at least 9
out of the 14 coefﬁcients of variation exceed-
ing 100 percent. In certain cases, extremely
high coefﬁcients of variation appear, notably
for traders who used local brokers for pur-
chases in the surplus regions and those who
used distant brokers for sales in the Gojjam
region. The heterogeneity viewed among
traders indicates that factors other than the
location, type of market, and even type of




In constrained market environments, long-
distance trade involves high coordination
costs and considerable risk. Each trader is
faced with the choice of either incurring
higher search costs by trading in a distant
market or trading locally, in a familiar mar-
ket, where search costs are relatively low but
opportunities are limited. In Ethiopia, grain
wholesalers in regional market centers lo-
cated 300 to 500 kilometers from the cen-
tral market can either trade locally in their
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Figure 7.2 Use of brokerage for purchases by region, 1996
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
Note: Coefﬁcients of variation are reported above the bars.market towns or trade in the distant central
market. This choice is partly determined by
the type of region in which traders are based.
Wholesalers located in surplus production
regions tend to purchase grain locally from
smaller traders and farmers and to sell this
grain in the distant central market. Whole-
salers located in the deﬁcit regions tend to
procure grain from the central market and
to sell it locally to retailers and consumers.
Traders in both surplus and deﬁcit re-
gions have a relatively high proportion of
distant purchases, 52 percent and 65 percent
of total purchases, respectively, compared
to central market traders, with 19 percent.
Traders in surplus regions have a markedly
higher proportion of distant sales, 65 per-
cent, compared to traders in both deﬁcit and
central markets, with 8 percent of total sales
(Table 7.1). As expected, traders located in
surplus areas rely to a greater extent on
brokers for their distant sales (66 percent)
than for their distant purchases (27 percent).
The converse is true for traders in deﬁcit
areas, with 48 percent of traders making dis-
tant purchases using brokers and 37 percent
of those making distant sales using brokers.
Central market traders do not use brokers for
their distant transactions at all.
A Model of Traders’
Sequential Choice 
of Brokerage
From the descriptive evidence it appears that
each trader’s use of brokerage is based on a
two-tiered choice. First, traders decide where
to trade, that is, locally or in a distant market.
This decision is inﬂuenced by each trader’s
transaction costs, as well as by market-level
effects such as whether other traders in the
same market have a high proportion of
long-distance trade. Second, traders choose
whether to use a broker for each type of
transaction (either sale or purchase) and for
each location of trade (either the local mar-
ket or a distant market). This choice depends
on the percentage of the trader’s transac-
tions represented by long-distance trade, the
trader’s transaction costs, and regional ef-
fects, such as the location of the market in a
given region.
Because long-distance transactions entail
higher search costs and are enhanced by
larger endowments of social capital than are
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Figure 7.3 Use of brokerage for sales by region, 1996
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
Note: Coefﬁcients of variation are reported above the bars.local transactions, the choice to trade in a
distant market is endogenous to each trader’s
unique search costs and social capital. A
percentage of a trader’s total business that is
composed of long-distance transactions de-
pends on the opportunity costs of his or her
search labor and working capital, as well as
the trader’s social capital and market-level
effects, such as the trader’s location. The
average percentages of long-distance pur-
chases (P−i) and sales (S−i) of other traders in
the same market capture these effects. Thus,
the percentage of a trader’s total transactions
that is devoted to long-distance trade is rep-
resented as
Di,t = D(ωi*, νi*,γi P−i, S−i), (1)
where ωi*, νi*, and γi represent the oppor-
tunity cost of search labor, the opportunity
cost of working capital, and social capital,
respectively.
With the availability of brokers, traders
who have chosen to trade at a distance in the
central market face a second choice. Each
trader compares the gains expected from
searching directly without a broker with the
gains expected from using a broker. A
trader’s net proﬁt from searching directly is
a function of the individual transaction costs
of search, the trader’s social capital, and the
time the trader requires to ﬁnd a buyer or
seller in the distant market (τ). A general
form for determining a trader’s net proﬁt from
direct search is
Πi
d =Π (γi, ωi, νi, τi). (2)
When a trader uses a broker, net proﬁt no
longer depends on the opportunity cost of
search labor, the trader’s social capital, or
the time that he or she requires to ﬁnd a
buyer or seller. Instead, the trader’s net proﬁt
from using a broker is a function of the bro-
ker’s social capital (γb), the broker’s commis-
sion (k), the opportunity cost of the trader’s
tying up working capital, and the time re-
quired for the broker rather than the trader to
complete the search (τb). Ageneral form for
determining a trader’s net proﬁt from using
a broker is
Πi
b =Π (γb, k, νi, τb). (3)
A trader’s participation constraint for using
a broker is that his or her net gains are higher
with a broker than with direct search, such
that Πi
b ≥Π i
d. If the broker is more efﬁcient
in search than is the trader, γb>γ iand τb<τ i.
In this case, the difference between proﬁts
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Table 7.1 Long-distance trade and use of brokers by type of market, 1996
Share of Share of Share of distant Share of distant
distant purchases distant sales brokered purchases brokered sales
Type of (percentage (percentage (percentage total (percentage total
market total purchases) total sales) distant purchases) distant sales)
Surplus Mean 52.06 65.49 27.49 66.18
SD 36.53 34.50 36.63 37.69
N 116 114 97 103
Deﬁcit Mean 64.73 8.25 48.45 37.22
SD 41.02 15.71 44.53 47.68
N 97 97 80 27
Central Mean 18.57 8.58 0.00 0.00
SD 35.14 22.44 0.00 0.00
N 67 67 21 11
Total Mean 48.44 31.80 33.04 55.47
SD 41.63 38.51 40.95 42.98
N 280 278 198 141
Source: Author’s survey, 1996.
Note: These statistics were compiled from both rounds of survey data.derived from using a broker and those de-
rived from searching directly, Πi
b −Π i
d, is
reﬂected in increases in the opportunity costs
of the trader’s search labor and working
capital and in decreases in social capital.
Because search costs are higher for long-
distance transactions than for local ones, a
trader’s use of brokerage increases with the
percentage of long-distance trade (Table 7.2).
Thus, the percentage of the trader’s total
transactions that is devoted to brokered trade
(B) depends on the transaction costs of the
trader’s own search, his or her social capital,
regional effects (G), and the predicted share
of long-distance trade (D ˆ):
Bi,t = B[ωi*, νi*,
γi ΣD ˆ
i,t (ωi*, νi*, γi, P−i S−I), G].
(4)
Arecursive approach is used to represent
participation in brokerage as a function of
participation in long-distance trade, which
itself is inﬂuenced by the transaction costs
of search and by social capital. Recursive
econometric models have been used to ex-
plain gift exchange (Ravallion and Dearden
1988) and technology adoption (Kumar 1994;
Zeller et al. 1996). Atwo-step Tobit estima-
tion avoids the inconsistent estimates of
brokerage use due to the simultaneity bias
that arises because trader-speciﬁc variables
inﬂuence both the use of brokers and the
share of long-distance trade.28 In the ﬁrst
step, predicted shares of long-distance trade
(D) are obtained from the Tobit estimation
of (3). In the second step, predicted shares of
long-distance trade (D ˆ) are used to estimate
the shares of brokerage use (B).29The use of
censored regression rather than least squares
is justiﬁed by the existence of a signiﬁcant
proportion of traders with zero shares of long-
distance trade and of brokerage. Ordinary
least squares would result in upward-biased
estimators due to the selectivity bias that re-
sults from including only nonzero observa-
tions in the analysis (Greene 1993).
In terms of comparative static effects on
the use of brokerage, the expected marginal
effects of the opportunity costs of search and
capital and of social capital on the use of
brokers are obtained from the total deriva-
tives of ω, ν, and γ with respect to B:
dB ∂B ∂B ∂D —— = —— + (——*——) (5)
dω∂ ω ∂ D ∂ω
dB ∂B ∂B ∂D —— = —— + (——*——) (6)
dν∂ ν∂ D ∂ν
dB ∂B ∂B ∂D —— = —— + (——*——). (7)
dγ∂ γ∂ D ∂γ
The expected partial effects of higher
transaction costs and long-distance trade on
the use of brokerage are positive. Thus,
∂B/∂ω > 0, ∂Β/∂ν > 0, and ∂B/∂D > 0. How-
ever, the complete effect of transaction costs
on Bdepends on the partial effect of costs on
long-distance trade, ∂D/∂ω and ∂D/∂ν. The
expected partial effect of social capital on
broker use is negative, ∂B/∂γ < 0. Although
the expected sign of ∂B/∂D is positive, the
total effect of social capital on the use of
brokerage is ambiguous, depending on ∂D/∂γ.
Estimation Results for Traders’
Long-Distance Trade (Step 1)
Tobit estimations of the share of each trader’s
long-distance trade are based on the shadow
transaction costs obtained from both the net
revenue and the gross value of sales instru-
mental variable estimations in Table 7.2.
Shares of long-distance trade are estimated
for purchases and sales separately in order to
control for the effect of location on long-
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28 Asimilar speciﬁcation is used by Ravallion and Dearden (1988) to model transfer receipts and outlays, in which pre-
dicted consumption is used as a proxy for the regressand, posttransfer permanent income.
29 Using predicted rather than actual shares from the ﬁrst Tobit estimation results in inconsistent standard errors. This can
be corrected with a maximum likelihood estimation.distance trading behavior, noted earlier. Un-
conditional or Tobit elasticities adjust the es-
timated coefﬁcients by accounting for both
the effect on the conditional mean of the de-
pendent variable in the positive part of the
distribution and the effect on the probability
that the observation will fall in the positive
part of the distribution (McDonald and Mof-
ﬁtt 1980).30 Tobit elasticities are obtained by
adjusting the coefﬁcients by the Φproportion
of the sample that has nonzero observations of
the dependent variable. In effect, this adjust-
ment lowers the marginal effect by the prob-
ability that traders with no distant transactions
would engage in some distant transactions as
a result of marginal changes in the regressors.
In both model speciﬁcations, transaction
costs have a large and signiﬁcant positive ef-
fect on long-distance trade for both purchases
and sales. Equations (5) and (6) suggest that
the total effect on transaction costs on the
use of brokerage will be unambiguously
positive. Social capital also has a signiﬁcant,
though smaller, negative impact on distant
trade, with the exception of distant purchases
in the second set of estimations. Equation (7)
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Table 7.2 Tobit estimation of the percentages of long-distance trade, 1996
(Model 1) (Model 2)
Net revenue Value of sales
Distant purchases Distant sales Distant purchases  Distant sales
(percentage of (percentage of (percentage of (percentage of
total transactions) total transactions) total transactions) total transactions)
Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient
standard Tobit standard Tobit standard Tobit standard Tobit
Variable error elasticity error elasticity error elasticity error elasticity
Intercept _cons −293.91*** −419.04*** −255.54*** −365.76***
92.32 86.00 78.90 73.66
Market share P j≠i 0.72*** 0.18 −0.45** −0.18 1.50*** 0.37 −0.36** 0.15
Distant purchases 0.11 0.21 0.20 0.18
Market share Sj≠i −0.22 −0.06 0.78*** 0.32 −0.24 −0.06 1.93*** 0.79
Distant sales 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.17
Opportunity cost ln ω* 53.43*** 13.36 75.02*** 30.76 15.88*** 4.00 26.13*** 10.71
of labor 19.60 18.04 5.76 5.32
Opportunity cost ln ν* 48.99** 12.25 58.34 23.92 45.68** 11.42 54.03*** 22.15
of capital 22.01 20.13*** 20.71 18.94
Social capital ln Z ¯ −23.91* 6.00 −41.73*** 17.11 −3.40 −0.85 −15.02** 6.16
14.69 13.58 7.61 7.06
N 200 200 200 200
SEEa 54.62 46.17 54.61 46.14
Probability
(T > 0|(X ¯)
Predicted 0.33 0.52 0.31 0.40
Actual 0.25 0.41 0.25 0.41
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
a Estimated standard error of the regression.
* = Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level; ** = signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level; *** = signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
30 McDonald and Mofﬁtt (1980) suggest a breakdown of the slope vector into
∂E[yi|xi]/∂xi = Prob[yi* > 0]∂E[yi*|xi,y i* > 0]/∂xi + E[yi*|xi,y i* > 0]∂Prob[yi* > 0]/∂xi.
The unconditional elasticity is obtained by scaling the parameters of the Tobit regression by the probability in the
uncensored part of the distribution. See also Greene (1993) for examples and Ravallion and Dearden (1988) for an
application of this method.implies that social capital will have an un-
ambiguously negative effect on the use of
brokerage. In contrast, market-level effects
are relatively small, though highly signiﬁcant
and positive for the same type of transaction,
either purchase or sale.
Estimation Results for Traders’ Use
of Brokers (Step 2)
In the second step, the share of brokered
transactions is estimated using Tobit esti-
mation for both model speciﬁcations, for pur-
chases and sales separately (Table 7.3). In
order to control for the effects of local use of
brokers (that is, within regional market cen-
ters), the share of brokered transactions is
restricted to brokers used for long-distance
trade. The set of explanatory variables used
includes regional dummy variables to capture
the effects of regional effects. In a simulta-
neous system of Tobit equations, where pre-
dicted values of long-distance trade are used
as regressors, standard errors of the estimated
coefﬁcients will be inconsistent. To correct
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Table 7.3 Tobit estimation of the shares of broker use for distant trade
(Model 1) (Model 2)
Net revenue Value of sales
Distant purchases Distant sales Distant purchases  Distant sales
(percentage of (percentage of (percentage of (percentage of
total transactions) total transactions) total transactions) total transactions)
Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient
standard Tobit standard Tobit standard Tobit standard Tobit
Variable errora elasticity errora elasticity errora elasticity errora elasticity
Intercept _cons −2187.29*** −1113.92* −1914.33*** −966.14***
713.91 616.57 621.30 531.17
Predicted Dpurch 0.70 0.22 −0.36 0.21 0.71* 0.23 −0.36 0.20
Distant purchases 0.53 0.60 0.56 0.55
Predicted Dsale −5.84 −1.87 −1.37 −0.77 −5.87** −1.90 −1.37 −0.76
Distant sales 1.80 1.20 1.90 1.09
Opportunity cost ln ω* 384.05*** 122.90 205.83* 115.26 132.67*** 42.45 61.43* 34.40
of labor 148.76 120.38 51.97 38.14
Opportunity cost ln ν* 301.65*** 96.53 188.06* 105.31 279.46*** 89.43 175.31* 98.17
of capital 127.31 107.40 124.64 100.09
Social capital ln Z ¯ −231.82*** −74.18 −137.73** −77.13 −94.50*** −30.24 −58.85** −32.96
85.91 74.44 35.34 30.87
Wollega 438.53*** 140.33 265.73*** 148.81 484.60*** 155.07 351.68*** 196.94
151.80 104.34 135.14 120.72
Arsi 676.64*** 216.52 256.55** 143.67 715.25*** 228.88 366.89*** 205.46
224.41 113.47 191.95 143.74
Tigray 108.79*** 34.81 258.79*** 144.92 104.74*** 33.52 264.23** 147.97
38.58 66.65 37.59 67.14
Gojjam 421.90*** 135.01 211.80*** 118.61 506.61*** 162.11 300.93*** 168.52
136.25 82.36 136.08 111.70
Hararghe −71.62*** −22.92 66.37 31.01 −64.59** −20.67 65.97 36.94
39.44 52.59 38.55 51.93
N 151 116 151 116
SEE 85.75 80.59 94.81 80.80
Probability
(T > 0|(X ¯)
Predicted 0.26 0.52 0.35 0.54
Actual 0.32 0.56 0.32 0.56
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
a Standard errors are estimated from bootstrapping with 1,000 replications.
* = Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level; ** = signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level; *** = signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.for this, standard errors are estimated using
bootstrapping with 1,000 replications, a
procedure that provides generally very good
estimates.31
The estimation results suggest that
traders’ use of brokers is individually ra-
tional in that higher transaction costs lead to
increased use of brokers, while higher levels
of social capital reduce the use of brokers,
suggesting that the presence of brokers en-
ables traders to minimize their transaction
costs and trade more efﬁciently. In both model
speciﬁcations, results are more robust for
distant purchases than for sales. This may be
because purchasing involves greater trans-
action costs than sales in that buyers must
ensure that the quality and the quantity of
the contracted grain will conform to their ex-
pectations and that delivery will occur in the
appropriate time frame. In the net revenue
speciﬁcation (Model 1), the opportunity cost
of labor spent in search has a larger effect
than the opportunity cost of capital or social
capital on the use of brokers. The high like-
lihood of receiving inferior grain or being
quoted an incorrect price leads many traders
to go directly to the central market to conduct
purchases. Traveling to the central market,
located up to 700 kilometers away, requires
leaving a responsible manager at the trader’s
stall. Traders who are unable to do this and
who are active traders have a very high op-
portunity cost of labor and are likely to use
brokers for distant purchases. Transaction
costs seem to matter less in the case of sales,
perhaps because traders are not concerned
with being cheated as to the quality of the
grain. Typically, traders who ship grain to
the central market must wait until sales are
completed and they have received their pay-
ments before purchasing new stocks of grain.
Highly impatient traders who seek to turn
their capital around as quickly as possible are
thus more likely to engage the services of a
broker to minimize the time that their work-
ing capital is tied up in grain stocks. In the
second speciﬁcation (Model 2), the oppor-
tunity cost of capital has a larger effect on
traders’use of brokers, although the magni-
tudes of the effects of both costs and of so-
cial capital are lower than in the ﬁrst model.
Somewhat surprisingly, the predicted
shares of long-distance trade do not appear
to have a signiﬁcant impact on the use of
brokers, and their effects are minor relative
to other explanatory variables even where
these are signiﬁcant, as for purchases in the
second model. Finally, the region in which
traders are located appears to have a very
large and signiﬁcant effect on their use of
brokers, particularly in Wollega, Arsi, and
Gojjam, the three surplus producer regions.
Summary
The transaction costs associated with search-
ing for a trading partner vary signiﬁcantly
across traders, according to where traders
operate, the types of transactions they are
conducting, and their individual characteris-
tics. A unique data set on Ethiopian grain
traders’ individual search efforts, access to
capital, and trading networks, along with a
rich set of instruments, enabled the analysis
of the effects of these costs on trading arrange-
ments made by individual traders.
An empirical model linking individual
traders’transaction costs and their use of bro-
kers was constructed to test whether traders
were individually rational in choosing to use
brokers in order to minimize the transaction
costs of search. In testing this model, sample
selectivity bias was avoided through the in-
clusion of traders who did not use brokerage.
Simultaneity bias that would arise because
the location of trade is linked to the use of
brokerage was avoided by using predicted
shares of distant transactions from a regres-
sion of distant shares against traders’ trans-
action costs and social capital, as well as
market-level effects.
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31 This procedure involves randomly drawing, with replacement, N observations from the data set and estimating the sta-
tistics for each replication. From the data set of estimated statistics one can estimate the standard error of the statistic.
However, the point estimate used is the original observed statistic θobs rather than the average θ ¯* from the replications
(Mooney and Duval 1993).The results reveal that, despite traders’
heterogeneity, their individual behavior
vis-à-vis the use of brokers is economically
efﬁcient. This ﬁnding suggests that traders
operating in newly liberalized markets are
“efﬁcient but poor,” to paraphrase Schultz’s
classic hypothesis, in that they operate within
highly constrained, risky, and costly market-
ing environments. Thus, although traders
exhibit optimizing behavior, they are none-
theless clearly acting in a second-best world.
The results imply that the function of brokers
is critical in reducing transaction costs and
enhancing the performance of the Ethiopian
grain market. In addressing the key question
of how best to strengthen the performance of
the private sector after market reform, this
study supports the view that policymakers
must have a clear understanding of the trans-
action costs faced by traders and their impact
on traders’microeconomic behavior.
This study highlights that efforts to im-
prove the overall efﬁciency of the Ethiopian
grain market must be aimed at increasing the
efﬁciency of the search function provided by
brokers and at formalizing and strengthening
their specialized role in the market, which will
particularly beneﬁt those traders with the
highest transaction costs for search. The fol-
lowing chapter explores the effect of brokers
on economic efﬁciency for the marketing
system as a whole.
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Brokerage and Equilibrium 
Search Behavior
I
n most markets in which buyers and sellers are unknown to each other and search for a
trading partner is time-consuming and costly, intermediaries such as market specialists,
agents, or brokers facilitate the search.32 The presence of intermediaries inﬂuences not
only whether agents search, but also how much they search. In the Ethiopian grain market,
how do brokers inﬂuence the intensity of traders’ search? And what are the welfare effects
of brokerage?
More search effort on the part of each individual trader leads to higher payoffs for all
traders by increasing the probability that traders will meet. However, individual traders do
not factor in the search effort of their partners when they choose the optimal amount of search
effort that will maximize their returns from trade. This leads to a positive spillover, or exter-
nality, of each individual search that is not internalized into private decisionmaking about the
amount of effort to put into search. Individually optimal search strategies diverge from those
that would be chosen by a Benthamite “social planner,” which would factor both partners’
gains into the decisionmaking process. The presence of this externality in the decentralized
economy results in a reduction of total welfare.
Traders differ in terms of how well they are able to search, that is, their search efﬁciency,
and in terms of the opportunity costs of the labor and capital they invest in search. The pres-
ence of a broker in the search economy decreases the optimal intensities of search chosen by
individual traders. The broker’s greater search efﬁciency leads to increased gains from trade
for both buyers and sellers among traders with less search efficiency, while traders with
greater search efﬁciency may continue to search without the broker.
In a market with brokerage, traders who search on their own face a lower probability of
matching with partners, because a subset of potential partners have gone to the broker. The
presence of the broker in the economy implies that each trader’s optimal choice of search in-
tensity must factor in whether other traders have decided to use a broker or to search them-
32 In labor markets, employment referral agencies fulﬁll this role; in housing markets, real estate agents; in ﬁnancial mar-
kets, stockbrokers. I distinguish between two types of middlemen: “market makers” and “matchmakers.” Market makers
step in to buy or sell on their account when no partner can be found. They post a “bid” price and an “ask” price at which
they are willing to sell or buy, at terms slightly more advantageous than the market price. Examples of market makers
can be found on ﬁnancial markets. In contrast, matchmakers only provide search services without entering the market
themselves. Examples are real estate brokers and employment referral agencies.selves, which partly internalizes the exter-
nality of search and leads to greater welfare.
Thus, even when the broker is no more efﬁ-
cient in search than the average trader, the
analysis shows that the presence of the bro-
ker enhances total welfare, because the gains
made by traders with high search costs and
low levels of search efﬁciency exceed the
losses of traders with low search costs and
high levels of search efﬁciency. The positive
impact of brokers on economic welfare is not
a general theoretical result, but is rather an
empirical issue that depends on the distribu-
tion of search costs and search efﬁciency in
the economy.
A Model of Bilateral Search
The conceptual framework used to analyze
the optimal search behavior of traders builds
on the search models of Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1987) and of Yavas (1992, 1994).
Yavas (1994) saw the search intensity of
traders as endogenous and based on differ-
ences in traders’price valuations. An impor-
tant distinction from Yavas’s model that is
made here is that optimal search strategies
are driven by differences in traders’ search
efﬁciency and costs of search rather than by
differences in price valuations, because mar-
ket prices are known with certainty and the
real constraint is ﬁnding a suitable buyer or
seller at the market price. Within a single
period, all traders are assumed to be risk-
neutral pricetakers.33 When sellers and
buyers meet, they trade at the competitive
market price. Thus, differences in net proﬁts
per unit transacted are due to degree of
search efﬁciency and search costs. Traders
(sellers or buyers) face uncertainty regarding
the outcomes of their searches. Thus, each
trader has a probability Θ of meeting a part-
ner, where Θ∈[0,1].
Each trader chooses his or her proﬁt-
maximizing level of search intensity, S for
sellers and B for buyers, where S,B ∈ [0,
1⁄2].
Each trader has an exogenously determined
and unique parameter of search efﬁciency,
γ∈[0,1]. For a given transaction, the prob-
ability of matching faced by each trader is
a linear function of both the buyer’s and the
seller’s search effort (S,B) and search efﬁ-
ciency (γ). A simple linear speciﬁcation of
the probability of matching that accounts for
the differences in search efﬁciency between
two trading partners is given by
Θ(S,B) =γ SS +γ BB. (1)
For a trader with search intensity S or B, the
costs of search labor, CL,and of holding cap-
ital ﬁxed during search, CK,are a function of
search intensity (Sor B), labor (L) and work-
ing capital (K), and the opportunity costs of
search labor (ω), capital (ν), and search time
(t) needed, such that
CL(S) = S2(ωLt), and (2)
CK(S) = S2(νKt). (3)
Search without Brokerage
A representative seller chooses S so as to
maximize VS:
maxSVS(S,γ,ω,ν)
=Θ (S,B)RS − CL(S) − CK(S) (4)
= (γSS +γ BB)RS − S2(ωLt) − S2(νKt),
where RS and RB represent the seller’s and
the buyer’s net revenue from trading, re-
spectively. Analogously, a representative
buyer chooses B to maximize VB: maxBV B
(B,γ,ω,ν).34The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
for the competitive economy is given by
[S*(·),B*(·)], such that
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33 In the Ethiopian market, there exists a competitive market price that is determined exogenously as a function of the
daily supply and demand in the central market. Prices are determined in a quasi-bidding process by brokers before the
market opens. Price discovery by brokers can be viewed as another externality of the presence of brokers that is not ad-
dressed here.
34 From here on, to avoid repetition, mathematical expressions will be presented only for the seller, with the understanding
that the buyer’s functions are exactly analogous.S*(·) ∈ argmax VS[S,γs,ωs,νs, B*(·)]
γs,ωs,νs, and (5a)
B*(·) ∈ argmax VB[B,γb,ωb,νb, S*(·)]
γb,ωb,νb.
(5b)
The optimal search intensity chosen by
each type of trader is the level of search in-
tensity that equates the marginal returns from
search with the marginal costs of search. The
optimal search intensities, S* and B*, are
characterized by the solution to the ﬁrst-
order conditions of the competitive equilib-
rium. For the seller, these are
S*(γ,ω,ν): γSRS = CL′(S) + CK′(S) 
= 2St(ωL +ν K).
(6)
Thus, S* and B* increase in search efﬁciency,
γ, and decrease in the opportunity costs of
search, ωand ν.This reﬂects what one might
intuit, that traders with greater search efﬁ-
ciencies expect greater net proﬁts from search
and thus search more, while traders with
greater opportunity costs of search expect
fewer net gains from search and thus search
less.
Externality Effects of Individual
Search Behavior
Greater search intensity by either the seller or
the buyer leads to a higher probability of ﬁnd-
ing a trading partner and to greater net proﬁts
for both traders. This gives rise to a positive
externality of search behavior that is not cap-
tured because individual traders do not factor
in the effects on their partners when making
search intensity choices. Were there a Ben-
thamite “social planner” who was concerned
with the most efﬁcient allocation of resources
in the economy, the seller’s and the buyer’s
net proﬁts would be maximized jointly and
the socially optimal choice of S** and B**
would be based on the effects of this choice
on both the seller’s and the buyer’s marginal
revenues. In the socially optimal model, the
choice of the seller’s and the buyer’s search
intensities would be characterized as
S**(γ,ω,ν): γS(RS + RB) =
CL′(S) + CK′(S) = 2St(ωL +ν K).
(7)
In a competitive equilibrium, with no
“social planner,” the allocation of search in-
tensities is less than optimal, with S* < S**
and B* < B**.
Search with Brokerage
In the presence of a representative risk-
neutral broker who does not trade on his or
her own account, traders choose whether to
use a broker and, if they opt to search on their
own, the optimal level of search intensity.
Each trader has a unique probability, µ, of
using a broker in a given transaction. Since
other traders in the market do not know this
probability, each trader makes conjectures
about the probability that others will choose
the services of brokers. An important feature
of this economy is that a trader who has
opted to search without a broker can search
for a trading partner among the pool of
traders who are similarly searching on their
own. Conversely, once a trader has chosen to
use a broker, he or she exits from the direct
search market. This phenomenon of dicho-
tomization of the “direct search market” and
the “brokered search market” is observed in
the Ethiopian grain market, where traders
who opt for brokerage physically ship grain
to their brokers and stop searching on their
own, while brokers who have received grain
from clients tend to contact brokers who
represent distant clients. This dichotomiza-
tion can be viewed as the self-selection by
traders into personalized versus anonymous
exchange.
The choice of optimal search intensity
depends on the size of the search market and
on the search intensities of other traders. A
trader i(either seller or buyer) who factors in
the possibility that a possible partner j(either
seller or buyer) will drop out of the search
market and use a broker has the probability
of matching of Θi′(S,B) =(1 −µ j)(γSS+γ BB).
When a trader uses a broker, his or her prob-
ability of matching depends on the broker’s
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M, and is adjusted by the probability that the
corresponding partner is using brokerage or
not. Thus, for a seller,
ΘS
M(M,B) = (1 −µ B)(γMM +γ BB). (8)
The seller or buyer then maximizes W Sor W B,
the expected net proﬁt with brokerage:
maxSW S =µ B(γMM +γ BB)RS(1 − k) 
− CK
M(M) + (1 −µ B)(γSS +γ BB)RS (9)
− CL(S) − CK(S),
where
k is the brokerage fee,35
CM(M) = M2(νKt′) is the trader’s cost of
capital with brokerage, and
t′ is the broker’s search time.
Again, the optimal search intensity chosen
by each type of trader is the level of search
intensity that equates the marginal returns
from search with the marginal costs of search.
In the presence of the possibility of broker-
age, the optimal search intensities, SM* and
BM,* depend on the probability of the broker-
age choices of other traders:
SM*(γ,ω,ν): (1 −µ B)γSRS =
CL′(S) + CK′(S). 
(10)
Thus, brokers’presence introduces a stra-
tegic interaction term between the optimal
search intensities of traders. Although search
intensities still do not depend on the payoff
from trade of a trader’s partner, as is the case
for the socially optimal model, traders’opti-
mal search strategies depend on the propor-
tion of traders who use brokers (µ), which
partly internalizes the externality of individ-
ual search. The externality is only partially
internalized, however, because the trader’s
choice does not depend on the partner’s rev-
enue, R, as in the socially optimal model.
In contrast, a search economy with bro-
kerage and an “efﬁcient” social planner
would maximize the sum of the seller’s and
the buyer’s net proﬁts. The ﬁrst-order con-
dition that would optimize a seller’s or a
buyer’s choice of search intensities can be
expressed as
SM**(γ,ω,ν): (1 −µ B)γSRS
+ (1 − kµS)γSRB = CL′(S) + CK′(S).
(11)
Traders factor in the possibility that the
search market is reduced by the use of bro-
kerage by their potential partners and also
factor in the effects of their own choice of
brokerage on their partners’net returns. It can
be seen from Table 8.1 that, for 0 ≤µ≤1,
S* ≥SM* and S** ≥SM**. Under competitive
equilibrium, the presence of brokers un-
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35 In the Ethiopian context, the brokerage fee is a ﬂat fee per quantity (bag) transacted rather than a percentage of the sale
price. Here the fee is represented as a proportion of transaction revenue, equal to quantity times price.
Table 8.1 Optimal search intensities under four search models
Model Sellers’optimal search intensity Buyers’optimal search intensity
(1) Competitive model 
without broker S* =γ S RS/2(ωL +ν K) B* =γ BRB/2(ωL +ν K)
(2) Socially optimal model 
without broker S** =γ S(RS + RB)/2(ωL +ν K) B** =γ B(RS + RB)/2(ωL +ν K)
(3) Competitive model 
with broker SM* =γ SRS(1 −µ B)/2(ωL +ν K) BM* =γ BRB(1 −µ S)/2(ωL +νK)
(4) Socially optimal model 
with broker SM**=γ SRS(1 −µ B) +γ SRB(1 − kµS)/2(ωL +ν K) BM** =γ BRB(1 −µ S) +γ BRS(1 − kµB)/2(ωL +ν K)
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
Note: γ=Search efﬁciency; R = net revenue from trading; ω=opportunity cost of search labor; L = search labor; ν=opportunity cost of inventory capital;
K = capital; µ=probability of brokerage use; k = brokerage fee.equivocally decreases the optimal search
intensity. Likewise, socially optimal search
intensities are greater than under competi-
tive equilibrium both with and without bro-
kerage, conﬁrming that a positive externality
still remains under brokerage. Finally, the
relationship between search intensity in the
socially optimal model with brokerage and
in the socially optimal model without broker-
age depends on the level of k, µB, and µS.
Application to the Ethiopian
Grain Economy
The Data
Although every trader, by deﬁnition, buys
and sells grain, the analysis distinguishes
traders in surplus regions as “sellers” and
traders in deﬁcit regions as “buyers.” For the
purposes of this analysis, traders located in
the central market are omitted, resulting in
a sample of 47 sellers and 33 buyers. Data
were obtained on each trader’s search time,
search labor, working capital, average net
returns per transaction, trading contacts, and
use of brokerage over six months. In order to
calculate net proﬁts (VSand V B) per trader in
comparable units, traders’net returns (R) are
expressed as returns per transaction, and
costs per transaction of search labor and cap-
ital (CL and C K) are expressed as the product
of the shadow costs per unit of labor and
capital per day, the number of days of search,
and the number of units of labor and capital.
Since the actual levels of search labor and
working capital chosen by traders are not in-
dependent of their choice of brokerage, the
opportunity costs of the traders’search labor
and working capital are derived as shadow
costs from each trader’s proﬁt function. The
parameter of search efﬁciency, γ, is an index
ranging from 0 to 1 that is constructed by di-
viding each trader’s social capital, that is, the
number of his or her trading contacts, by the
maximum number of trading contacts avail-
able to an individual trader in the economy.
The Importance of
Traders’ Heterogeneity
In order to determine whether traders’hetero-
geneity is a factor in his or her search behav-
ior, the analysis initially compares the search
intensities and surpluses when traders are ho-
mogeneous with search intensities when they
are heterogeneous with respect to search ef-
ﬁciency and search costs.
A baseline scenario of the competitive
model without brokerage assumes that all
traders are perfectly homogeneous, with iden-
tical cost proﬁles, revenues, and search efﬁ-
ciency. The optimal search intensity chosen
by individual traders takes a parameter value
bounded between 0 and 0.5. In the case of
full homogeneity, all traders have a low op-
timal search intensity of 0.08. The sum of all
traders’net proﬁts per transaction (after sub-
tracting the opportunity costs of search labor
and working capital per transaction) is Eth.
Birr 597, which represents 3 percent of the
sum of traders’gross revenues per transaction.
Asecond scenario of competitive equilib-
rium without brokerage relaxes the assump-
tion of perfect homogeneity by allowing
trader-speciﬁc search costs and revenues,
although traders remain homogeneous with
respect to search efﬁciency. As in the base-
line scenario, all traders have the same pa-
rameter of search efﬁciency, γ=.24.36 The
results of this scenario are that the optimal
search intensities of traders increase from
the baseline scenario, from .08 to .15 in the
case of sellers while remaining .08 in the case
of buyers, because traders with lower search
costs signiﬁcantly increase their search ef-
fort. Traders who increase their search effort
obtain higher payoffs from search, raising
the sum of net proﬁts in the market by 40 per-
cent, to Eth. Birr 834, or 4 percent of gross
revenues.
In the third scenario, still in a competi-
tive economy without brokerage, traders are
completely heterogeneous with respect to
all variables: search costs, search efﬁciency,
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constructed by setting the γ of the trader with the highest number of contacts equal to 1.and revenues. In this case relatively search-
efﬁcient traders invest more effort in search,
while less efﬁcient traders allocate fewer
resources to search. The more efficient
allocation of search effort results in a signif-
icant increase in economic surplus, with the
sum of net proﬁts increasing by 181 percent,
to Eth. Birr 1,677 per transaction, or 8 per-
cent of gross revenues. These results indicate
that the assumption that traders are homoge-
neous in search efﬁciency and transaction
costs leads to highly biased estimations of
the optimal level of search intensity in the
market. That is, traders with a lower level of
search efﬁciency than the sample average
(in this case, .24) will demonstrate a higher
than optimal search intensity under the homo-
geneity assumption, and traders with higher
efﬁciency than the sample average will search
less. This misallocation of search effort is
demonstrated in Figures 8.1 and 8.2, where
it can be seen that many sellers (who are rel-
atively more search efﬁcient) search less with
the assumption of homogeneity and many
buyers search more with the assumption of
homogeneity.
In contrast, a comparison of sellers’and
buyers’ net proﬁts under competitive equi-
librium with heterogeneity reveals that a
lower level of search on the part of buyers
results in a lower level of average returns to
buyers (see Figure 8.3). 
Individual versus Socially Optimal
Search without Brokerage
Sharp differences in search intensities are
apparent between the competitive equilib-
rium and the joint welfare model. As shown
in Figures 8.4 and 8.5, the results conﬁrm
that in the presence of a positive externality,
as noted earlier, individual search intensities
are lower than the social optimum. In com-
parison with the competitive model with
heterogeneous traders, the level of search in-
tensity rises from .15 to .28 for sellers and
from .08 to .28 for buyers.
Sellers’ search behavior under competi-
tive equilibrium appears to be closer to the
socially desirable search intensity level than
is that of buyers. Under competitive condi-
tions, buyers demonstrate very low search
intensities, with an average search intensity
parameter of .08, compared to the average
search intensity of .15 for sellers. This result
could be rooted in either differences in search
costs between sellers and buyers or differ-
ences in search efﬁciency. In the sample data
there are greater differences in search costs
between sellers and buyers than there are in
search efﬁciency. Buyers had an average
labor cost of Eth. Birr 231 per transaction
and an average capital cost of Eth. Birr 172
per transaction, compared to sellers’average
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Figure 8.1 Comparison of sellers’ search intensities, homogeneous
versus heterogeneous sellers, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
Figure 8.2 Comparison of buyers’ search intensities, homogeneous
versus heterogeneous buyers, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.search labor costs of Eth. Birr 207 and capi-
tal costs of Eth. Birr 154. These cost differ-
ences are explained in turn by the longer
time needed to purchase grain rather than to
sell grain, with an average of 3.6 days for
buyers relative to 1.9 days for sellers.
Finally, in comparison with the compet-
itive equilibrium model without brokerage,
the sum of net proﬁts in the joint welfare
model without brokerage rises by 126 per-
cent, to Eth. Birr 3,798 or 18 percent of gross
revenues per transaction, due to the greater
allocation of resources to search activities
by all traders. This result demonstrates that
socially efﬁcient search behavior leads to pos-
itive welfare gains as the positive externality
of search is fully internalized in the search
allocation decisions of individual traders.
Does Brokerage 
Internalize the Externality 
of Individual Search?
The proﬁt maximization conditions of the
competitive model with brokerage imply that
the broker’s presence enables traders to par-
tially internalize the positive externality of
searching for trading partners by factoring in
other traders’ decisions to use a broker. In
other words, the positive spillover of better
allocation of search effort from using a
broker is captured in the market-determined
brokerage fee. This premise is tested by sep-
arating the gains in welfare that are due solely
to the broker’s presence in the economy
from those due to the broker’s greater search
efﬁciency. For this purpose, the case with
homogeneous traders is extended to include
a single broker with the same average search
efﬁciency (γ=.24) as traders. In an economy
with a broker who has the same search efﬁ-
ciency as the set of homogeneous traders,
the sum of net proﬁts across traders in-
creases to Eth. Birr 959 per transaction. This
is in comparison to Eth. Birr 834 in the ear-
lier scenario of homogeneous traders with-
out brokerage. This result demonstrates that
even when the broker is not more efﬁcient in
search than the traders, there are allocative
efﬁciency gains from having a broker in the
economy.
The Effect of Brokerage 
on Heterogeneous Traders’
Search Behavior
In the competitive model, the introduction of
a broker into the search economy has the ex-
pected effect of signiﬁcantly reducing traders’
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Figure 8.3 Sellers’ and buyers’ surplus under competitive equilibrium,
without brokerage, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
Figure 8.4 Sellers’ search behavior, without brokerage, in competitive
and joint welfare models, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.optimal search intensities. On average, sell-
ers’search intensities decrease by one-third,
from .15 to .10, and buyers’ search intensi-
ties decrease by more than half, from .08 to
.03. Figures 8.6 and 8.7 show that optimal
search intensity declines considerably in
every individual case.
Welfare Effects of a Broker’s
Presence in the Market
Although traders with a low level of search
efﬁciency and high costs will always choose
to use brokers if they are marginally better
off doing so, their welfare increases in ordi-
nal terms. However, traders who continue
searching on their own lose welfare due to the
arbitrary shrinking of the search market, and
hence their expected payoffs from trade, over
which they have no choice. As noted earlier,
the positive or negative effect of brokerage
on total welfare is not a general theoretical re-
sult, but rather an empirical outcome that is
directly related to the distribution of search
costs and of search efﬁciency in the market.
The results of the welfare analysis in the
Ethiopian grain market using the actual dis-
tribution of search efﬁciency and search
costs reveal that the presence of a broker in-
creased the sum of net proﬁts by 64 percent,
from Eth. Birr 1,677 per transaction without
brokerage to Eth. Birr 2,748 per transaction,
or 13 percent of gross revenues. Figures 8.8
and 8.9 demonstrate the mixed welfare ef-
fects on individual sellers and buyers, re-
spectively. Asigniﬁcant proportion of sellers,
47 percent, experienced welfare losses of 41
percent of net proﬁts without brokerage, on
average, while 61 percent of buyers experi-
enced losses of 62 percent of net proﬁts with-
out brokerage, on average. However, these
losses were compensated by the large gains
experienced by the remaining 53 percent of
sellers and 39 percent of buyers, who gained
an average of 206 percent and 232 percent of
their proﬁts, respectively without brokerage.
The relationship between the welfare
effects of brokerage, search efﬁciency, and
search costs is demonstrated in Table 8.2.
The average search efﬁciency of sellers and
buyers who experienced welfare losses is .33
and .19, respectively, compared to the sub-
stantially lower average search efﬁciency of
those who gained of .19 for sellers and .14
for buyers.
Similarly, the average search labor and
search capital costs of traders who experi-
enced welfare losses were Eth. Birr 156 and
Eth. Birr 116 for sellers and Eth. Birr 204 and
Eth. Birr 152 for buyers, in contrast to the
considerably higher costs of Eth. Birr 301
and Eth. Birr 225 for the labor and capital
cost of sellers who gained welfare and of Eth.
Birr 272 and Eth. Birr 203 for the labor and
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Figure 8.5 Buyers’ search behavior, without brokerage, in competitive
and joint welfare models, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
Figure 8.6 Brokers’ effect on sellers’ search intensity under competitive
equilibrium, 1996 
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.capital costs of buyers who gained welfare
from brokerage. Thus, the welfare effects of
brokerage are conditioned upon each agent’s
speciﬁc search efﬁciency and search costs.
Socially Optimal Search 
with Brokerage
Although brokerage reduces the externality
effect of individual search behavior, there
continues to be a wide divergence between
optimal search intensities with joint welfare
under the competitive equilibrium model.
The key difference between the two models
is the addition of a second term in the ﬁrst-
order conditions for maximizing the joint
welfare problem. This term adjusts the search
intensity upward to take into account the
effect of each agent’s own probability of
choosing a broker on the reduced payoff to
the searching partner.
Figures 8.10 and 8.11 reveal that the di-
vergence between the two models is more
pronounced for buyers than for sellers, as
noted in previous sections. It is interesting to
note that the socially optimal solution results
in an equilibrium level of 10 sellers and 10
buyers to the search market, where they op-
timally search at the maximum level of search
intensity. In all cases, the socially efﬁcient
search intensity is higher than that in the
competitive model. The ﬁrst-order conditions
for the joint welfare’s problem imply that as
the probability of the agent’s own use of bro-
kerage increases and the brokerage fee jointly
increase, the socially optimal search inten-
sities fall to the same level as the competitive
economy.
The total economic surplus with broker-
age is 60 percent higher in the joint welfare
model than in the competitive model, in-
creasing from Eth. Birr 2,747 to Eth. Birr
4,399. The joint welfare model with broker-
age increases welfare 16 percent over the joint
welfare model without brokerage. Table 8.3
provides a summary view of the welfare ef-
fects and the average optimal search inten-
sities for each of the four alternative models
discussed above.
Summary
This chapter has investigated the impact of
the institution of brokerage on the optimal
search behavior and welfare gains and losses
of traders in the Ethiopian grain market. The
theoretical expectations are broadly con-
ﬁrmed by the numerical data analysis.
The results suggest that without brokers,
private search behavior in equilibrium widely
diverges from the socially optimal strategies
that would capture the positive spillovers of
individual searches for trading partners. The
presence of brokers appears to partially in-
ternalize this externality by forcing traders to
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Figure 8.7 Brokers’ effect on buyers’ search intensity under competitive
equilibrium, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
Figure 8.8 Effect of brokers on sellers’ surplus, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.make conjectures about the probability that
potential trading partners may have switched
to using brokers. The results show that with
brokers there is less overall search intensity
on the part of most individuals and that bro-
kers in the economy have a positive effect on
total surplus by enabling a more efﬁcient al-
location of search effort.
An important result from a policy per-
spective is that traders who were doing well
without brokers stand to lose from the pres-
ence of brokers because of the shrinking of
the search market that ensues. Thus, higher
overall welfare is obtained at the expense of
substantial losses by the relatively “search-
efﬁcient” members of the trader population.
In the socially optimal model with brokerage,
this welfare loss is avoided by maximizing
the search intensity of those who search well
while less efﬁcient traders switch to using
brokers. As a result, all traders are better off
with brokers, and total surplus is 60 percent
greater than in the competitive equilibrium
with brokerage. The policy challenge fac-
ing Ethiopian policymakers then, and, more
broadly, those concerned with strengthening
market institutions in recently liberalized de-
veloping countries, is how to devise market
policies that best achieve the socially optimal
solution. In this context, policies must be de-
vised that encourage the specialized function
and search efﬁciency of brokers without ad-
versely affecting the outcomes of relatively
efﬁcient traders. This could potentially be
achieved by increasing the search efﬁciency
of brokers relative to all traders so that all
traders would gain from switching to broker-
age and would not feel the adverse effects
of the shrinking of the direct search market.
Some policies that could enhance the spe-
cialized role of brokers would be the formal-
ization of their role in the market (at present,
brokers are not distinguished from traders in
the eyes of the state), setting up rules of con-
duct and standards of entry for brokers (rules
similar to those governing brokers on organ-
ized commodity exchanges), and strength-
ening their search capacity through training
and improved access to market information
and telecommunications.
Finally, although this study has revealed
important insights regarding the implications
of optimal search behavior and the hetero-
geneity of traders with respect to search costs
and search efﬁciency, further research could
be envisaged that extends the welfare im-
plications to include the effects of market
search behavior and the presence of brokers
on producer and consumer welfare, in addi-
tion to that of traders.
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Table 8.2 Welfare from brokerage, search efﬁciency, and search costs,
1996
Welfare loss Welfare gain
Sellers
Percentage of traders 47 percent 53 percent
Average Birr amount (percentage of π) 41 percent 206 percent
Average search efﬁciency (γ ) .33 .21
Average labor costs of search (C L) 155.89 300.84
Average capital costs of search (CK) 116.40 224.63
Buyers
Percentage of traders 61 percent 39 percent
Average Birr amount (percentage of π) 62 percent 232 percent
Average search efﬁciency (γ ) .19 .14
Average labor costs of search (CL) 203.52 272.35
Average capital costs of search (CK) 151.96 203.35
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
Table 8.3 Summary of optimal search intensities and welfare effects of four search models
Competitive equilibrium Joint welfare
Without broker ΣiΠi +Σ jΠj = Eth. Birr ΠSP=Σ π i+Σ π j = Eth. Birr
1,677 3,798
S* = .15 S ¯* SP = .28
B* = .08 B ¯* SP = .28
With broker ΣiΠ,M +Σ jΠj,M = Eth. Birr ΠM
SP=Σ iπiM +Σ jπjM = Eth. Birr
2,748 4,399
S ¯M* = .10 S ¯M*SP = .24
B ¯M* = .03 B ¯M*SP = .26
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.Figure 8.9 Effect of brokers on buyers’ surplus, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
Figure 8.10 Sellers’ search behavior in competitive and joint welfare
models, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.
Figure 8.11 Buyers’ search behavior in competitive and joint welfare
models, 1996
Source: Author’s calculations, 2001.CHAPTER 9
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
for Improving Market Performance
Economic growth is dependent on stable political and economic institutions that provide
low costs of transacting in impersonal political and economic markets.
—Douglass North, 1989
W
ith nearly half of the Ethiopian population dependent on the foodgrain market, the
performance of the domestic market is vital for food security and economic
growth. The liberalization of the Ethiopian grain market in 1990 has effectively
reduced marketing margins and enhanced long-term market integration. Yet market per-
formance remains “efﬁcient but poor,” to paraphrase Schultz’s hypothesis, in that reform has
not led to market development in areas such as contractual arrangements to transfer risk, in-
creased impersonal exchange, the provision of value added beyond transport, and increased
trader investments. Arelatively low share of domestic production is marketed, 28 percent in
a good harvest year such as 1995/96, and an even lower share goes through private market-
ing channels, only 18 percent of total production. Thus, the scope for increasing the scope of
market participation both in volume and in value added remains high.
An important step in the design of appropriate market development policy is to better
understand the links between market institutions, transaction costs, and the microeconomic
behavior of traders. This study addresses a largely neglected area: how do buyers and sellers
ﬁnd each other in the market and at what cost? Using the New Institutional Economics frame-
work, this study focuses on the institution of brokers, acting as intermediaries on behalf of
traders, in the Ethiopian grain market. In addition to presenting new evidence on the arbitrage
behavior of traders, this research report analyzes the nature and extent of transaction costs
related to market search, the role of social capital, and the impact of the brokerage institution
on minimizing search costs. The following ﬁndings are based on a national survey of whole-
sale traders and brokers conducted in Ethiopia in 1996.
Summary of Findings
Trader Arbitrage
Analysis of traders’ operations and their arbitrage behavior reveals that Ethiopian grain
wholesale operations are generally small-scale, personalized, enterprises in which the owner individually owns and manages the business.
Social capital plays an important part in trade
in that at least half of the traders interviewed
are children of current or past traders, gener-
ally their fathers. Traders’ arbitrage activity
is mainly limited to transport, with an aver-
age distance of 200 kilometers for whole-
sale transactions. Overall, physical marketing
costs related to transport, handling, and other
costs represent 83 percent of gross margins.
Traders’net margins are less than 5 percent
of sale price, indicating that traders are quite
competitive, particularly in the surplus re-
gion markets.
The Role of Brokers
Weak public market information, a lack of
grain standardization, the oral nature of con-
tracts, and limited legal enforcement of
contracts are all factors that contribute to the
difﬁculty that traders encounter in attempt-
ing to trade directly with unknown partners.
In response to the risk of commitment fail-
ure, traders either choose to trade with part-
ners with whom they have prior personalized
relationships or they engage the services 
of a broker whose role is to conduct market
searches on their behalf, inspect the grain
delivered, handle the delivery and payment
logistics, and guarantee the transactions.
Brokers retain a repository of information on
traders’ market behavior and are thus able
to deliver a very important good, trust, or
imnet. The presence of brokers facilitates
impersonal or anonymous market exchange
between traders despite the constraints im-
posed by the market environment. Although
85 percent of the sample of traders indicated
that they use brokers, the use of brokers re-
mains somewhat limited. Overall, traders
use brokers for roughly one-fourth of their
transactions. For long-distance trade, traders
use brokers for one-third to one-half of their
transactions, suggesting that personalized ex-
change continues to be important.
A closer investigation of the norms and
rules underlying agency relations between
brokers and traders reveal that client rela-
tionships are generally long term in nature,
with repeated interaction over an average of
six years. Asomewhat surprising result is that
these relations are unrelated to ethnic ties;
only 26 percent of traders have the same eth-
nicity as their brokers. Although traders have
difﬁculty monitoring the actions of their bro-
kers, they avoid conﬂict through established
norms that provide incentive-compatible con-
straints on cheating by brokers. These norms
include the specialization of brokers by re-
gion and the fact that a large number of
traders in a given market all use the services
of the same broker. These practices ensure
that traders can inform each other of their
broker’s actions and collectively punish the
broker in the event of cheating. Second, bro-
kers are compensated with a ﬂat fee rather
than a percentage fee, which limits their in-
centive to incorrectly report the prices at
which grain is transacted.
Transaction Costs of Search and
Social Capital
Traders are constrained in terms of both the
opportunity cost of market search labor and
the opportunity cost of holding capital ﬁxed
during search. Traders spend between one
and three days searching for potential buyers
or sellers with whom to complete transac-
tions.Many traders do not have other staff to
conduct searches on their behalf, suggesting
that the opportunity cost of their labor time is
very high. Further indication of this is that
traders estimate that, at the margin, an addi-
tional staff member would increase their op-
erations by 47 percent.
Trader-speciﬁc transaction costs of
search labor time and of holding working
capital during search are estimated as
shadow costs from the traders’ proﬁt func-
tions, using instrumental variable estimation
to avoid simultaneity bias. The results reveal
considerable heterogeneity in transaction
costs among traders and suggest that traders
may be more capital constrained than time
constrained.
Transaction costs are a signiﬁcant share
of the total set of costs, including physical
marketing costs, representing 19 percent of
total costs. However, traders in surplus and
deﬁcit markets diverge considerably, with
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the deﬁcit markets, possibly because of the
greater risk of commitment failure in pur-
chasing grain of unknown quality. Thus,
transaction costs might be more signiﬁcant
in trader’s choice to use brokers in the case
of distant purchases.
In addition, social capital, deﬁned as the
network of trading contacts available to each
trader, is important in enabling traders to
more readily ﬁnd trading partners. Although
traders invest in contacts in distant markets
as well as in regular trading partners, ethnic-
ity and kinship are not obvious factors in
social capital. Thus, fewer than one-third of
trading networks are based on common eth-
nic identity.
Brokers and Transaction Costs
An empirical model tests whether traders are
individually rational in choosing to use bro-
kers in order to minimize their transaction
costs of search. Each trader’s decision to use
a broker is based on a two-tiered choice.
First, traders decide where to trade, either
locally or in distant markets. Second, they
decide whether to use brokers for those trans-
actions, based on their opportunity costs of
labor and capital, their social capital, and
their choices of location. The estimation
results reveal that traders are individually ra-
tional in their choice of brokerage; the op-
portunity costs of labor and of capital had
large and signiﬁcant effects on the use of
brokerage by the traders surveyed. Of the
two costs, the opportunity cost of search labor
had a larger effect in sales.
Brokers and Market Welfare
An optimal search intensity model is con-
structed in order to address whether the in-
stitution of brokers increases the global
efﬁciency of the marketing system rather
than just that of individual traders. The model
supposes that individual search behavior
has positive spillovers to other traders. The
presence of brokers in the economy allows
strategic interaction between the search de-
cisions of market participants, because traders
base their search decisions on conjectures
about other traders’decisions to use brokers.
With brokerage, traders with relatively higher
levels of search efﬁciency and lower search
costs choose to search on their own, while
traders with low levels of search efﬁciency
and high search costs choose to use brokers.
Numerical estimation of this model
demonstrates that the presence of brokers
increases total welfare by 60 percent.
Traders with relatively high levels of search
efﬁciency have small welfare losses because
of the shrinking of the search market that
results, while relatively inefﬁcient traders
have large welfare gains from using brokers.
Policy Implications
This study presents a comprehensive analy-
sis of a key market institution, brokerage,
and its links with transaction costs and social
capital. The ﬁndings highlight how, in the
context of the weak marketing environment
of Ethiopia, the brokerage institution spon-
taneously minimizes transaction costs and
facilitates exchange. However, the study also
reveals that at present this institution plays a
limited role in that traders continue to rely on
personalized trade for a signiﬁcant share of
their transactions, even in distant markets.
In light of what has already been said,
three areas of policy intervention emerge
from the study ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is address-
ing the constraints in the marketing environ-
ment that lead to high search costs. The
second is reducing the dominance of per-
sonalized exchange, because it can limit the
scope of the market and contribute to a re-
duced capacity to effectively respond to mar-
ket signals. Related to this, is capitalizing on
the welfare gains of brokerage through in-
creasing the share of marketed grain handled
by brokers.
Reducing the Transaction Costs of
Search through a Grain Exchange
The key to reducing search costs is to reduce
the average time required to ﬁnd a trading
partner for a wholesale transaction. At pres-
ent, with or without a broker, it takes one to
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ner, though it is important to bear in mind
that the real issue is ﬁnding a partner that one
can trust. The implications of this length of
time are that traders incur the opportunity
costs of both labor and capital in the form of
grain inventory and working capital does not
rotate as frequently as it could. Reducing
search time would require the development
of a means of readily informing traders and
brokers of corresponding supply and demand
while at the same time screening potential
partners and maintaining records of traders’
past behavior in the market. An organized
grain exchange is a well-known mechanism
that reduces search time, coordinates market
offers, and effectively screens market actors.
In a sense, the operations of the central mar-
ket brokers described in this study resemble
those of an informal grain exchange. Thus,
a formalized institution such as a grain
exchange, located in the central market of
Addis Ababa, would leverage the role cur-
rently played by brokers, who would con-
tinue to carry out the matching function. If
brokers were to operate in a formal exchange,
their search efﬁciency would be enhanced
through the use of information technology
and improved logistical coordination of
supply and demand offers.
At present, the central market of Addis
Ababa plays a key role as a clearinghouse for
grain supply and demand, serving all regions
of the country. In addition to enjoying the
presence of brokers who are specialized in
market search and price discovery, Addis
Ababa has a natural advantage in that it is
located at the hub of the surplus zones (in
the western, southern, and northwestern re-
gions) and the deﬁcit zones (in the eastern,
northeastern, and northern regions). The
radial structure of major road links and of
telecommunications gives the Addis Ababa
market an infrastructural advantage.
Aviable exchange depends on a number
of supporting institutions. Among these are
a regulatory apparatus to establish rules and
guidelines governing the behavior of buyers,
sellers, and intermediaries on the exchange.
Complementary are the legal underpinnings
of an exchange, that is, commercial laws that
address the conduct of the market. At pres-
ent, the commercial code in Ethiopia is an
antiquated French code dating to the 1930s,
which has little relevance to the present ac-
tual trade practices. Third, a transparent sys-
tem of grades and standards for different
qualities of grains is required to ensure that
transactions relate to clearly established
norms. A corollary is the need for a neutral
inspection service to ensure that traded grains
fall within the established norms. Finally, a
liquid grain exchange critically depends on a
functioning system of trade ﬁnance. That is,
an underlying warehouse receipt system that
is closely supported by the banking institu-
tions is needed to ensure the smooth transfer
of payments across market actors. Other
important elements for the functioning of an
exchange include standardized contracts that
incorporate standard contractual parameters
such as dispute settlement, weight and qual-
ity tolerance, and force majeure provisions
as well as a market information system.
Depersonalizing 
Personalized Exchange
This study indicates that traders avoid trans-
action risk in long-distance trade by trading
with partners they know. Social capital, de-
fined in both quantitative and qualitative
terms as the number of trustworthy trading
contacts, enables traders to carry out long-
distance transactions given existing transac-
tion costs. Thus, in addition to reducing
search costs, a complementary policy is to
target ways to increase traders’ social capi-
tal. That is, if social capital relies on whom
traders know, how do they get to know more?
One means of expanding social capital is to
change the way in which it is acquired. So-
cial scientists distinguish “in-born” social
capital from acquired social capital. In-born
social capital is obtained as a right of birth
into a particular ethnicity, religion, or family.
Although this kind of social capital can be
lost, it is difﬁcult to acquire, since the acqui-
sition does not depend on one’s own actions.
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one’s own merit, over time, through repeated
interaction, common interests, location, or
various types of behavior. The policy chal-
lenge is to increase the relative importance
or worth of the latter type of social capital
versus in-born social capital. This can be
done through the promotion of institutions
such as trader associations whose member-
ship is merit based and can be revoked de-
pending on behavior. Similarly, existing
licensing bureaus could be given the role of
maintaining historical records of previous
trade disputes and providing this informa-
tion on request, offering services much like
those of a credit reporting agency.
Increasing the Use of Brokers
This study shows that, despite the specialized
functions of brokers in the market and the
clear efﬁciency gains of using them, traders
use brokers for only 25 percent of their total
transactions. Even for long-distance trans-
actions, where search costs are higher, traders
use brokers for only roughly 33 percent to 55
percent of transactions and brokers handle
only 16 percent of the total marketed surplus
of grain. Although this may justify promot-
ing direct exchange through expanding social
capital, ultimately this strategy alone is not
likely to expand the reach of markets sufﬁ-
ciently. Moreover, the specialized function
of brokers in both matchmaking and price
discovery is an important source of efﬁciency
gains that would not be captured by expand-
ing social capital. Thus, an important policy
question is this: What constraints are there
on traders’use of brokers?
A close examination of the relationship
between traders and brokers reveals that
traders have difﬁculty monitoring their bro-
kers’ actions and that mistrust and ensuing
conﬂict are issues. Information asymmetry
gives brokers more market power than indi-
vidual traders. To get around this, traders
work exclusively with the same broker for
long periods, relying on trust-based relations,
and work jointly with the same broker, using
reputation as a disincentive to cheating by
the broker. Thus, policy aimed at capturing
greater market efﬁciency from increasing
the use of brokerage services should address
means of making the brokers’ role more
transparent and regulating their function in
the market. To begin with, existing trade reg-
ulations do not distinguish brokers from
other traders in the market by issuing bro-
kers’licenses versus trading licenses. Policy
to enhance the use of brokers could also
address enforcement of the norms already
established for this institution, such as the
prohibition of brokers’buying and selling on
their own account.37 Policies to regulate
brokers’market behavior could include poli-
cies regarding maintaining a record of past
violations as well as a certiﬁcation process
for brokers.
In sum, the policy implications of this
study are threefold. Within the existing mar-
ket environment, policy can expand access
to social capital and promote the use of bro-
kers. At a more fundamental level, policy
needs to address how to transform the mar-
keting environment and effectively reduce
search costs through a viable grain exchange.
Establishment of such an exchange will in-
volve a broad effort to ﬁrst establish the var-
ious supporting institutions that are needed
to truly change the context of markets in
Ethiopia. These three policy recommenda-
tions should be viewed as complementary
and mutually reinforcing, with the broad ob-
jective of expanding marketed surplus and
making markets more functional relative to
the needs of the population.
Lessons for Other Countries
This study contributes to the policy dialogue
on the appropriate role of policy in liberal-
ized markets in supporting market devel-
opment. The study develops an innovative
approach to measuring the transaction costs
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37 In many organized exchanges, brokerage houses are prohibited from taking advantage of their knowledge of their
clients’orders to take a market position, a practice which is called “frontrunning.”of search and rigorously analyzing the effect
of the institution of brokerage on minimiz-
ing search costs and on global economic ef-
ﬁciency. It also develops conceptual links
between social capital and search behavior.
The methodology used here can be viewed
as an international public good that is
broadly applicable to other market contexts
where search is important and in which in-
termediaries play a particular market role.
More generally, one of the insights that
comes from this research is that policy-
makers need to directly address search as a
key market issue that fundamentally inﬂu-
ences market dynamics and the structure of
the market. Second, transaction costs cannot
be assumed to be uniform across market par-
ticipants. Heterogeneity in individual trans-
action costs leads to different behaviors and
different sets of institutions in the market.
More important, heterogeneity implies that
market-enhancing policies will have differ-
ent effects on speciﬁc actors. Thus, in Ethi-
opia the proposed policies to reduce costs, to
expand social capital, and to promote bro-
kers will have some positive and some neg-
ative effects, which will need to be factored
in during policy design.
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